The above-entitled SAFE Commission meeting was held before Patrick Stephens, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Georgia, commencing at 9:02 a.m. on this, the 13th day of June, 2018, in the Sewell Mill Library & Cultural Center, Marietta, Georgia 30068.

TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

- (Interjection of thought for clarification)
-- ( Interruption of thought)
... (Trailing off or did not complete thought)
(ph) (Phonetically)
[sic] (In its original form)
SECRETARY KEMP: All right. Well, good morning, everyone. Before we get going with the initial start of the meeting, I do want to call on Commission Bob Ott from Cobb County to welcome everyone this morning.

Commissioner, good to have you with us and we’re glad to be here.

COMMISSIONER OTT: Thank you. Do you have this one on? Okay. I’m going to try to do this so I can -- I’m talking to everybody. So my name is Bob Ott. I’m a District 2 county commissioner and I represent this area. I want to welcome all of the citizens and commission members to Cobb County and District 2.

For those that have never been to this library, if you haven’t toured, when they all take a break or you take a break, you can get a tour of the library. It’s the most technological-advanced library in the state and it’s one of our pride and joys.

I wanted to welcome everyone to the first meeting of the SAFE Commission, which will examine the future voting in -- in the State of Georgia. Voting is a fundamental right that we are all given under the Constitution and I look forward to hearing what recommendations come out of the commission and what will be presented before the
General Assembly next session.

And it’s critically important that we move forward.

Everyone knows the voting system that we have does need to be replaced. And so, I -- I commend all of you for agreeing to participate. And, with that, I wanted to introduced the co-chairs of the commission: Secretary of State, Brian Kemp -- welcome -- and State Representative, Barry Fleming. Welcome to Cobb.

SECRETARY KEMP: Thank you so much, Bob, for being here today, and I also want to just thank everyone else that’s here and certainly welcome you-all to the first meeting of the Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission here in the Sewell Mill Library and Cultural Center here in Marietta.

Let me also -- first, by thanking the staff that has worked so hard to put this meeting together for us, and Mr. James Mitchell who’s done a fabulous job for accommodating us for the meeting. I also want to thank all of the fine law-enforcement personnel that has helped us today as well so we can have a good, orderly, organized meeting.

So we appreciate what all of you do every day to keep our families safe and I'm just honored to be in such a great facility to kick off our commission meeting that we’re starting today and we certainly look forward to a
very open and transparent process.

And, with that, I’m going to start the meeting and ask if you’ll -- we’ll have a moment -- we’ll have an invocation, and then we’ll stand for the pledge, and then I’ll have some opening remarks and we’ll turn it over to my co-chair, Representative Fleming.

So, if you would, just pray with me. Lord, thank you for this day; thank you for the many blessings that we have in this life, in this beautiful state and country that we live in. Just bless our work, give us wisdom and transparency as we move through this process. Be with us in our travels to and from our meeting today, and in future meetings and let us just have good work for the good people of this state, to protect and make sure we have secure, accessible, fair elections in Georgia. I ask this in your holy, precious name. Amen.

(Collective Amen.)

SECRETARY KEMP: And, if you’ll stand with me, we’ll say the pledge.

(Collective Pledge.)

SECRETARY KEMP: I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Okay. For our first order of business, I wanted to
just go ahead and introduce the members of the SAFE Commission that are here with us today. Certainly, to my right, my -- my good friend and co-chair, State Representative, Barry Fleming, from Harlem, Georgia, down in Augusta, Columbia County, part of the state.

Barry and I have worked together a lot over the years. He has done a lot of election law as well and worked on a lot of legislative issues dealing with elections, so we appreciate Representative Fleming’s willingness to co-chair.

Representative Beverly -- Representative, good to see you. I’m sorry I hadn’t gotten to see you. Dr. James Beverly, who’s a state representative from Macon; Dr. Lester Jackson, state senator from Savannah, Georgia; we also have Senator Brian Strickland from McDonough that’s on the commission. I don’t believe Senator Strickland could be with us today.

Lynn Bailey, who’s the executive director of the Richmond County Board of Elections; Nancy Boren, who’s the director of elections and voter registration in Muscogee County in Columbus; Maxine Daniels -- I don’t know how we talked Maxine into doing this because she is a retired registration election’s director in DeKalb County.

Deidre Holgrem (ph) -- Holden, who’s the supervisor of elections and registrations in Pauling County; Judge
Darin McCoy -- Darin is the probate judge and elections superintendent in Evans County; Cynthia Welch is the supervisor on the board of elections and voter registration in Rockdale County. As many of you know, we did a pilot project with Ms. Welch and her -- and her team in the November election -- municipal elections using a new ballot-marking technology with a voter-verifiable paper trail. Her team did a great job as we did that pilot and I know we’re going to hear more about that in future meetings.

Our cyber-security expert on the panel, which I think is very important to all of us in the -- in this room, is Dr. Wenke Lee. He is the executive director of Georgia Tech’s Institute for information of security and privacy; Michael, Mike Jablonski, who’s the General Counsel of the Democratic Party of Georgia; John Monds, who’s with the Libertarian Party of Georgia -- he’s on their executive committee; Vincent Russo, who’s the deputy counsel for the Georgia Republican Party and then our voter-accessibility expert, Amy Howell, who is the commissioner and general counsel for the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities.

Representing Georgia's voters at large is Mr. Jimmy McDonald. Jimmy is a former legislative counsel, so he has a lot of experience in writing the code here in Georgia and
he’s a managing partner of the McDonald Firm, LLC. And also representing Georgia voters at large, Sheila Ross. She's the former deputy district attorney in Fulton County and the current director of capital litigation for the Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia.

And I know you-all can see that we have a very impressive panel from all walks of life, and every region of the state and from a lot of political -- different political walks of life as well, which I think is -- is very important. I want to thank Representative Ott, certainly, for being here. I just wanted to mention -- I know we had one other state representative here today representing Brad Raffensperger.

I certainly want to welcome the members of the media. We have worked very hard and will continue to do that to make sure that they have accessibility to these meetings. I think that's very important from a public-transparency process and we look forward to working with them.

And I also want to thank you-all for being here this morning. I know there’s many elections officials and registrars from all over the state here in the audience and many members of the voting public, different advocacy groups, and we welcome your presence. We also welcome your input as we move through this process.

I did want to mention that we do have a -- a court
reporter here that will document not only today's meetings but all of our meetings, so they will be available to the public and we’ll -- we’ll make those transcripts available on our website in approximately three weeks. This will give the court reporter time to make sure that we have the record straight from this meeting and -- and we’ll do the same in future meetings, and that will be available on our website at GA -- or sos.ga.gov.

Real quick, I wanted to mention that the presenters from the Secretary of State's office will be our elections director, Chris Harvey, who I think many of you already know; General counsel, Ryan Germany, and the assistant elections director and deputy counsel, Kevin Rayburn.

I wanted to mention just a few guidelines as we get started. The commission members, you are welcome to ask questions and provide input as we move through the process and during presentations or when we wrap up presentations, so we certainly welcome that. I would just ask that when you do do that, we need you to speak clearly into the microphones, try not to speak over one another so we can make sure that we have a -- a proper transcript of the meetings and we can get everything for the public record.

Members of the public, you do need to sign up for our public-comment portion of the meeting which would be after we get through with the presentations. Today we have
allotted two minutes for each speaker, which is what we
normally do at our state elections board meetings, so we’re
glad to hear from anyone who is here today.

I would just tell you that you don’t need to get into
the details of -- of what your issue is. Just let us know
what that is so we can get that in the record. We will
make sure in future meetings that we allow individuals or
groups that want to present or advocate for certain issues,
or technologies or whatever it is, we -- I promise you we
will have a transparent process. And you can either submit
those documents that you would like for the commission to
review or also speak to that or -- or make presentations.
So we’ll certainly be working on that as we move forward.

When we move to your public comments, I would just
urge you to stay to the two minutes, make sure that you’re
speaking clearly and -- and not too fast. I -- I don’t
have a problem with that, obviously, but I would ask others
just to make sure you speak clearly and don’t go too fast
so we can get your testimony on the -- on the public
record.

Certainly -- I mentioned this earlier, that anyone’s
welcome to send feedback or questions to our SAFE
Commission’s website -- I mean E-mail address, which is
SAFE Commission at sos.ga.gov, and we’ll certainly be
reviewing that after this meeting and prior to our other
meetings.

And, with that, I want to just welcome you-all again. I’m looking forward to a great, transparent, hard-working process. And, with that, I’m going to turn the microphone over to Representative Fleming and my co-chair and thank him again for being willing to lead this effort with myself and the other commission members. Representative?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Secretary, I appreciate you for allowing me to be here today and serve on this commission. I appreciate you, as our Secretary of State, taking proactive steps to form this group and bring us together so we can give good advice during the legislative process, hopefully next year, pick our -- our state’s next all-important voting machines. Thank you for that leadership.

The commission is tasked -- as the secretary said -- with reviewing options for Georgia’s next voting system. And, of course, members, that is no small feat. The initiative will ultimately involve a complete rewrite of Georgia's election code and state election board rules once the General Assembly has made a decision on our next voting system.

It will also, of course, involve the appropriations of millions of state dollars so we want to make sure we do a good job of coming up with the best options. Some
estimates put that -- those state dollars anywhere from a
low of 30 million to sometimes as high as 150 million,
depending on what kind of system that we would choose. And
also, of course, that includes training and the
decommission of the old machines that we currently use.

This commission, hopefully, will guide lawmakers in
the process with active participation from Georgia voters
and -- and multiple of the stakeholders, which will be
involved in this.

I’d -- would want to share with some of my commission
members, before we get started, it may be helpful to go
through some of the processes that went on with the
legislature the last session and bring us kind of up to how
we got to where we are now.

Last fall, the House of Representatives -- State House
of Representatives’ Science and Technology Committee met to
discuss the future of Georgia's voting equipment. In that
first meeting, a discussion was held on our current
machines and the estimated shelf life of those almost now
20-year-old voting machines.

The second meeting of the house committee involved
product demonstrations to see what some of the market
options currently offered by election vendors were. In the
beginning of the legislative session, in House Bill 680 on
January the 11th, State Representative Scott Turner began
the process in proposing one of the first voting-system bills that would overhaul our -- our process during the legislative session.

As with many times with the legislative process, a representative or senator will introduce a bill to begin the discussion. It's usually not how the final product looks, but it’s just the beginning.

Representative Turner's bill did not -- would not allow -- would not allow, going forward, the use of our current touchscreen voting machines by January of 2019 and called for what has been referred to as a risk-limiting audit where local election officials would manually tally the ballots. This was the beginning of the discussion of that particular version of legislation. It didn’t move forward to a great extent.

In a separate house bill, House Bill 848, on February the 8th of this year, House Science and Technology Committee Chairman, Ed Setzler, who -- the chairman who had held those prior committee meetings, proposed a second bill to overhaul the voting system.

That particular bill required our Secretary of State to issue a bid by August of 2018 of this year for the state's purchase of something referred to as optical-scanning voting-assistance equipment and supporting services for use in the primaries and elections, in all 159
That legislation would have required optical-scanning equipment for the elections after January of 2024 and it would have also provided state appropriations to fund the optical-scanning equipment to counties no later than the 2020 presidential-preference primary.

It passed by substitute and a committee wrote a few changes which involved adding audit provisions. However, the bill did not go ahead to the full house of representatives for a vote.

On the other side of the aisle -- or sort of the other side of the capitol, in Senate Bill 403, on February the 8th, State Senator Bruce Thompson proposed a very similar version of Chairman Setzler’s House Bill 848 to the Senate.

That bill went through many changes during the legislative process and in committee and it eventually was the bill that crossed over, as we would say, it passed from one house to the other. It came over to the House of Representatives for consideration where the House held hearings, and Chairman Ed Rynders’ committee on government affairs on that legislation.

Senate Bill 403 ended up being the voting-system bill, the overhaul bill, that traveled furthest during the legislative session before it ended but, ultimately, that bill did not pass both houses as well, which is fairly
typical of discussions at the capitol. Sometimes a
discussion, like I said, is begun with legislation and that
has led to our process of us being here today.

All of that history, I hope, is relevant to you
because -- to show you that we have to continue that
discussion now that began at a time of progression toward a
replacement of our current voting machines.

Although the system continues to work as it was
intended, we obviously have to plan for its replacement,
and a project of this size takes months of planning. And,
thus, I must again thank our Secretary of State for
convening this commission and allowing us to have this
discussion.

I anticipate our commission will engage in a robust,
open discussion about all of the viable options for
replacing our current system and pass along a good
recommendation to the state legislature for the next
session, which will begin in January of '19.

I want to thank all of you for taking the time to be
here today, for joining us in these proceedings. And, as
the secretary introduced you-all, you come from a wide
background, very well positioned to participate in these
discussions.

As we go through this process, as was mentioned, we’ll
have several presenters today. I’m looking now and will
try to keep my eye on several of you. If you have a
question, I’m going to ask you to pass that microphone near
you to the person with the question.

We do have Patrick over here, who is our court
reporter. I had a chance to chat with Patrick earlier. If
you’ve never been in a proceeding with a court reporter --
and I suspect many of you have though -- you know that he’s
trying to take down everything we say, and one of the worst
things you can do to a court reporter is talk over one
another. It happens to be that my wife is a court
reporter. And so, I am -- I am well-trained in that idea
and I intend to make her proud and pass that along to you
today.

In a natural conversation that we have with people, we
do talk over one another because we can hear, and listen
and talk at the same time. For the court reporter, it
makes it much more difficult. So if I do -- I admonish you
about that, please understand I’m doing it so that we have
a good record.

Now, that’s just a brief overview but, before we
begin with our first presenter, I want to see if any of the
commission members have any questions about what we’ve
initially tried to go over today or about our process of
how it would work.

I think all of you came in a little bit earlier; you
know that there’s water and coffee right back here for you as well as restrooms. Please feel free to get up and move around, if need be. Any questions?

SENATOR JACKSON: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator, did you have one?

SENATOR JACKSON: I have one.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I’m going to -- I’m going to turn my mic to you. Now, I’m giving it to you just for a second. Okay? You have to tell that to senators.

SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Now, we’ve talked about the anticipated cost of these new machines. Would you have any idea of what was the cost of our old machines some 18 years ago?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I know it didn’t -- Lynn Bailey down there served on that commission that many years ago. Do you have any idea or does someone else want to speak up?

SECRETARY KEMP: I -- I think, from the best of --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Secretary?

SECRETARY KEMP: -- reputation (ph) -- recollection, and what Ms. Boren is telling me as well, it was around 52 -- 54 million which was funded through the Help America Vote Act funds, which was federal funds, so that was the cost back in, you know, early 2000s.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely. Good question,
Senator.

SECRETARY KEMP: Mr. Chairman, I’m going to let Ms. Boren give you some additional information.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please do.

MS. BOREN: That was the state's contribution to the equipment. Each county had an option to purchase additional equipment. I -- I think many of the counties represented here did purchase the other equipment, though, the 54 million was just the state portion.

SENATOR JACKSON: And our anticipated cost --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: (Provides microphone.)

SENATOR JACKSON: And, Mr. Chairman, and our anticipated cost is between 30 and 60 million?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That's just a rough estimate. The -- the technology is, I suspect, even more variable than what was available almost 20 years ago now. And, as we have done some background and I’ve heard testimony through hearings, those are some of the ranges that we’ve heard.

And, of course, not only included in that is the equipment which, by far and away, for 159 counties, will be the largest part of our appropriation, but there's also a lot of training, obviously, that the -- some of the people at the state will have to implement and -- and classes and whatnot for our elections officials to attend and -- and be
able to understand how to use it.

SENATOR JACKSON: Okay.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good question. Any other questions from any members of the commission before we get started? Well, if I don't see any, what we will do next -- I believe we have, from our Secretary of State Elections Division, Chris Harvey.

Chris, why don't you please come forward. Good to see you again this morning. Please introduce --

MR. HARVEY: Good morning, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please introduce yourself to all of the commission members, and we’d love to hear from you today.

MR. HARVEY: Good morning, commissioners. Secretary Kemp, Vice Chairman Fleming and members of the Georgia State Election Commission, my name is Chris Harvey and I have the honor of serving the people of Georgia as the state election director for Secretary of State, Brian Kemp.

This morning I have the privilege of taking you on a deeper dive into how elections are conducted in our state. I know that some of you participated in elections as candidates and some of you have participated in elections as elections professionals but, most importantly, we have all participated in the process of the most esteemed title, that of voter or citizen.
By way of beginning, allow me to introduce and tell you a little bit about myself and my background. I grew up in DeKalb County before attending college and graduating from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, with a BA in political science and a specialization in criminal justice in 1989.

After studying theology in graduate school and teaching high school for a few years in Charleston, South Carolina, I returned to DeKalb County in 1994 where I joined the DeKalb County Police Department. From 1994 through 2007, I worked primarily in homicide investigations for the DeKalb County Police Department, DeKalb District Attorney’s office and the Fulton County District Attorney’s office.

In 2007, Secretary of State, Karen Handel, hired me to be the chief investigator for the Secretary of State's office where I spent considerable time in election investigations and state election board proceedings. In July of 2015, Secretary Kemp asked me to take the position of election director and I have served in that role since then.

I do not serve alone. The Secretary of State’s election division is composed of professionals in fields that include law, data and systems -- systems management, customer service, training, voter registration and military
voter outreach just to name a few.

We provide service and assistance to the 159 county election offices throughout the State of Georgia and we coordinate with a number of state agencies to facilitate voting and election management. As you will see very shortly, the work that the Secretary of State's office does in an election compliments but primarily supports the true hard work of elections that take place at the county level.

Georgia's current election system was born out of issues arising from the November 2000 general election. Although much of the national attention was focused on Florida and topics like hanging chads, and punch cards and butterfly ballots, Georgia realized we had problems of our own.

In 2000, Georgia was operating four different systems to cast and count ballots. Some Georgians used old lever machines, whereby a mechanical device recorded votes, while others bubbled in ovals next to names on coded papers that were then read and calculated by a light scanner, while others marked a check or an X next to a name on a piece of plain paper that was read, interpreted and counted by a person or team of people and some Georgians wielded a pointed metal stylus to punch out small rectangular holes in paper stock cards set in a plastic frame. These multiple variations in voting did not serve the citizens of
Georgia well, as you shall see.

Let me mention these -- briefly explain two terms that will be important throughout the presentation and throughout the consideration you will give to these most important matters: These terms are undervote and overvote.

Briefly, an undervote is a discrepancy in the total number of ballots cast and the total number of votes counted.

For example, if 10 people were to vote in an election for president -- three voted for Candidate X and four voted for Candidate Y but the other three decided not to cast a ballot for president because they found no acceptable choice, but -- but then did cast votes in down-ballot races, the results would be that there were only seven votes cast for president, resulting in three undervotes.

An overvote, as odd as it may sound, will also result in an undervote. An overvote is making more selections in one race than one is eligible to make. For example, if an election for governor -- 10 people voted for governor but one person mistakenly thought that they could pick their top two candidates instead of one and marked their ballot with two choices, then no vote would be counted and there would be -- the overvote would result in only nine votes for governor even though 10 voters cast ballots, thus leaving one undervote for governor.

These terms are important in order to, first,
understand the important reason, if not the primary reason, that Georgia selected and implemented the kind of voting system we currently use. And, secondly, to understand the significant distinction in voting systems that are currently available, and which are being used in the rest of the country and as you and the legislature consider what might be best for Georgia in the future.

The goals of this presentation are five, and you -- you can follow along in your PowerPoint. I believe it’s in Tab 2. It’ll be up on the screen, but you won’t be able to see it. I’ll do my best to announce sort of the titles so you can follow along.

First is describe the election interaction between state and counties conducting elections; secondly, to give a historical context for the current voting system; thirdly, to describe how votes may be cast in Georgia; fourth, to explain key components of the current voting system and, lastly, to explain security and election systems. If you give me one second, I'm going to try to raise this a little. (Adjusts microphone.) That's a little bit better for me.

So those are the goals of the presentation. Now, let’s start by saying that elections are a complicated process. If you go to the next slide, you'll see a flowchart that looks more like, you know, the traffic on
the connector at 5 o’clock on a Friday afternoon.

If you look at the diagram -- and this does not necessarily represent everything in the Georgia voting system, but most of the components are represented here. But this is a -- this is a slide I took from another presentation.

But you notice, at the very center, you’ve got the voting system and that’s really what we’re talking about now. However, look at all of the other factors that lead into it. You’ve got voter-registration systems; you’ve got state agencies submitting information; you’ve got county offices; you’ve got administrative reports; you’ve got election-night reporting; you’ve got the E-poll books which are used to give voters their proper ballots. You can tell that if any part of this system were to have a hang up, it could startle the entire process.

When I taught high school, the assistant principal, who was sort of mentoring me, would tell me every morning, he would say, Chris, teaching doesn't -- education or teaching doesn’t happen; it is caused, and that’s an analogy that I’ve taken with elections.

Elections don’t just happen; they’re caused. And they’re caused in combination, in conjunction, with the Secretary of State’s office, and with the county election officials and with other support organizations.
So any time you talk about elections, you’re talking about a very complex system with many moving parts. You’ve got federal law that covers requirements in some elections. For example, we just completed the process for the -- a runoff that’s happening in Georgia. We had to get ballots out to overseas voters for the federal runoffs that are happening in -- in -- later in July. That’s a federal requirement. It’s not necessarily part of state law.

You have state law that puts restrictions, and time limits and deadlines on things happening. You’ve got state election board rules that get more specific with this -- these regulations and these -- these rules and they govern elections.

The elections calendar -- if you were to -- to go to our website and look at the elections calendar, you can see the entire year laid out for you. You know, it’s -- it’s -- it’s set by the legislature. The election will happen at this date; the runoff will happen this many days later; this is the deadline for qualifying; this is the deadline for submitting this, that and the other.

It’s like being on a treadmill. There are no snow days; there are no rain delays; there are no timeouts; you don’t get a -- you know, you don’t get a spike the ball and -- and get a do over. The -- the calendar keeps rolling, the treadmill keeps rolling and it’s -- it’s everything
that the county and the state does to make sure that we meet all of our obligations and we work together to get that done.

If you can, turn to the next page. Just some brief elections by the numbers so you have an idea of the scope you’re dealing with. Of course you know there are 159 counties in Georgia. Each office has their own elections division, has their own elections office.

On election day in Georgia, there are approximately 2300-plus polling places in Georgia -- that’s throughout 159 counties -- which required between 12, to 20, to 25,000 poll-workers. So, you know, every polling place will have a minimum requirement of three workers and many polling places require many, many more than that. In the large counties, you could have 20 to 30 people at a polling place.

So this is a -- essentially a one-day workforce that gets activated several times a year, that these are the folks that are going to be operating this equipment, these -- whether it’s a machine, whether it’s paper, whether it’s pencils, these are the folks that are going to be operating this equipment.

Approximately 10 percent of the voters who vote in elections vote by mail. They vote an absentee ballot. They -- they request it; it’s sent to their home; it’s a
paper ballot and they mark it in, there’s a return envelope and they send it back to the county and it gets counted just like every other ballot.

About half of the voters now vote in what’s called advanced voting, which is a three-week period prior to the election where every county is required to have at least one location where any county voter can go to and they can cast their ballot on a DRE just like it was election day.

They don’t have to go to their polling place. As a matter of fact, they cannot go to their individual polling place to vote where they would on election day. Usually, it’s a county courthouse or a central county building. Voters go there and, for three weeks, they can cast ballots in elections.

That’s become a growing trend. In the -- in 2006, 2007, 2008, absentee balloting by mail was very, very popular and advanced voting seems to have overtaken that in terms of popularity among people. People like the idea of going to some place central and casting a ballot.

And -- and then about 50 percent of the voters who vote, vote on election day. So election day is still a big deal. Even with all of these other options for people voting, election day is still a big deal in Georgia. And, currently, there are approximately six-and-a-half million voters in Georgia. So those are some of the rough numbers
with elections.

I’ve got a map here that you can see. This shows the population breakdown by voters in Georgia -- and, again, this should be in your -- in your notebook. The green are obviously 100,000-plus voters and then the blue or purple is down from that.

Obviously, you can see that most of the voters are centered in the metro area but notice also, in Muscogee County, in Richmond County and Chatham County, you have major, major population centers. And then, as you look through the central and -- and southern part of the state, there’s sort of that marbling effect that shows, you know, you’ve got some -- some very, very small counties and you’ve got -- still some pretty substantial counties. Everybody operates with the same exact system.

All right. I want to talk a little bit about the election environment in Georgia. Georgia is one of a very few states that has a uniform voting system, which means that every county uses the same equipment, the same procedures, the same forms and the same recording mechanisms.

If you vote in Chatham County and you -- or you vote in Rabun County, or you vote in Fulton County or you vote in Seminole County, with the exception maybe of some of the accents you hear, your experience is going to be exactly
You’re going to fill out the same form, you’re going to see the same posters on the wall, you’re going to encounter the same equipment, you’re going to encounter the same instructions and your voting experience is going to be the same everywhere. There are only, I think, four or five states that -- that provide that, so Georgia is not completely unique but somewhat unique in that capacity.

With 159 counties, which is the second most counties in the United States after Texas, means that whatever system is chosen will have to be recreated and executed 159 times.

Therefore, whatever system is chosen will be used by election directors in large counties -- like Rick Barron in Fulton County -- with his over 600,000 voters in a large election office with full and part-time workers -- but the same system will be used by Probate Judge Denise Dallas in small Glascock County with 1800 voters and its correspondingly small election-office staff of one, Judge Dallas, herself, who is also the probate judge, the chief magistrate, the vital-records clerk and the traffic-court judge. So Judge Dallas is going to have her work cut out for her regardless of -- of what you-all decide.

To talk about -- I had mentioned that each county has its own election office. There are basically two forms of
administering elections -- administering elections in
Georgia: You’ve got probate judges and you’ve got combined
boards of election registration. Judge McCoy is a -- is a
representative -- as a probate judge, he is the election
superintendent.

The majority of Georgia uses a combined board of
elections and registration. Matter of fact, 120 counties
have combined boards of election and registration. The
other election directors that are on the commission operate
in that environment. And, in that sense, they have the --
the board sometimes has as few as three, sometimes as many
as seven people -- we’ll talk about that a little bit more,
but they are the election superintendent.

They are the ones that decide what happens in that
county if there’s a judgment call to be made. That’s the
body that certifies the election; that’s the body that
would hold the challenge here; that’s the body that would
essentially administer the election.

And Judge McCoy and his -- his other 35 probate judges
that serve as election superintendents have that authority
similarly. And it’s a -- it’s -- the election boards are
designated by the state legislature. Usually, the
delegation from whatever county it would happen to be would
pass a -- pass a law, and it would be signed and that would
create a state board of elections.
So there are 120 county boards of elections and registration, there are 36 counties with probate judges as their election superintendent and there are 3 counties in Georgia that have a separate board of elections and a separate board of registration. It’s kind of unusual.

One of those counties is actually going to a combined board at the beginning of 2019. So, in 2019, there will only be two counties that have separate boards. It doesn't affect operations that much, but I know that the -- the directors that are here from combined boards, I believe, probably enjoy the fact that they -- they deal with one board instead of two boards.

But, as I mentioned, boards of election in counties are created by the legislature and their composition varies depending on the legislation that creates them. Though they’re usually created to ensure representation from various sources such as political parties, county commissions or appointed by judges, the trend in Georgia is decidedly towards the creation of boards of election and registration.

Boards of election generally designate and hire a director or a supervisor of elections to run the day-to-day operations in their county. In some counties, these supervisors will direct a staff of dozens of full and part-time employees while, in other counties, the director will
do 90 to 100 percent of the work by him or herself. This information is important so that the commission has a more complete understanding of the diversity of elections offices and capacities in different parts of the state.

I’m going to talk briefly about the division of responsibilities and roles in elections and how the Secretary of State’s office works with counties.

Elections are primarily county-based events. You know, we talk about having a federal election or having a statewide election. To some extent, that’s a misnomer. There are -- every time you have a statewide election in Georgia, you have 159 county elections, and what the Secretary of State’s office does in a statewide election, we aggregate and report those -- those totals. But they’re largely county operations.

For example, voters are registered in their individual county of residence, voters vote and have their votes counted in their county of residence, voters are updated and their voter-registration system is maintained in their county of residence and the county elections officials -- whether it’s the board or the probate judge -- determine all of the validity of ballots and votes cast.

They also determine, as I mentioned before, whether a voter stays on the voter list if there’s a challenge to a voter’s registration or if there’s a problem with
registration. That’s decided primarily at the county level.

You know, the former speaker of the house, Tip O’Neill, has famously said that all politics is local politics, and I kind of take that with voting. All voting is really local voting. I mean, I don’t count any ballots as a state election director; I don’t decide whether or not an absentee ballot gets -- gets approved; I don’t decide whether someone’s voter-registration application is complete. Secretary Kemp doesn’t -- does not do that. Nobody in the state election office does that.

Ms. Welch does that every day; Ms. Bailey does that every day; Ms. Holden, Ms. Boren, they do that every day. Now, Ms. Daniels used to do it every day but she takes it easy now in retirement. She -- she did it very well for a very long time in DeKalb County.

And in the -- the next slide you’ll see is a brief illustration of the difference between the state and the county responsibilities, and we’ll go through them just quickly, one by one. And, again, just so you can get a feel for this.

The county maintains individual voter records while the state maintains a state voter-registration ballot list. So when Ms. Bailey approves a voter’s registration application, it comes into the system that we maintain.
Okay? When an absentee ballot is issued by Ms. Welch, it’s reported in the state system.

Secondly, the county maintains their individual pieces of equipment. And, as Ms. Boren said before, you know, the counties bought some extra equipment when this stuff was done. So they maintain all of that equipment. Every voting machine in Georgia that’s used in elections is in the custody of, in the care of, in the responsibility of every county election office.

So they maintain individual pieces of equipment, the Secretary of State’s office provides the voting-assistance environment and that’s what we’re talking about here. We’re talking about the environment for voting in the future in Georgia.

The individual counties, they select, they train and they staff the polling places. You know, it’s not uncommon that I’ll get calls and E-mails from people after election day and they’ll say, I can’t believe it. I left my polling place and, you know, I had to do this, I had to do this, and there were no signs, and there -- it was too hot and -- and there was somebody playing the radio.

And -- and I tell them, You know, that’s unfortunate. Let me give you the number of your county election director, and call them or E-mail them and let them know how -- how satisfied or unsatisfied you were with the
voting environment because they're the ones that do it.

You know, mercifully, I don’t pick any of the 20 --
2300 -- 2600 polling places in Georgia. But the Secretary
of State's office provides training and guidance on
election-law practices and procedures. So, again, we -- we
push stuff down to the counties.

The counties issue and count individual ballots.
Again, I don’t make a decision about whether somebody is --
it’s up to Ms. Bailey and her staff. If somebody shows up
on election day and they say, I’m -- I’m here to vote,
and they look them up in the system, they say, you know,
Sir, we don’t see you registered in the voter-registration
system, and it’s then their responsibility to determine
what should be done next.

There’s -- there’s certainly rules and procedures that
would have to be followed, but it’s -- they’re the ones who
make that decision; they're the ones that decide to issue a
ballot. Do they give them a regular ballot and let them
vote on a DRE, on a machine, or do they give them a
provisional ballot or do they direct them to their proper
county, say, Sir, you never changed your voter
registration. You’re still registered in the next county.

You need to go there and vote.

So the county does that. The state provides the
general ballot databases for the counties. So, when an
election comes up, the Secretary of State provides the
database that Ms. Bailey is going to use to -- to program
her machines and accept her ballots, and we're going to
give it to -- to Ms. Boren and her team so that they can
operate in this uniform system. Individuals work with
counties and counties work with the state.

Currently, as I mentioned before, the Secretary of
State's office creates and provides the databases used by
each county in county, state and federal elections. We do
it in some municipal elections. However, municipal
elections have a little bit more leeway to operate
independently. This means that voter lists for elections
as well as ballot creations for the DRE voting units are
produced in Atlanta and distributed to each of the 159
counties.

So, you know, these transactions are handled off-line
by hand-to-hand exchanges of media between officials from
the Secretary of State’s office and county election
officials.

While possibly inefficient by modern standards, this
non-network exchange of information provides additional
security and prevents corruption of data or systems. This
process, however, places significant time pressures on the
Secretary of State’s office and sometimes causes counties
to wait on these database creations. In addition, if
corrections or changes are needed to these databases, additional delays can ensue.

Modern election systems have generally become easier to use and might allow some decentralization of this process so that some counties may start to create or assist in their own election databases or ballot voting. Keep in mind, however, that in some counties elections offices -- as I’ve pointed out -- are comprised of one or two people with a limited IT staff that might make this process more difficult.

So, again, because it can happen in a specific county doesn't necessarily mean it can happen well in every county. But it’s just something to consider when you -- when you see some of the new systems arise.

As expert as professional election officials are with the current voting technology, most of the people who use this equipment are part-time poll-workers and even more part-time voters who vote every 2 to 4 years sometimes. Keep in mind that, when the current system was deployed in 2002, there was a pretty steep learning curve that required extensive familiarization and training of poll-workers and voters.

Keep in mind, in 2002, this was five years before the first iPhone was released. There were no iPads, or tablets or any smartphones. The idea of a touchscreen was new
technology and even people who were used to interacting with computers did not necessarily have experience with touchscreens and touching a screen in order to effect actions.

Even though the general public is far more experienced, and exposed and familiar with touchscreen technology, any new system would require significant effort and training and familiarization for both the election officials and the citizens before being deployed.

All right. Now I’m going to talk a little bit about some of the historical context about our voting system, what we -- kind of how we got to where we are. In 2000, most of the energy and the national attention was focused on Florida, but when Georgia looked at the results of its 2000 general election, we found significant problems and the Twenty-first Century Voting Commission was established in December of 2001 by, then governor, Roy Barnes.

If you go back -- and I mentioned this briefly before, but if you go back to see how voters voted in Georgia in 2000, you had two counties that used paper ballots -- and that's what -- exactly what it means. That means you have a piece of paper and it says Joe Smith and John Jones and you put an X or a checkmark next to it -- kind of like what you may do for student council at a high school. Two counties did that.
You had 17 counties that used punch cards, and that’s the -- that’s where most people think of the butterfly ballot. It was in a -- a plastic frame and you turn the ballot like a book, and you punch a stylus and it would punch out the little punch cards that you would then feed through the old IBM machines and it would count the votes that way.

You had 73 counties that used the lever machines. A lot of people referred to them as Shoup Machines -- I believe the company that made them was called Shoup Machines -- and that involved a complex system of setting levers and setting all of your votes and then pulling a -- that’s kind of what you see in a classic movie where somebody cranks this -- this handle down and (descriptive sound) it -- it marks the -- the machine and records votes that way. Almost half of the people in Georgia are doing that.

And then 67 counties are using optical scans, and an optical scan is a paper ballot. That’s the -- that’s what’s used, actually today, still for absentee ballots or provisional ballots. It’s a paper ballot that you bubble in like you would on a standardized test, an SAT or an MCAT or something like that, and it’s fed through an optical scanner -- I’ll show you some pictures of the machines. And, again, 67 percent of the counties were using optical-
scan devices in 2000.

Well, they discovered several problems with the 2007 -- I’m sorry -- with the 2000 election. First of all, the lack of uniformity in how Georgians voted was -- was pretty stunning, and I think the -- the thought was if it is not being cast the same way, and it’s not being counted the same way and there are different standards for determining what’s good, are people really voting equally in Georgia. And if you’re -- if you’re in a county that doesn't have a lot of resources and can’t afford the most efficient or maybe the most accurate error-proof way to vote, are you somehow being treated as a lesser voter. So that was the first thing. The lack of uniformity was a problem.

The second was there was -- you know, people -- many weren’t thinking about it quite as much in 2000, but there was no accessibility and autonomy for handicapped voters. One of the most strident causes that’s taken place since then is the -- is the effort to make sure that every voter is able to vote as independently as possible, regardless of their disability.

I’ll talk about some of the ways people can do that now, but if you had -- if you were blind, if you were illiterate, if you couldn't operate the machine, it means you had to have somebody to help you. And you can still do that in Georgia. You can still have somebody assist you,
if you need to, for -- for whatever reason. But the idea
is that, as much as it is -- it is possible, you want a
system where every voter, regardless of their ability or
disability, has the opportunity to vote as independently as
possible, and that didn't exist in any of those four
systems we talked about.

And, lastly, it gets back to what I talked about
earlier: Undervotes were a serious problem. And I’ll --
I'll get into a little bit of detail about that. Go back
to the 2000 election. Now, we just came through a -- an
election where you had some -- some controversy, some
people that maybe weren’t completely satisfied with all of
their candidate choices.

But, in 2000, you had -- for president, you had, you
know, George Bush and Al Gore running against each other.
And, while there were certainly people that preferred one
or the other, there wasn't -- there -- as I recall, and I’m
old enough to remember, there wasn’t a lot of vitriol that
people were going to sit out and protest this.

However, in Georgia, you had over 93,000 -- almost
94,000 ballots cast in Georgia that did not reflect a vote
for president. That's 3.5 percent of all ballots cast in
Georgia. I have a hard time believing that 3-and-a-half
percent of Georgians just chose not to vote for president.

Now, usually, people vote at the top of the ticket,
and then they may get bored and they don’t vote for the stuff down -- they don’t vote for the dogcatcher and, you know, that kind of stuff -- but they usually vote for the top of the ticket.

Florida got all of the attention. Everybody was talking about Florida. They only had an undervote rate of 2.9 percent, and they were the ones that were talking about the -- the butterfly ballots where, I think, Pat Buchanan, you know, beat the democrat in Broward County, which was a -- which was a big democratic stronghold. Everybody was talking about the problems in -- in Florida when Georgia had it worst. The -- the Florida rate was 2.9 percent; the national rate was 1.9 percent. So Georgia was way above the average for undervotes.

And there were 38,000 undervotes that were cast by voters in counties using optical-scan devices which, at that time, would have generally been considered the most technologically advanced form of voting. So you had 38,000 undervotes.

And then, in 13 counties that calculated overvotes as a separate category -- remember overvotes is when you mark more than one person in a single race -- you can see that over, you know, 61-and-a-half percent of the overvotes were duplicate selections, voting for more than one person in an office. That’s simple human error.
That’s either people don’t understand that you just vote for one or they’re trying to -- you know, they vote for one -- you know, they want to vote for Candidate A and, just so that the election director gets it, they’re going to cross out Candidate B.

You know, they -- they so dislike Candidate B, they’re going to draw a line through them or they’re going to, you know, draw a frowny face next to them or something like that. Well, the optical scan can read that as a vote and they say, Well, it looks like they voted for Candidate A and Candidate B. Guess what? They don’t get a vote for either. And that was -- as -- using the -- using -- people using paper and pencil and marking optical-scan ballots. So it was clear that undervotes and overvotes were a problem that had to be solved by a new system.

As a result of the -- the work of the Twenty-first Century Voter Commission, they came to -- to basically three resolutions: The first was that Georgia needed to go to a statewide uniform voting system, and the legislature did that. The second was the acquisition and deployment of a DRE, which stands -- short for direct-record electronic technology for in-person voting.

So they said we’re getting rid of the -- the -- you know, the student-council paper ballots, we’re getting rid of punch cards, we’re getting rid of lever machines and
we’re going to reserve the optical scans for -- for when they’re necessary.

But everybody in Georgia, for in-person voting, is going to be voting on one of these touchscreen DRE devices -- and I’ll use that term DRE and that’s what it stands for -- and that’s what most people refer to it [sic]. And, lastly, as -- as Ms. Boren mentioned, about 54 million dollars was required to implement the system.

All right. Currently, the ways to vote in Georgia. Again, just to -- a -- a brief discussion. As I mentioned, even by absentee mailing of a paper ballot, every person, if they wanted to in Georgia, could vote with a paper ballot by requesting the absentee ballot to be mailed to their house.

You don’t need a reason; you don’t need an excuse; you don’t need a doctor’s note. You just say, I want to vote by mailing absentee. You can E-mail an application, you can fax an application, you can mail it, you can deliver it yourself and your county election director will send you a big envelope that’s got your ballot in it.

You mark it -- the paper ballot -- with a pencil or a pen, you put it in an envelope, you seal it, sign an oath and you send it back and you’ve voted in Georgia. And that’s -- that’s open to everyone. Formerly, years ago, you had to have a reason; you had to have an excuse; you
had to jump through a bunch of hoops. Now you just ask for it and you’ve got it.

Secondly, as I mentioned before, is advanced in-person voting. That’s on a DRE and, as I mentioned, that’s three weeks before the election. Every county has to provide advanced voting for three weeks prior to an election. The third is on election day on a DRE which, again, is how half of the people who voted in Georgia vote.

There are a few special circumstances I want to mention. The first that I’ll mention is UOCAVA voters, and that’s a term you may hear. UOCAVA is an acronym for uniform overseas civilians and I -- I can’t recall off the top of my head exactly what it means, but it’s basically armed forces members that are in Iraq, they’re in Afghanistan, they’re in Germany, or they’re in Alabama, or they’re, you know, in Columbus and they live in DeKalb County.

They have -- by federal law, they have a special exception. They're actually allowed to be -- essentially E-mail their absentee ballot. They have to have the ballot 45 days before the election and they’re given extended time to return it after the election day. So that’s only available for UOCAVA voters. They use -- so I think it’s called an EBD, which is a mailed -- E-mailed absentee ballot, or they can get a traditional mail-in ballot if
they’d prefer.

Provisional voting is done either during advanced voting or on election day if there's some discrepancy as to whether or not the voter is eligible to vote. So if I show up at the wrong polling place, or I show up in -- in the wrong county or I’ve never updated my information and they look me up in the system, they say, Mr. Harvey, we don’t see you registered here, and I’m -- I’m adamant that I’m eligible to vote, they would have me vote a provisional ballot, which is just like a paper ballot.

They’d take me off to the side, give me a paper ballot and I fill out an envelope, fill out my vote and it will be given to the county registrar or board of elections. They would have three days then to determine whether or not my vote should count, whether I was registered or if I was in the right place.

Maybe I’m in the right county but I’m in the wrong polling place. So, then, you have to count the part of the ballot that I’m eligible to vote for. So maybe I could vote for governor, or president or something like that, but I get down into the, you know, school board -- wrong district -- and those votes don’t count. So provisional ballot is another special circumstance for voting.

Third is voting on a DRE with audio assistance and a touchpad. This is generally for people that have vision
issues. There’s a headset you plug into a DRE and it gives
voice prompts, and you have a little keypad and it tells
you, you know, This is -- you know, Do this to vote for
this person. It records your vote the exact same way. It
can be done independently so the voter can do it completely
by themselves.

And, lastly, is by receiving assistance for a voter
who is physically disabled or illiterate. And that's if,
you know, somebody shows up and they -- they can't -- you
know, they -- they can’t operate the equipment. They’re
allowed to have somebody assist them; they sign an
affidavit saying they’re eligible; they come in and they
can actually touch the screen for them and consult -- under
consultation with the voter. So those are sort of special
circumstances. Those are ways to vote in Georgia.

All right. I want to talk briefly -- and briefly as
possible -- about our current voting system. And, again,
this is not so much a defense of the current voting system.
I mean, I -- as -- as it’s been said before, I think
probably everybody in here would agree the voting system is
due to be replaced.

Whatever the legislature replaces the system with is
going to have to have something like these components.
They may not necessarily have these same machines or these
same processes, but everything I’m going to talk about has
to be recreated somehow, whether you’re using paper, whether you’re using electronic devices, whether you’re using a combination of both.

The first is the voter-registration system. I’m just going to list them all quickly and then I’m going to go talk about each one of the briefly. The second is some type of electronic poll book for voter lists, and that’s what you check when somebody comes up to vote and you show them your ID, they look you up.

Currently, as you’ll see, we use an electronic poll book, but obviously the -- the people at the polling place have to know who’s eligible to vote and what ballot they’re eligible to vote.

The third is the global election-management system, which is called GEMS, which you’ll hear more about. That’s essentially the brain of the operation. Everything kind of runs off of that. Fourth is the actual DRE, the system that -- where people record their votes. Next is some type of recording media. The vote has to be recorded somewhere. Is it recorded on a piece of paper, is it recorded on a memory card, is it recorded on internal memory -- how was it recorded.

Next are optical scanners, which is how you -- you read the paper ballots. You’re going to have paper ballots regardless of what system you go to. We -- we have what
most people would say, a fully-electronic voting system. However, you know, 10 percent of the people are voting with paper ballots and provisional ballots. So you’re going to have to have some way to read these paper ballots.

And then, lastly, some type of election-night recording. You know, 7:01 hits on election night and people are checking the website; they’re looking at the news. They’re saying, Okay. Who’s up? Who’s -- you know, What’s happening? Who won this? Who’s up -- who’s up with this? We have to have a way to get that information out to the public.

So let me go through each one of these briefly. The voter-registration system is referred to, mostly by election officials, as ENET. And this is an online system. This is the only part -- this and the ENR, which obviously is the very end of the system, the caboose -- is the only part of the system that’s networked online.

This is an online web-based database maintained by the Secretary of State's office. Every time Diedre Holden gets a voter-registration application from a voter in -- in Paulding County and enters it into the system, (descriptive sound), it goes up into the -- it goes up into ENET and that person is now part of the Georgia voter-registration database.

It’s accessible by county election officials through
secure means; it’s also actually accessible to the public in limited ways. We have a site called MVP, My Voter Page, where anybody in Georgia can go to that site, you put in your first initial, your last name, your county and your date of birth and it will put up your voter information. It’ll give you your precinct-card information; it’ll tell you where to go; it’ll tell you how you registered; it’ll let you do sample ballots, do all of that kind of stuff.

As I mentioned, it’s web-based and it’s secured with multiple layers of cyber security. ENET does not connect to any ballot-counting, casting, recording system at all. So it’s a separate online database.

Next is the electronic poll books. These are ExpressPoll. Georgia uses two: the ExpressPoll 4000 and the ExpressPoll 5000, and the device you’ll see next to it is a -- is a scanner, a barcode scanner, which will scan driver’s licenses and pull up the voter.

This is what the election officials use. When you show up at a polling place in Georgia and say, Here’s my driver’s license, or, Here’s my ID, if you have a driver’s license, they scan the back of it and it immediately finds you in it and it says, Okay. Here’s Chris Harvey; here’s his ballot; let me create a voter-access card, a yellow card that you put into the DRE.

This is a very efficient way to do it. This doesn't
require, necessarily, a -- a poll-worker to look down a
list of paper, and then find Chris Harvey and then come
over to see, Okay. He’s in Precinct 13-G. Let me check
off here. This does it automatically. Now, if somebody
doesn’t have a driver's license, you can -- you can put in
their data and pull them up the same way. So you don’t
need a driver’s license to use this, but it’s certainly
efficient.

If somebody shows up, you pop a barcode and you’re
good to go. Here’s Chris Harvey -- you can confirm that
this is the right voter and then you take the yellow voter-
access card, put it in the ExpressPoll and it will create
the -- it will create the ballot.

So you've done that and the poll-worker has given you
your yellow card and says, You can go vote on any of these
machines. You walk over there with that yeller (ph) --
yeller... yellow voter-access card and you find the
machine, you put it in there.

What is on that voter-access card? Is your voter-
information on there? Is your personal information?
What’s on there? The only thing that's on that card is the
-- is the information about what ballot you're -- you’re
going to get.

So if I go to vote and they -- they create a voter-
access card for me in ExpressPoll, that card says, Okay.
Chris Harvey lives in the Fifth Congressional District, he lives in the State 41st Senate District and the -- this and that and the third city district in -- in City of Decatur and all of this stuff so that, when I put that card in the machine, it pulls up the ballot for me.

If -- if somebody else -- if a neighbor from across town was voting in the same polling place, say, during the advanced voting. Let’s say somebody from the southern end of the county is there. They’re going to go to that same ExpressPoll; they’re going to get the same voter-access card; their ballot is going to be very different from mine.

It’s -- they put it in there and it’s going to pull up their ballot. So we could be voting side by side in the exact same building and we’re looking at two completely different ballots.

When you -- and so, there’s -- but there’s absolutely no voter information. That yellow card cannot be traced back and have any of my information there. Well, it’s got my name; it’s got my address; it’s got the last time I voted -- none of that stuff’s on the card. That’s a message for the DRE.

So you go and you put it in the DRE and, next, you see the DREs which are the -- Georgia uses two systems now: the R6 and TSX, and they operate the exact same voting-system software so there's really no difference. They’re a little
bit different in size but, again, you wouldn’t -- you wouldn't know the difference between the two except just by outward appearance.

These are approved for -- and I use this term guardedly, these are dumb machines. Okay? They’re not connected to any network; they have no wireless capability; they're not plugged into the Internet; they don't connect to anything. They have memory cards in them that record votes.

When somebody casts a vote, you know, you see your whole ballot and you make your choices. And, obviously, you can -- you can change your choices and you can leave -- you can leave races blank if you want, but one thing you can’t do on these machines is overvote. You can't -- you can’t void your ballot or void a race by overvoting.

Now, if you choose not to vote for president or you choose not to vote for superior-court judge, completely your choice. That machine will let you do that. It’ll tell you that, Hey, you haven’t recorded a vote for dogcatcher or superior-court judge, or county commission or whatever and, if that’s the way you want it, that’s fine and you can cast that ballot.

It’s going to tell you that, but it’s not going to let you spoil your own ballot by casting an overvote, and that is how we got here from 2000. That was a significant
problem that this system fixed.

This can, at the end of every election -- and a lot of people have seen this. At the end of the election, when the machines are shut down, they print out a tape. It's like -- almost like a cash-register receipt that shows all of the votes that are cast on that machine for every -- for every candidate. You know, This person got 20; this person got 5; this person got 6. All of the questions: This -- this amendment got 3 yes votes; it’s got 20 no votes. All of that stuff is printed out.

Multiple copies are printed out and the memory card that has recorded the vote is taken out and a copy of the tape is given with the memory card. In addition to that, the internal memory on the machine also records votes. So if somebody were to take that memory card out and, you know, accidentally, you know, drop it down in a bottomless pit, we would be able to go to the internal memory and access the votes that are on there.

These machines are tested before every election in what’s called logic and accuracy testing. It’s required to be advertised and open to the public. Anybody can come see this where the sample ballots are put through and voting is put through. Although publicly, the results are -- are released. Anybody can see this.

These are kept under secure environments at all times.
Again, counties maintain these. State election board rules and law set requirements that they be under lock and key, that they be sealed, that seal to be checked before they're brought out. So they're very tamper evident if somebody were to mess with them.

And, if necessary, you could pull every ballot image from these devices. It wouldn't be associated with any particular voter, but if you wanted to go back and see, Okay. This -- this DRE had 100 votes on it this night. You could actually print the image of every vote that gets cast, every ballot, so that, you know, this -- this -- so here are 100 ballots. We won't -- we're going to -- the local government won't have any way to tie them back (ph).

You can say, Okay. This ballot -- you know, This person didn't vote for superior-court judge; the next ballot, the person voted for everything; the next ballot, somebody didn't vote for county commissioner and dogcatcher. And you can actually see, print out a hundred of those images and then tie it back to the -- the -- you know, the cash-register tape, basically, that's printed out by the machine.

Next, briefly, as I mentioned before, all of these devices have memory cards in them that store the media; all of these memory cards have to be accounted for and they have to be uploaded into the GEMS system, which I'll talk
about in just a minute.

Next is -- what you see is an optical-scan device. This is what's used to count paper ballots. As you know, the paper ballots have a -- like a Scantron type thing. You feed them in there, it has a memory card that records the votes and they -- they go through the system. If something is overvoted, it’s going to kick the ballot back.

Okay? It’s not going to count it.

This has no internal memory. The memory card is on there because you still have the paper ballot. I mean, you can run 20 -- 20 ballots through that and the card will keep track. The card also prints a tape just like the DREs do and they do it for us to retain the paper ballots.

These are -- there are about 820 or so of these in Georgia currently. These are designed to precinct-level standards. These are not designed to run a full statewide countywide election. These are, you know, to be done, you know, for absentee voting, for advanced voting.

Now, there are vendors -- and you’ll see when the vendors come in at a future meeting -- there are companies that make, you know, large scanners that can do dozens, and dozens and dozens of ballots per minute. These are not those. These are one time -- you know, you feed one through one at a time. And if you're talking about, you know, thousands and thousands of ballots being counted,
you're talking about smoke coming out of these things by
the time you get through all of the ballots on election
night.

Next is GEMS, the Global Election Management System,
and GEMS is a system that we currently use, and this is why
I call it the brain of elections: Every county has a GEMS
server. The GEMS server is -- is basically a desktop
computer. This is the alpha and the omega of the election,
the beginning and the end.

When every county -- when Rockdale County is going to
have an election, they get their GEMS database from the
Secretary of State's office. We give it to Ms. Welch, she
uses that GEMS database, uploads it into her GEMS computer.
She uses that to create all of the memory cards for all of
the voting machines. It's -- it's the beginning and end,
and everything that's created by that card has to go back
to it.

So, if, for whatever reason -- let's say they --
they're uploading all of the memory cards and they forgot
one. GEMS is going to tell them, Hey, you're not done yet.
You're missing a card, and it's going to tell you which
card you're missing and they're going to have to go find
that card. They're just not going to be allowed to -- to
finish the election until every card is accounted for.

By the same token, if somebody were to try to
substitute a different card that wasn’t created for that
election in that GEMS server with extra votes or some other
data, GEMS is going to reject that and say, No, no, This
isn’t mine; you’re not allowed to upload this into the
system.

This -- this is what provides the official results on
election night so, when -- when Diedre Holden has all of
her memory cards back from all of her machines and she's
uploaded however many dozens or hundreds of them there are,
it says, Okay. These are the results. And what’s on that
machine are the official results.

They take that information on election night, put it
on a different media and upload it to the Secretary of
State's office, but those aren’t the official results.
What’s on that GEMS server are the official results of the
election. If there's ever any dispute, you go back to the
GEMS server. The GEMS server is non-networked. Okay?
Although it is a -- a laptop thing, by a state election
board rule, it is not allowed to be connected to any
network.

The GEMS has to be under lock and key. If they want
to move their GEMS server -- if a county wants to move
their GEMS server from one room to another, they have to
get written permission from the Secretary of State's
office; if they want to move it from one side of the room
to another, they get written permission from the Secretary of State’s office.

The GEMS is auditable. You can -- if there's a question about something happening in GEMS, you can go check an audit log and see, Hey, this memory card was put in here, this was done, this data was created here; this jump drive was inserted at this time. Every entry in GEMS is audited and tracked.

The last component of the voting system -- which is really not a part of the voting system, it’s more of the reporting system -- it is ENR, election-night reporting. This is a web-based service, again, that is operated by the Secretary of State’s office. It's an online system we use with a vendor.

Anything that goes onto that -- like I said, if you look at it on election night, it says unofficial or incomplete because these are copies of results that the counties have sent to us electronically. Nothing is going to ENR directly from any voting system, not from any GEMS server, not from any voting machine -- what’s on there is the best stuff that’s been reported to us by the county offices.

If there's ever a discrepancy though, you go back to -- you can go back to the tape, go back to the GEMS server and say -- because every GEMS server prints out a report.
And it says, Okay. The GEMS server says that Joe Smith got 50 votes. That's -- that's the official result.

An issue that's come up recently -- and Tennessee experienced this, I think, last month or the month before -- is some cyber firms have launched what are called denial-of-service hacks on E-mail, which is -- you know, they basically crash the website so that people can't get election results or they make the site unavailable for two -- you know, a couple of hours. And think about the effect that that would have on people if -- if, you know, you log in to see the results on election night and the website is down. It's going to cause -- it's going to cause problems.

We work with, again, our cyber-security vendors and with our IT office to make sure that we've got every level of protection against any kind of denial-of-service attack, but that's something that people target.

All right. And I'm -- I'm nearing the end, but I have a few more things to say. I'll be happy to take questions at the end, if you want.

While it might seem to be easy to transition from one form of voting, such as the DRE, to another form of voting, such as a hand-marked paper ballot or a machine -- or a machine-marked paper ballot, I believe it's important to understand the changes that might seem simple on the
surface often don’t consider the details that exist below
the bar line.

For example, many current election officials in
Georgia have never conducted an election using paper
ballots. Two of your commissioners have: Ms. Boren and
Ms. Bailey have been doing it long enough that they are --
they remember the old days. I wouldn’t necessarily call
them the good ol’ days. I wouldn’t be able to decide
whether they were good -- good ol’ or not, but they
remember that. But many, many election officials have
never operated any other system. It doesn’t mean you
shouldn’t change it, but that’s something to consider.

There seems to be a strong consensus, and I -- I feel
comfortable saying this, that any system should have some
form of voter-verifiable paper-trail component to it. And,
given that there’s no corresponding paper component with
our current voting system, that would necessarily leave
some transitional changes.

And here are a couple of things to keep in mind when
we’re talking about this: First of all, laws. And we
have, you know, four legislators on this commission and
they’ll be the ones who are responsible for this. But the
election code and the state election board rules which
govern elections and which are in place now have been
written and refined to work with the current DRE voting
system. We've been doing it since 2002.

There may be changes to existing laws and state election board rules to allow differences and variations from what we currently use and currently how we conduct elections. Again, not saying that shouldn’t be done, just pointing out that needs to be done.

Second is equipment. Not all equipment is created for all tasks. For example, while counties do have optical-scan readers for counting paper ballots, as I mentioned, these scanners are not designed to handle the volume of ballots that a total paper election would generate.

And to mention a specific issue with advanced voting: Advanced voting is a little bit different and, when you have an advanced voting location, we need to have every ballot available for every voter.

Now, let’s take Fulton County as an example. Fulton County has 100 -- in the May election, they had over 170 different ballots cast. When you combine the different commission districts, and the house districts and the federal stuff, they had over 170 different ballots.

So that sounds like 170 stacks of -- of ballots, but that’s not even the limit of it because, in advanced voting with the paper ballots, you have to have a ballot for every precinct, so the absentee ballots have to be sorted by precinct. That would require over a thousand stacks of
paper ballots for a Fulton County advanced-voting location.

Now, there are ways to deal with this. There are printers that can print ballots on demand, but that also increases the costs and increases the complexity of what’s going on. Again, just something to consider.

Additionally, the current voting system has a significant equipment footprint. It would -- as someone -- I believe Chairman -- Vice Chairman Fleming mentioned, you’d have to decommission and do something with what we now have. There’s a lot of stuff. There -- there are about 28,000 DREs in Georgia right now, you know, and a DRE is about the size of a -- of a suitcase, the old Samsonite suitcases is what a DRE looks like. So you’ve got to do something with those.

Now, most of the vendors have -- that’s part of their -- their whole process is they’ll go, Okay. We’ll sell you this new stuff and we’ll do this withdrawal stuff, but that’s something that has to be taken into consideration, too. And then, because our statewide uniform voting system requires -- because our statewide uniform voting system -- being able to deploy a new system will be especially important [sic].

As I mentioned before, the election calendar is like a treadmill that keeps rolling on and states are fixed for years and vendors need to be able to provide statewide
service like that. Some vendors in other states deal with -- you know, other states, where every county decides what they have to do.

They may be dealing with one county and they may be replacing equipment for one county. We’re not talking about that here. We’re talking about the whole -- the whole shebang, 159 counties. That’s a lot of stuff and that is going to require a lot of -- a lot of support and a lot of logistical expertise. Next is training and education. Any new system will require substantial familiarization with election officials and voters.

And, lastly, public perception. You know, there are currently some people who believe that if they had to vote a paper ballot -- say they’d have to vote a provisional ballot, that that’s an inferior way to vote and, somehow, their vote won’t really be counted, that they just take the paper ballots and just throw them away. They don’t, but that’s what some people think.

There are other people who don’t believe that their DRE properly captures their vote. It does, but -- but they believe that. Simply changing a voting system even for a good cause, even because it needs to be changed, can cause voter confidence to suffer. Therefore, it’s important that these changes are made after careful consideration and examination.
There's an MIT professor that has done a lot of research and he's pointed out that even -- even in an upgrade, any change in a voting system causes voter confidence to wobble a little bit. So even if you say, Hey, this is great news; this is a -- this is a new thing, it's going to have an effect and we need to be aware of that.

I want to talk -- lastly, I want to talk about security in elections in Georgia, and this is not a -- this is not an exhaustive explanation on security, but kind of a list of different things that -- that makes elections in Georgia as secure as they can be.

First of all, we have a non-network system. We have state law and state election board rules that require the proper handling, and storage and security of voting equipment. We have tamper-evident seals on all of our voter equipment; we have public testing of voter equipment; we have decentralized operations where, you know, 159 counties are doing it -- nothing is networked.

So even if somebody were to get a hold of the voting machine in Evans County or in Muscogee, they would have one voting machine and it wouldn't affect other voting machines. And one important -- and, make no mistake, one would be way too many, and it hasn't happened but it's not like if you get one and you get every one.
The auditability of GEMS, which show tampering or other interference, the uniformity of Georgia election procedures I believe is a strength and, while there is not a voter -- voter-verifiable paper trail with the current system, as a lot of people understand it, and as -- as most people are considering moving to it, there are known -- there are paper components that tend to corroborate election results.

And that -- you know, every DRE prints out a tape, so you get a tape of the result. You get every voter that fills out a voter certificate -- you’ve got that number; you’ve got recap and reconciliation forms. So if Lynn Bailey is at a polling place and the DRE vote is 1500 votes and she’s got 200 voter certificates, she knows she’s got a problem; if she has 1500 voter certificates and she has 200 votes, she knows she's got a problem. We haven't encountered those problems, which is -- again, is a testament to the election officials and their -- their team or their staff.

As you know, there hasn't been any subject in elections that has gotten more attention in the last two years than that of security. When I attended the 2016 National Association of State Election Directors’ Conference in August of 2016, the subject was not a hot-button topic. Nobody was really talking about it.
However, in 2017, at the same conference in February, the issue of cyber security easily made up 75 to 85 percent of the program and presentations. There is even an unprecedented classified security briefing for the Secretary of State and state election directors on issues concerning election security.

Election systems, as many of you know, have been declared to be part of the nation's critical infrastructure and, therefore, are entitled to additional government services and protection. There have been hearings in congress and in state legislatures that have proposed to aim state and federal money and other resources to be used to protect election systems.

In all of this discussion and examination, I believe it's critically important to remind commissioners and every Georgian paying attention to these meetings that there has not been any evidence that the votes cast by anyone in Georgia have been changed or otherwise tampered with. It simply hasn’t happened.

There are some who believe that a non-electronic paper ballot is unhackable. People think that if a system can be hacked, we need unhackable paper ballots. I disagree. There's a hacking device that can be found in every classroom and office in this state that can be used to hack a paper ballot.
This device, a pencil, can either use the eraser or the graphite end to hack a paper ballot. You could erase votes; you could intentionally spoil the ballot. That's hacking a paper vote. Again, I'm not -- I'm not saying that paper is bad, but to say that paper is a cure-all and an end-all, be-all, as opposed to electronic, I think is -- is sort of shortsighted.

Paper ballots, in addition, can be lost, they can be forgotten, they can be substituted, they can be spoiled, they can be double counted, they can be misread or they can be misunderstood. Again, this is not a condemnation of paper ballots but a simple fact about them.

Last fall, I received a call from a mayor in a small county in South Georgia. He sounded like a relatively young man and he was concerned about something. He told me that his grandmother had mailed in her absentee paper ballot and, not surprisingly, had voted for her grandson.

He was calling me to ask me if her ballot would be counted. He said that she had told him that she had marked her ballot for him by way of crossing out the names of the other two candidates who were running for mayor. I told him I didn't know how the -- what the election superintendent would decide about the ballot, but that it sounded like she could have unintentionally overvoted or spoiled her ballot and, therefore, her vote for mayor and
her grandson may not be counted.

I thought that way of voting was very bizarre until a couple of weeks later I learned that, in 1922, this is what the law in Georgia read, quote: On the ballot shall be printed such words as will enable the voter to express his choice, such as vote for one, vote for two and the like. And the voter or elector shall erase, mark out or cancel the name of the candidate or candidates for whom he does not wish to vote.

If it had been 1922, she would have voted her ballot properly. Unfortunately, it was 2017, and I don’t know what happened because I’m -- I don’t count ballots, but -- but that’s a problem. I don’t know what happened to the mayor’s or his grandmother’s ballot, but it was a striking example to me of one of the perils in assuming that people will follow instructions or do what we expect them to do.

Obviously, the security of Georgia's voting system is of highest priorities and we cannot flag at our effort to continue to emphasize security in whatever voting system we use. We need to continue to use physical security measures, such as locks, alarms, seals, chains and cyber defenses to secure and protect all election materials and processes.

Lastly, having said that our system is secure, I can assure you that our office -- Secretary of State’s office
and each county election office works daily to monitor and improve the security of our system. I believe it would be naive to claim that any system is invulnerable to every conceivable threat, but our voting system and the election officials who’ve operated it for the last 16 years have done so responsibility and with great care towards the responsibility they have for the citizens they serve.

No question, our -- our system’s due for replacement. I believe that most people can agree on that idea. 16 to 18 years is a long time for any system to operate, but the economy and care that county election officials have taken to use and preserve this system has served all Georgians well and I believe that they should be recognized for their dedication to preserving this valuable state resource.

I believe that there are impressive voting systems and options in the market place today. The challenge will be in the effort to identify a voting system that provides accessibility, convenience for the voter, minimization of voter error, security, security results, voter confidence, efficiency of result recording, vendor support, adaptability and flexibility along with reasonable costs.

One of my goals in this presentation has been to make -- has been to make sure that you understand that local election officials, and part-time employees and part-time voters will be the people using the new system.
The system will not operate in a vacuum. The most sophisticated voter with advanced degrees will encounter the same system as the person who never completed high school and both of these voters, and every one in between them, deserves a voting system that will allow and encourage them all to make their election choices in a way that ensures that their votes will be accurate, and recorded and not easily spoiled.

I'm pleased and proud to be able to work with this commission towards its goal of evaluating how new voting systems might work best for all Georgians. And, with that, I’ll be happy to answer any questions that you have.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, Chris, we appreciate you making a very thorough overview for us there of the voting system in Georgia. As I mentioned, when we began, to members of the commission -- this, of course, goes to the audience as well; we’re going to go ahead and move through this -- if, at any time, you need to excuse yourself, as I mentioned, there are facilities back in the back for commission members or out front for anybody in the audience. Please feel free to go and do that. But I do want, at this time, to go to commission members and take questions.

Chris, I have one for you that I’d like to ask. And am I correct, that it’s my understanding, that you talked
about the GEMS system, and that’s where all of the DRE
machines will be counted -- the votes will be counted and
tabulated.

Now, am I correct that that information those various
counties send to you -- I guess electronically -- their
initial numbers, the official numbers, the ones that count,
are downloaded into some sort of disk. They do not travel
electronically to Atlanta to your -- your office.

However, I think our elections directors take those to
the nearest state-patrol post and these gentlemen over here
looking out for us actually transmit those, by hand, to
your office; is that right?

MR. HARVEY: Very close. You’re -- you’re correct.
The election-night -- the data is taken from the GEMS
server --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

MR. HARVEY: -- to a different device, not the GEMS
server because the GEMS is not connected, and that
information is transported to us electronically, then
populates election-night reporting.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That lets you fill the
webpage with -- with results.

MR. HARVEY: Correct. And -- and lets people see --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Right.

MR. HARVEY: -- see the unofficial result. And then,
after the election is certified -- you’re correct -- the county election officials coordinate with investigators from the Secretary of State’s office to receive the actual physical copies of all of this stuff. They get taken to the state-patrol office and then they’re picked up by investigators from the Secretary of State’s office --

REP. FLEMING: Okay.

MR. HARVEY: -- and they’re off to Atlanta.

REP. FLEMING: I gotcha.

MR. HARVEY: So the GSP doesn’t -- doesn’t deliver them here, but they hold them in place.

REP. FLEMING: Hold them in good keeping until your people get there and pick them up --

MR. HARVEY: Correct. Yes, sir.

REP. FLEMING: -- and take them to Atlanta for the official count.

MR. HARVEY: Yes, sir.

REP. FLEMING: Okay. Thank you. Questions from members of our commission? And, if you want to, just let me see your hand and we’ll make sure that we have a microphone for you.

DR. LEE: (Indicating.)

REP. FLEMING: Dr. Lee?

DR. LEE: Okay.

REP. FLEMING: Dr. Lee, just make sure your
DR. LEE: Okay. So thank you, Chris. I think that was very informative. So I have a question regarding whether the companies are responsible for maintaining their systems. For example, for the GEMS server, are they required to conduct regular software updates, computer updates, security updates, analysis and so on?

MR. HARVEY: They are not -- they don't conduct regular updates because it's -- it's an offline system.

DR. LEE: Right.

MR. HARVEY: So the system they use is -- should never interact with any other system.

DR. LEE: Right.

MR. HARVEY: So it -- it is a static defense. So the answer to your question is no. However, it's kept under lock and key with very limited access.

DR. LEE: Okay. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good question, Dr. Lee.

Other questions from members of the commission?

MR. MCDONALD: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Jimmy, if you would, grab that microphone right there.

MR. MCDONALD: This is --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Bring it a little closer to you.
MR. MCDONALD: This is probably going to be more of a general question but it seems like, since 2000, the big thing is that uniformity has gone to great lengths in the last 18 years. And I know there’s probably great challenges, with 159 counties, of trying to get complete uniformity because there will be things that are unique to the local governments (ph).

But from a general standpoint -- from the state’s perspective and your perspective and in a perfect world -- are there things that you’d like to see be considered from an administrative standpoint that will take more steps toward a uniform system and/or are we just at a place where you feel comfortable, with respect to uniformity and an efficient administration of our elections?

MR. HARVEY: I don't think we can get any more uniform than we are. I think something that may be interesting to consider -- and this -- this happens on some levels -- is if there were some consideration of county size, for example. I mean does Glascock County need to hold as much advanced voting as Fulton County. Maybe the answer is yes.

But the -- the idea of at least considering different standards based on voter population would be the kind of thing that I could see at least discussing to see if that’s a reasonable thing to do, because you are talking about significant differences. Of course, every -- every
distinction you make creates a possibility of breaking that
uniformity. But I don’t think we can get any more uniform
than we already are.

SENATOR JACKSON: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator Jackson?

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chris,
thank you. That was a very good presentation. Just a
couple of questions. The first question: What’s the two
counties with two separate boards? Do you happen to know
those two counties?

MR. HARVEY: Chatham County? Glynn County, I believe,
is changing to -- if everyone’s -- it’s changing, and I --
I can’t recall the third. I’m sorry.

SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. And you mentioned the
percentage of errors on absentee ballots in 2000. What’s
those -- do you know the percentage of errors in our
absentee-ballot process now in the past election?

MR. HARVEY: I don’t. But they -- those weren’t --
those weren’t just absentee ballots. That was all -- that
was all ballots in 2000.

SENATOR JACKSON: From 2000, have you seen them go up
or down, the -- the errors?

MR. HARVEY: Those -- we don’t track those on a
regular basis.

SENATOR JACKSON: Okay.
MR. HARVEY: And there are -- there are other ways also to deal with that that weren't present in 2000 also. You have voter-review commissions; you have other ways to deal with a -- a potentially spoiled ballot.

SENATOR JACKSON: Okay. You mentioned that we have 6.5 million voters.

MR. HARVEY: Approximately.

SENATOR JACKSON: What’s the percentage of those who actually vote?

MR. HARVEY: It depends. I believe, at the last primary, the number was around 1.2 -- 1.3 million, so I don’t -- I'd have to do quick math, which I'm not prepared to do on the spot.

SENATOR JACKSON: About 20 percent.

MR. HARVEY: If -- if that’s -- now, obviously, we had much higher turnout last year in the -- in the presidential election, but it really varies based on -- based on what the issues are, what the candidates are. You know, primaries don’t generally get as much; you know, runoffs tend to get a little bit less.

I believe our -- and I don't have the statistics in front of me -- I can certainly provide them for you -- but I believe in the last general election, in November of ’16, we had more voters than ever voting. So I -- I can’t tell you what percentage that is but, in terms of gross numbers,
I believe more Georgians voted in November of 2016 than had ever voted before. So those numbers are trending upward, but I don’t have specific percentages.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you.

MR. RUSSO: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Mr. Russo?

MR. RUSSO: Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Grab it closer to you there.

MR. RUSSO: Chris, thank you for your presentation today. Do you know how many municipalities do not contract with the counties to administer their elections?

MR. HARVEY: That’s a good question. I don’t have a number. I believe there are 600-and-something municipalities in Georgia. And, just so you know, municipalities are able to hold their own elections and municipalities can use paper ballots.

I mean, you have got some very, very small cities in Georgia that are not bound by the rest of these rules. I believe -- and it’s just speculation. I believe that less than half of them contract with counties.

MR. RUSSO: Do the ones that don’t contract with the counties -- do they use separate equipment or do they use the county's equipment?

MR. HARVEY: It depends. In some cases, they use the county equipment. I think, more often than not, they use
paper ballots or they use their own tech solution. They can use -- yeah, they can use the machines but then every -- if you use the machines, you know, it generates additional work and additional sophistication. But they’re -- the law certainly allows them to use the machines.

MR. MCDONALD: Do you think that that will --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sure.

MR. MCDONALD: So, theoretically, if half of them -- even under the same primaries, that they would have two different polling places where people would have to go two different places to vote for the municipal and the county?

MR. HARVEY: In some cases, yes.

MR. MCDONALD: All right.

MR. HARVEY: A lot of the times, they’re combined but, in some places, yeah, you have to go to two different places to vote.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay.

MR. JABLONSKI: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, absolutely, counsel.

Here, take my mic -- oh, you’ve got Dr. Lee’s.

MR. JABLONSKI: Hey, Chris. Good to see you again.

MR. HARVEY: Yes, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Speak right close to it there.

MR. JABLONSKI: How’s that? Oh, better. There are
several things that have always concerned me, but one of the principal ones is the case with a spoiled ballot. And it’s absolutely true that the law says that -- you know, if you spoil the ballot, it is not counted, if you even mark it up. But some of these -- as you’ve pointed out, some of these markups are done in a way where the intent of the voter is clear. Is anything done to review -- review spoiled ballots to see if the intent of the voter can be ascertained?

MR. HARVEY: There is an allowance for that, where counties have voter-review commissions where it’s a -- it’s a bipartisan commission and, if they can tell the -- you know, if they can determine the intent of the voter, they will recreate -- they will duplicate that ballot and it will be counted, so that can happen.

MR. JABLONSKI: Okay.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other questions from any members of the commission? Anybody else? I don’t see anybody to my right and I don’t see any questions to my left. Okay. Well, Chris, you did an excellent job. And, once again, thank you for all of that good information.

MR. HARVEY: Thank you, sir.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I do think the secretary has informed us it’ll take a second to set up for our next presenter so I’ll tell you what we will do: We will take a
five-minute break. It is now, according to my iPhone, about 10:39. So, at 10:45, we will reconvene. So we will break for just about five minutes. Thank you.

(A recess was taken from 10:39 a.m. to 10:49 a.m.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. If you would, everyone, I’m going to ask you to take your seats. And our next presentation will be by Ryan Germany, who is general counsel for the Secretary of State’s office. Ryan, good to have you with us this morning. We appreciate you being here and I’m going to turn it over to you.

MR. GERMANY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Kemp.

My name is Ryan Germany. I am the general counsel of the Secretary of State's office. First, I just want to say thank you to all of the commissioners for serving on this commission. I know that each of you are very busy and what you are doing is truly the definition of public service. The work you're doing helps inform the next general assembly and the next secretary. Hearing the voices of everyone around Georgia is crucial and we’re all grateful for your service, so thank you.

But, first, I will be significantly briefer than Chris. I think it’s very important that -- that he went through that. My -- my job is a lot less complex. My job today is to give you guys a brief overview of Georgia
procurement law and how it will affect -- we think -- your work and also the work of the state as it moves to procure a new system based on your recommendations and -- and as it will the next general assembly and the next secretary.

First, and most important, I'm going to discuss the process that our office is putting in place to inform the work that you are doing so that you can get accurate information that you need to adequately weigh the options -- all of the options that are out there and that will allow you to ask good questions when the vendors come and give you a presentation of their systems. We want you guys to be very well-informed so you can ask the questions, if you want to.

Second -- and, at this point, it'll be more for informational purposes -- I'm going to explain the process that the state will likely use as it moves to procure the next system. That process will take place after your work is done, but I think it'll be helpful for you to know a little bit about it.

Before I dive in, I want to add one pretty major caveat: I have done a lot of work with the Secretary of State's office and state procurements. I am, by no means, the expert on Georgia procurement law, but I do know those people and I have found them to be very helpful as we’ve gone through stuff in the past.
So I -- I’m happy to take questions at the end or throughout as you guys have questions. I might have to take them under advisement and get back to you with an answer. So, other than that, I’ll get into just a couple of things.

First, every state purchase that’s over $25,000 has to go through a competitive bidding process. As you know, and -- and Chris especially hammered home, the election system is complicated and responsibly moving to a new system will require the purchase of a lot of different parts, whether it’s ExpressPolls, voting machines, ballot on-demand printers, optical scanners -- whatever it is.

It’s not just a situation where you -- you roll it in, unpack it and you’re good to go. It will require a lot of planning, decommissioning of old machines and education of both election officials and voters.

To that end, what we’re doing right now is we are working on an RFI, a request for information. So we should have that draft finalized next week and we will start to relate it to each of you, and we certainly welcome your input on that.

So what an RFI is, it’s not a competitive solicitation. It’s -- it’s kind of a pre-solicitation event where we’ll put together technical questions that will ask each vendor the information about their solutions,
about how it works, about the security of their system, ability to provide ongoing maintenance and decommissioning of existing machines, the -- the implementation of the new system and other pertinent questions.

We will also ask about costs. And, while the cost information in an RFI is not binding on the vendor, it -- it is -- it’s going to be used for -- I think for budgetary purposes. You know, there -- as Chairman Fleming talked about at the beginning, the numbers we’ve heard throughout this process have -- there’s a wide range, so I think it’ll be very helpful for you guys to hopefully get some information from the horse’s mouth on that.

The RFI is not scored, so it's really informational, and what will happen is our office will receive the stuff from the participating vendors -- and we hope that many of them will participate -- and we will provide that information to you. We will also provide summaries for you guys as well.

We envision the next meeting of this commission being vendor demonstrations. So we want to have that all -- we want to have the RFI responded to and summarized for each of you prior to that. I think that’s -- we’re looking at that being an early-August timeframe.

So we want to get the RFI posted in the next couple of weeks so we can give the vendors enough time to prepare
responses prior to the next commission meeting and then, as I said, we will -- we will give you all of those materials as well as summaries.

I’m going to next -- if there are not any questions on the RFI process, which I’m happy to pause for, I’ll move into the -- I mean what’ll happen after y’all’s work.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any questions from members of the commission on the process that Ryan has described to us this morning? Any questions?

MR. RUSSO: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Vincent?

MR. RUSSO: Ryan, if any -- if any members do not respond to the RFI, are they excluded from responding to an RFP?

MR. GERMANY: I don't think so. I think, in working with the vendors, I believe they will want to -- to do this. I think it will be helpful for them to get more information out on their solutions but, no, it wouldn't -- it’s not -- I don't think it would be exclusionary.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other questions from members of the commission?

DR. LEE: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: All right. Very good, Ryan. Oh, we do have one. Dr. Lee, please. Uh-huh.

DR. LEE: So, Ryan, is it in the RFI that we can
request a vendor to agree to the process of a -- say, if we
want to do a take-down analysis of the system, is this the
time to request -- where they would agree to that
assistance or later -- later in the process?

MR. GERMANY: So the RFI is more for getting
information from the vendors. So we’ll ask kind of for
their technical specifications and -- and sort of their --
yeah, I guess that’s the best word, technical
specifications. In terms of, I think, getting -- it’s not
the time to sort of get them to agree --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MR. GERMANY: -- to anything. It’s the time -- Okay.
We want you to tell us -- you know, answer our questions,
let’s get the information out there, and then I do hope
that what this process will do would then lead someone like
you to really know what you would want to look at --

DR. LEE: Okay.

MR. GERMANY: -- when that time comes to do a
technical evaluation. Great question. Thank you.

DR. LEE: All right. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Dr. Lee. Other
questions from any members of the commission on that issue?
Okay. Ryan?

MR. GERMANY: So, in the next part of this -- and this
is really for informational purposes, and I know I’m
talking to people -- some people that at least already know about this. But the next part after the commission finishes its work, generates a report to the General Assembly that the General Assembly can then take under advisement, the state would have to do a competitive solicitation to actually procure the new system. This will likely be in the form of a request for proposals, an RFP.

According to the Georgia Procurement Manual, an RFP is a formal solicitation method that seeks to leverage the creativity and knowledge of business organizations in order to provide a solution to a unique procurement. The RFP process allows vendors to propose their own comprehensive, individual solutions to the state’s needs as described in the RFP. The RFP then seeks to identify the best value for the state by using a combination of technical and cost factors to evaluate supplier proposals.

So, in this instance, we would use the RFI we’re putting together -- and I should have said earlier that there are multiple states that are going through this process now that have either just finished putting out an RFP or that have one out now. And so, we have gathered all of that information and we’re using it to put together our -- our RFI. We want to make sure that we’re asking all of the right questions.

And then we’ll use that process to then -- what we’ll
put in our RFP. You know, what type of -- what type of --
what type of proposals are we looking for and then see what
type of solutions can be offered. The main difference
between the RFI and RFP is the RFP will be evaluated. The
RFI is not evaluated. It’s just informational.

The RFP, when that process comes, it's -- it’s
evaluated by an evaluation committee. All of the different
questions have different weights and -- and then the
suppliers are scored that way. They are also scored on
costs with the lowest costs receiving the highest score and
it’s kind of a step down from there.

So we -- we envision -- you know, based on the work
that this commission is going to do, we envision having an
RFP ready to go when the next secretary is sworn in so that
he can work directly with the General Assembly during the
2019 legislative session. I think that will work well with
the calendar for this commission.

So then we’ll complete this commission’s work, take
that under advisement, have an RFP ready to go -- you know,
a lot of the work is in putting it together, so that’ll be
done before the next secretary is sworn in but then it
won’t be released, I think, until after he's -- he’s sworn
in.

I'm happy to answer any questions, and I just want to
say thank you for your time and your service on this. I
look forward to working with you on this project.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Other questions for Mr. Germany from any members of the commission?

SECRETARY KEMP: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Secretary Kemp?

SECRETARY KEMP: So, Mr. Germany, I -- I don't know if you answered this question earlier and, if not, it would certainly brief the committee and -- and everyone in the public, too, but will you speak just briefly to that RFP evaluation committee and how that's made up? I think that would give some transparency to the procurement process.

MR. GERMANY: Yes. So the evaluation committee can be made up of different people. When we do ones at the Secretary of State's office, we generally choose different Secretary of State employees. We want someone who has kind of a subject-matter expertise on whatever’s being procured, some legal expertise -- to the extent we have it -- and then cost, budget people; that sort of thing.

Now, with this committee, we are able -- I believe -- to have people on this evaluation committee that are not -- you don't have to be an employee of the Secretary of State's office.

So, again, with one of this size, we work with a state agency called the Department of Administrative Services, and they oversee all of the big procurements for the state.
So they are really the procurement experts, they will run the procurement and we will -- we will look -- we kind of -- we’ll put together the subject matter for them but, in terms of actually doing the procurement process, they run that, they oversee it and make sure that everything is done correctly.

And so, I think the evaluation committee would consist of Secretary of State people but, also, it could be people who are outside of the Secretary of State's office.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Any other questions from members of the commission?

Ryan, something that I would think I understand -- and you can elaborate on it if need be: Obviously, the Secretary of State’s office plays a role in this, and we’re in the process of doing that now and will going forward because of all of the aspects that y'all are involved in in elections. However, in January, the actual appropriations of funds will have to come through the legislative process with the new governor's budget and the House and Senate having to agree upon numbers.

For us to have reasonable numbers to plug in -- and of millions, that is -- that’s where this process will help significantly. But also, typically, for the -- attorneys on the panel will understand this; I know Secretary Kemp will as well -- our current voting machines, the DRE
systems, are actually described in Georgia law.

If you open the codebooks or you go look online, you can read the words, DRE, in the code. And the legislature actually has to pass a bill that changes those words and the governor has to sign it.

So this process of deciding what exact -- the kind of machine we have is currently in the state law and, if we follow that pattern that the legislature and governor did some 17 -- 18 years ago, we would -- we would actually put words in the code that would describe this machine that would be selected. Is -- do I have that understanding correct?

MR. GERMANY: Yes. I -- I think that would -- that would be the best way to go forward, to -- as the commission does its work. Also, within the code, we can see as we -- as we move to a new voter system, we also need to look at the law surrounding that system.

As the elections directors on the panel can tell you, they -- I bet they have their election codebooks all year and they are going in that book every day, as well as the election board rules.

So, as we move to new processes, we should certainly look at the legal environment surrounding it, which I -- which I think will both include a code rewrite and also a look at state election board rules.
I would also add, from a procurement standpoint, the legislature -- we -- we can’t fund -- we can’t run a procurement that’s not funded. So the legislators will have to fund it or do something that says, Secretary of State, go ahead and do this and then --

Representative Fleming: It needs a source of revenue to pay for it.

Mr. Germany: Yes, sir.

Representative Fleming: And -- and, you know, with just going through this process, we know that we went from a multi -- multiple type of voting systems all across the state, as Chris described to us, in 2000 to one system. But the actual reason of why a county somewhere doesn’t use one of those old mechanized machines where you pull levers is because our law describes a new machine that they had to use, which was supplied by the state. So that’s a -- actually where the rubber meets the road in the -- the changes that we have to make.

Okay. Any other questions from any members of the commission?

Ryan, we appreciate you doing that, good job and your timing was better than Chris’. We’ll have to give him a hard time even though he did a great job.

Okay. Next on our list is Deputy General Counsel Kevin Rayburn. Kevin, we welcome you. We appreciate you
being here. Please introduce yourself and we’ll be happy to hear from you.

MR. RAYBURN: Can everyone hear me okay? All right. Thank you.

My name is Kevin Rayburn. I’m the assistant elections director and deputy general counsel for the office of the Secretary of State. I’ll start by saying, once again, thank you-all for being a part of this commission. You are all truly stepping up to serve and I very much look forward to your work product that comes out of this commission. It’s going to be valuable going forward.

What I want to talk about today is an overview of the various legal considerations that have to be made when we move to a new voting system and then I’ll also briefly talk about some of the procurement operations being done in other states in this country.

On the legal-consideration front, I think there are four main sources of legal requirements on the next voting system in Georgia based on the current laws: That would be federal statutes, Georgia’s Constitution, Georgia’s state statute and Georgia’s rules.

I’ll start with federal laws. The main law that defines federally what a voting system has to have is the Help America Vote Act of 2002. This was a law that was passed after all of the things that Chris talked about
earlier with the 2000 election. Congress wrestled with, 
How do we fix the problems, because, in all states, there 
were issues. And they passed, eventually, the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002. It’s often called HAVA, and I will refer 
to it as HAVA.

So what HAVA did was it said, when there are federal 
elections going forward, these basic requirements have to be in voting systems. Now, because most of us don’t want 
to have separate election dates for federal offices than state offices, that means -- because we have combined 
ballets most of the time -- all voting systems have to follow these rules.

The first rule laid out in HAVA and arguably the most important has had the most impact on how voting systems 
look and how they’re implemented, and that deals with accessibility. This is what HAVA says -- the requirement on accessibility:

Voting systems must be accessible for individuals with disabilities including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation including privacy and independence as for other voters.

Now, what that means in practice is that it would be unlawful to have a 100 percent pen-and-paper election. That would violate federal law, and there is no state
currently that has that.

And I'll give you an example of three states that we often kind of think in our minds as paper states, and that would be Colorado, Washington and Oregon. Those three states are the three states that have vote-by-mail systems. So every registered voter in those states is sent a piece of paper, a ballot, for each election.

Even in those states, they have to use computers and technology as a part of their voting system to meet the accessibility requirement. What Colorado and Washington do is they have still polling places. Even though everyone is sent these ballots by mail, they still have polling locations where people can go and, if they need accessible, they have DREs in some counties; they have ballot-marking devices in some counties, but they have some sort of accessible computer-based equipment to help a voter mark their ballot and cast it.

Oregon goes even further, and is probably the most progressive as far as accessibility. What they do is not only have physical locations for those people to cast ballots in voting machines, they also will bring you machines to your home. They will bring you a tablet and a printer and allow you to vote from home if you need that.

They will also send people electronic ballots -- similar to what Chris described earlier -- except these
 electronic ballots can be used by these people with
disabilities, if they have the right equipment, with
E-reader technology. They can actually mark their ballot
electronically, print it out and mail it in.

So, even in these states that we consider the main
paper states in this country, they clearly still are using
technology as part of the solution. And what this
commission and the next General Assembly are going to have
to wrestle with and decide is what role in Georgia will
technology have, how extensive will that role be.

There’s a wide range but the federal law sets the
minimum, and the law actually says you can meet this
requirement by having one DRE -- that’s actually in the law
-- or one accessible voting piece of equipment in each
polling place. So that’s -- that’s the baseline. What we
do from there will come from y’all’s recommendation and the
General Assembly.

And, as you’ve heard the description of Oregon, I hope
you started to also think about security. That’s --
there's a lot of computers; there’s a lot of Internet
involved in that description.

Accessibility and security are often at odds,
especially with voting systems, and there are people in
both of those communities, advocates, that feel very
strongly about their side. And it is important that both
sides are represented, are heard and a solution can be made that addresses both of their needs. But it’s going to be balanced and there has to be compromise.

You can’t have a hundred-percent secure system that’s inaccessible and you can’t have, at least with current technology, a -- really, a system where you vote on your cellphone. That would be -- probably be the most accessible, but I think there are serious security risks with doing that. And so, we have to strike the right balance with the new system.

The next requirement I’m going to talk about federally is audits. There is currently not a federal requirement to have postelection audits. However, there is a current draft of legislation called the Secure Elections Act that would require that.

That legislation was -- I think last week actually -- being proposed as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill being discussed right now which usually means, if you get it out of the Defense Authorization Bill, it’s got a good chance of passing. So we’ll see what happens there.

But what that legislation says -- one of the pieces -- is that, starting in November of 2020, you have to have postelection audits in every state for federal elections. So we’ll see if that passes, but current law does not require that.
The current law does say that the system has to produce and be able to produce a permanent paper record for each vote cast. Now, that’s been interpreted by the EAC and the Secretary of the State to not be the same thing as a voter-verified paper trail, but it does mean a system after election day, before certification and especially if there’s a recount.

It still has to be able to print out every single vote that was cast from the electronic system, and our DREs actually can do that. So that would be the current audit requirement but, like I said, we might have a more strict one but we’ll find out very soon if that passes.

The next requirement in federal law deals with voter review and correction. The federal law says that voters have to have an opportunity, before they finally cast their ballot, to review their choices and to be able to go back and make a correction or change their mind.

Our current DRE system does allow that. There’s a review page and voters can -- if they see something that they didn’t feel like reflects their intent, they can go back and make a change. And if you have a paper system, if you’re voting a paper ballot at a polling place, you need to have the ability to go to a poll-worker, spoil it and start over before you cast your ballot.

The next requirement deals with alternative-language
accessibility. The federal law says that voting systems have to have the capability of being run in multiple languages. Now, that’s not the same as saying that elections have to be in multiple languages, but the equipment has to have the capability.

There is a separate law that actually does deal with multiple-languages elections, and that’s Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. And, in 2016, one of Georgia’s counties, which is the first county in Georgia to now fall within those requirements -- and that would be Gwinnett County.

In the primary that Gwinnett County held a few weeks ago, it was both -- in both Spanish and English. And, because our voting machines meet this requirement, they were able to accommodate that, and the next system will have to be able to -- be able to be run in multiple languages.

The final federal requirement in HAVA I’m going to discuss deals with error rates. There is actually a minimal acceptable error rate with voting equipment, and the current standard is 1 error out of 500,000. So, when they do testing federally, that’s -- that’s the baseline minimum. The target is 1 error out of 10 million but, to pass federal certification, it would be 1 error out of 500,000. So those are the requirements of HAVA.
Now, there is a separate federal aspect of this that’s not technically a requirement of the federal law. HAVA created the Election Assistance Commission, EAC, and one of their tasks was to develop voluntary voting-system guidelines. The key word is voluntary.

These are requirements that are much more in depth, much more technical; they go through the various aspects both from a material -- from a use standpoint, the technology of the various voting systems and what’s the bare minimum that systems have to do, how well they have to operate in order to pass these voluntary guidelines.

While it is voluntary, at least 47 states have some sort of law or rule requiring that a voting system used in that state meet those guidelines. Georgia Secretary of State rule says that the next voting system has to meet those guidelines.

The current version of those guidelines is 1.1 and it was adopted in 2015. Just to give you an example of the kind of things that are in there: There’s a provision that says if your voting equipment does have an ability to transfer information over a network -- ours doesn’t, but some states do have network-connected devices [sic].

It sets a basic level of encryption that have to be found, and the current level -- the current-level standard is it has to meet a NIST-approved algorithm with a security
strength of 112 bits. Now, the security experts in the room might have cringed a little bit there because I think the gold standard is probably 256.

So this is clearly at a minimal level; it is now eight years old, but they are working on a new version, 2.0, that’s recently been approved by a standards board and it’s being -- it’ll ultimately eventually be decided whether the EAC will adopt that, and that would improve the standards further.

I think right now there is an issue -- there might be a forum issue at the EAC for their members, so it’s not clear when we will have an opportunity to review and adopt the new standards. So that’s an open question. When we move to adopt a new system, we might be under 1.1; we might be under 2.0 So that covers the federal requirements.

On the state side, we start with the Georgia Constitution, and it has a provision that guarantees a right to a secret ballot. And so, any voting system that we move to has to ensure that individual votes cast cannot be tied to an individual voter. We can’t know how they vote. You have a right to a secret ballot under the Constitution of Georgia.

On the state-election code front, state statutes, there are two main statutes that come into play now. We actually still have skeletons in the election code. We
actually have a whole series on lever machines, which
cannot be used for state and county elections, but it's in
the code. It has, This is how you run an election on a
lever machine, but we have other laws and rules that say
you can’t use lever machines.

So there is commonality between the code section for
optical-scan machines, which we use for absentee voting,
and DREs. And it’s actually pretty much in the language,
and this language was largely used in the legislation that
we saw earlier in this year, so there's a good chance that
this is a starting point for state requirements. That’s
very high level, very basic, pretty much common sense but
it's in the law and I'll go through those very quickly.

The current law says the voting system must allow for
write-in voting. For general elections, you have to have
the option to write in a person's name who is not listed on
the ballot. You must not allow someone to vote for a
candidate more than once unless you have multi-candidate
voting but, either way, you -- actually, ranked-choice
voting might change that as well under our new systems
being developed that would allow that, but the current law
says you can't. You can only vote once for a particular
candidate.

You must allow people to vote for candidates and
questions they’re entitled to vote for and not allow them
to vote for candidates and questions they’re not entitled
to vote for.

The equipment has to be constructed of material of
good quality. When properly operated, it must record
correctly and accurately every vote cast. It has to be
constructed in a way that is easy for a voter to learn how
to use and it must be safely transportable. So those are
the state-law requirements, generally, for voting systems.

Our law says that we have a uniform system in Georgia,
as have been discussed, where everyone has to use the same
equipment. This law does not apply to municipalities, and
that’s why we were able to do a pilot in 2017, during the
primaries, using newer equipment. So the cities are not
bound by the uniform requirements. That’s state, federal
and county election law.

We’ll move now to the rules of Georgia. As I said
before, we have a Secretary of State rule that says the
next voting system has to be federally certified. The
system also has to be state certified. And so, part of the
process will be reviewing systems to determine, do they
comply with Georgia law. And so, therefore, we need to
have a Georgia law that a system can comply to, and that’s
where changing the law can be really important.

It needs to be changed broad enough so that you’re not
picking a vendor -- obviously, you want a competitive
process -- but it needs to be specific enough so that there are -- there’s trust in the system; there’s trust in the process and people have confidence -- legal confidence that the next system will follow certain standards that you-all and the General Assembly decide.

And there’s also a rule that says that federal, state and county elections have to be performed using the DRE equipment in voting booths. And so, that would obviously also need to be changed if the next system is not a DRE system. So that wraps up the legal front and the legal considerations that are out there.

I’m now going to talk about some of the procurement operations that we’re seeing in other states and what that means. Having reviewed some of the RFPs that have already been produced and currently pending, I personally see three basic models of voting that states are moving to.

The first model is a model that's primarily paper-based. When people vote in person, they will be presented with a paper ballot they mark with a pen and pencil. It’ll be run -- when they’re satisfied with their selections, they can review it, they run it through a scanner and then it drops into a secure ballot box.

And that -- those polling locations would also have at least one ballot-marking device so that people with an accessibility concern were to use it -- can use it to help
them mark their paper ballot. It would print their selections, they would review that paper, and they would scan that and it would drop into a ballot box. So that’s the first model that I’m speaking of.

The second model is close to what we have today, and it’s one where everyone would be expected to vote in person on a ballot-marking device. They would use that machine to mark their ballot, they would print out and review it, they scan it and it’s securely placed in the ballot box.

And then the third model is a hybrid of the two, and that is where, for early voting, people would be expected to use ballot-marking devices. And the reasoning there would be because you have certain advantages with computers.

As we talked about, Fulton County, more than a thousand, basically, types of ballot styles that would be needed for early voting in Fulton County. Whereas, on election day, there might be one, two, three styles -- hopefully tops -- it depends on whether there’s a split precinct or not. But there’s far, far fewer styles on election day than in early voting.

So, in this hybrid model, ballot-marking devices could be leveraged for that advantage for early voting and then, on election day, people would be presented with a paper ballot and you would still have those accessible machines
available to use.

The current lay of the land is that 41 states have at least one jurisdiction using ballot-marking devices. 30 states have at least one jurisdiction using DREs still and then 20 states have moved solely to having paper ballots, and ballot-marking devices and scanners.

Recent procurement that has occurred: Michigan released an RFP in 2016. Thankfully, they put that bid to the public and that included cost estimates. And so, you can start to get a feel for costs by reviewing their RFP.

They had three vendors selected to the RFP process. Michigan is not a uniform-system state, so the counties can individually choose between those three vendors -- and there's a contract already negotiated, so they’re getting the cost benefit of the state negotiation, but they have to choose one of those three. When you look at a map of voting systems in Michigan, it’s marbled. There’s different selections based on the county.

Other procurement: Also, there was an RFP in Arkansas in 2015, there was one in Rhone Island and then, in 2014, there was a state RFP in Maryland, and they opted for a paper and ballot-marking device system.

There are some current pending procurement operations. In Louisiana, they have an RFP outstanding right now and they will actually make their selection, I believe, by next
Wednesday. That’s going to be an important one to watch and we will definitely summarize and review all on that.

Louisiana has a similar system as ours. It’s uniform voting; everyone votes on DREs. Sound familiar. So what they’re planning -- according to news reports and statements from their Secretary of State’s office, what they’re thinking about doing is moving to that second model. They are going to exchange their DREs for ballot-marking devices.

That gives them what advantages exist for using a computer to mark your ballot, but they do have voter-verified paper trail, they can review it, they can hold it, they can redo if they need to and, if they were satisfied, they scan it and its secured in the ballot box.

So they’re planning to move towards that system, the second model I described. We’ll see if that’s what ends up in the procurement. They’re estimating that it will cost 40 to 60 million. We’ll see what the final cost is. Keep in mind, they have a population of 4.6 million.

Pennsylvania issued an invitation earlier this year in April. They’re not a uniform-model state; they are working to certify new systems, but they have a mandate out there that all of their counties have to adopt the new voting equipment. They believe -- and, of course, I’ve read -- that it will cost 125 million to do so. They have a
population of 12.8 million. Georgia has a population of just over 10 million.

Ohio is probably closer to where we are in the process. They have not secured funding yet. Their house just passed legislation to do so. They appropriated 100 million dollars that would go to the counties to procure a new system. It still has to get through their Senate, and has to be signed by their governor and then they would have to go through their own procurement process. Ohio is not a uniform-voting state so they would have -- the counties would have the flexibility to choose from certified systems.

So that's all have I have to say in my presentation. Thank you for your attention and, if y'all have questions, I'll be happy to try to answer them.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Kevin. Good job. We appreciate your information on all of the legal fronts that our next voting machines will have to consider and comply with. Now, questions?

MS. BAILEY: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lynn Bailey, do you have a question for Kevin?

MS. BAILEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Kevin, you mentioned earlier federal legislation that would require postelection auditing that's pending now. Do you know if
that legislation specifies any particular type of audit or
just an idea that some type of an audit needs to be
performed?

MR. RAYBURN: The language says that the audit has to be
done using a sample of ballots cast and it has to have
statistically significant -- basically, an outcome from the
audit so that people are confident in the results.

So, if that passes, we’re going to have to figure out
what that means. What -- does that mean just risk-limiting
audits? Does that mean you can have fixed-percentage
audits or tiered-percentage audits like they have in
Arizona?

A lot of states basically say 5 percent of all
precincts have to be audited. Well, is that statistically
significant? Is that such a high level of confidence, if
it passes that, that meets the federal requirement? At
this point, I don’t think we know, and we’ll have to have
experts advise us on that.

MS. BAILEY: Just another follow up, if I may.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely. Please.

MS. BAILEY: Do you happen to know if that legislation
has been assigned a number or if there’s some way we can
read it back or have access to it? Or, if you don't know
off the top of your head, would you get that to us?

MR. RAYBURN: Yes. I will be happy to get that
information.

MS. BAILEY: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Lynn. Other questions from any members of the commission for Kevin? I don't see any.

SENATOR JACKSON: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Senator, please.

SENATOR JACKSON: You mentioned a number of items that need to be corrected in our existing law.

MR. RAYBURN: Yes, sir.

SENATOR JACKSON: Are you going to list those items out, what needs to be corrected? And is this in election law or our voting law?

MR. RAYBURN: Basically, we need a legal mechanism for this new system. The technology that exists now isn’t described in the code. So we can either take one of our existing statutes, like the DRE statutes and modify them to fit the new system.

Or -- and this might be the better route to go -- we can just pass a whole new section of code saying, All right. Start from scratch. This is what the system -- the guidelines, the rules and regulations are, and either repeal the other statutes or basically say they -- they're null and void; they no longer apply, which is kind of what we do with lever machines. We still have that
lever-machine statute in the code even though you can’t use those machines in federal, state and county elections.

SENATOR JACKSON: But did we repeal the lever machine? Did we repeal it or --

MR. RAYBURN: It’s still there.

SENATOR JACKSON: Okay.

MR. RAYBURN: It’s still in the code.

SENATOR JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

MR. MCDONALD: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Absolutely. Jimmy?

MR. MCDONALD: Just to follow up --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Grab your mic there.

MR. MCDONALD: Just to follow up on that. Senator, first, that’ll probably be something for the code commission to look at. I mean, that’s all it is. It’s an obsolete statute.

But to follow up on the point you made also, Mr. Chairman, while the previous act was very specific, that doesn’t necessarily tie you, as the General Assembly, to that type of specificity.

So, as we go through this process and, toward the end of it, if we have an idea of the technical parameters or general descriptions that we know that are minimum requirements, so to speak, for what we want to guide the Secretary of State's office with, y’all have the freedom to
draft legislation that goes, The following things must be considered, and it may be -- even be very technical in nature. You have the freedom to draft it the way you wish despite the fact that, in 2002, it was done very specifically.

So we don't necessarily have to come up with a specific system and say, This is what it is. As a -- as a drafter, as -- in your role -- through your committee process and et cetera, et cetera, we’ll have enough information hopefully by the end of this commission and we’ll -- we have a very general idea of what -- where we want this to go and this is what it must look like.

So that -- that counsel, of course, would -- would draft that up but they’ll take specific recommendations from a technical standpoint and then convert that into some type of statute.

MR. RAYBURN: There’s certainly concerns when you go to a new system. The current systems are based on those 2015 guidelines. We’re about to have new guidelines from the federal government.

They are all -- vendors are always coming up with new concepts and tweaks. And so, if you draft it too narrow, basically based on what we see in the market now, that means we're going to have to go back later and change the state statutes if there's a new system that we want.
And another thing to keep in mind -- I should have mentioned this: Maryland, with their procurement, they decided to lease instead of purchase. And so, that’s an option. And, if you lease, now you have the flexibility of -- when something new does come out and that’s what we want to move for, the sum of costs are not as severe.

SENATOR JACKSON: Jimmy.

MR. MCDONALD: (No response.)

SENATOR JACKSON: Jimmy?

MR. MCDONALD: Yes, sir. I’m sorry.

SENATOR JACKSON: And -- and -- now, just to follow up, and what you’re saying is this commission will be tasked with coming up with those recommendations.

MR. MCDONALD: My understanding is that part of our mission is to determine and give recommendations to the legislature as well as Secretary of State. I mean this is -- at a bare minimum, these are the technical aspects that this system should have.

We can convert that very easily into a statute that says, you know, any system that is procured or established by the Secretary of State's office must have a minimum -- have the following, and then give guidance there. And then, even if y'all so wish, you can give further discretion to the Secretary of State's office.

So regardless of what the -- regardless of what the
statute says right now, I mean, that doesn't inhibit your
ability to kind of go in there, wipe it clean and just
write new -- I mean, it's 18 -- it's 16 years old. We've
learned a lot obviously and -- and have the mechanisms to
give the right roadmap, so to speak.

MS. HOWELL: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, ma'am?

MS. HOWELL: Thanks for your presentation. I'm sorry.
(Adjusts microphone.) Thanks for your -- I'm sorry.

Thanks for your presentation. In your review of other
states' RFPs, did they -- you mentioned that access and
technology may sometimes be at odds. Did they address or
have requirements around permission or access to their
systems?

MR. RAYBURN: They do. They definitely have
requirements that the system has to meet these basic
accessibility and security requirements. And so, future
procurement documents that we issue will definitely need to
have those in there.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Ms. Howell. Other
questions?

JUDGE MCCOY: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Judge?

JUDGE MCCOY: Just a comment.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Pass this mic down, please.
JUDGE MCCOY: Just a comment in the obsolete statutes on lever machines. You did specify that cities were not bound, and there are some cities that use the lever machines and that's why those statutes were left in place for the cities that do choose to use those machines.

MR. RAYBURN: That's right. One of the consonances of review and/or repealing those old statutes is we take that flexibility away from the cities. You may want to do that if you feel like those elections -- if there is an issue with lever machines. But that’s -- you’re right. There’s a few cities that hold lever-machine elections in the state.

MR. MONDS: (Indicating.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes?

MR. MONDS: I have a question about -- in our packet, we received some information somebody had concern on. Could you explain, currently, is the voting system in Georgia meeting all federal-compliance requirements with HAVA concerning the ability to manually audit an election and not just have a paper-vote total?

MR. RAYBURN: Yes. That’s -- I’ve reviewed those materials and I do believe that our current system does meet federal requirements.

That issue in particular dealt with the permanent paper record, and what the EAC has done -- and the memo is
actually in your packet -- it referenced two pieces of the
VVSG, for the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, and it
said you can meet the permanent paper-record requirement by
looking to those VVSG exceptions. And, when you do that,
it says it can be done after the election, but it has to be
at the individual-vote level.

So you couldn’t just have, for example, the tickertape
we talked about that has vote totals. That doesn't meet
the federal requirement, but having the capability to print
each and every single vote, one for each voter on paper
with their selections, that would meet it. And so, I do
believe we meet that requirement.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Mr. Monds.
Anybody else on the commission have any questions for
Kevin? Okay. If not, Kevin, thank you so much for your
presentation.

Now we are going to move to the part of our agenda
that deals with public comments. We had previously
circulated some sign-up sheets and we have about 24 people
that I can see here that are signed up.

As mentioned earlier, the way we’ll handle this is
I’ll call you and ask you to come forward. I think I will
have your name right, but I want you to tell me your name
when you get up there so we can make sure we have that
right.
I will ask you to remember that we do have a court reporter taking down everything that is said. So, if I do ask you to slow down or something like that, it’s not because I’m trying to break your chain of thought. I just want to make sure it’s well recorded.

We will allot, as I mentioned, two minutes for each of you. I’ll have a little timer up here. I will try to let you finish and summarize. This will not be the last meeting. There will be more, and more than one more. And so, there will be other opportunities.

So far, I do want to say thank you to the Secretary of State’s staff for a good presentation. I think the intent was to give us, as commission members, an overview of where we've been, what the law is, the kind of things we may have to anticipate and how the process may work going forward, and I think it’s been very educational.

So I’m going to ask each person that comes forward to be respectful in your comments. It's okay to disagree, but I would like for you not to try to be disagreeable. And is there any questions about this process, as we’re going to move forward now, because I’m going to ask you to abide by the guidelines that I've just given to you. Any questions by anybody that’s signed up? If I don’t see any questions, I’m going to assume that you agree with that and that’s how we’ll operate.
Okay. All right. We will start with my first list here. As I call your name, if you would, please come up. And, once again, state your name again for us and then also tell us, just like in a public-hearing format, where you’re from -- your county and city -- that would be great.

I'm going to begin with Becky Arrington. Becky, are you here?

MS. ARRINGTON: I am.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Lovely. Good to see you. Pull that mic down so we can hear you well. Go ahead and please tell us your name and where you’re from, Becky.

MS. ARRINGTON: Good morning. My name is Becky Arrington and I am from Cobb County, so welcome. I am a citizen; I am a voter activist. And, after recent elections, I became very involved with understanding the process.

I regularly attend the Cobb County -- and my board of elections is over here and I also just took training. And so, I’m working the polls in the last election. So I really have a good idea of what you-all, in terms of election professionals, are dealing with and the magnanimous issues that we have before us.

I became very involved in the recent legislation and looked at -- and thank you, Representative Fletcher [sic] for -- or chairman, for giving us a background of all of
the different bills that came forward last year. And I --
anybody who was on that legislation board or any of you who
served in the legislature, I know you-all received a lot of
public outcry and a lot of public opinion in terms of the
bills.

And, in particular, the SB 403, one of the biggest
issues with that -- and the Senate had tried to avoid the
-- the use of barcodes, and I'm asking you-all -- we have
petitions available with hundreds and hundreds of
signatures and that was one of the main things that came
about, to be able to have a voting ballot that was hand-
marked and was verifiable.

And so, I urge all of you -- Mr. Rayburn, I -- I
thought your presentation was fabulous. We've got all
sorts of data from different states, so thank you all. One
of the things that we had asked about with the SB 403 was
to have this commission, and thank chairman -- Mr. Kemp to
-- thank you for putting this together.

I know that you guys have lots to do; it's very
confusing, but I urge you all to remember and keep in mind
the public outcry against barcode and unverifiable voting.

Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Becky. We
appreciate you being here today. Okay. The next person --
and, as I go through this list, some of you have good
handwriting and some of you don’t. And if I -- and if I mispronounce your name, I’m going to blame it on you. It’s not your fault. But, nonetheless, I’ll do my best. Garland Favorito? Garland? I’ve got the first name down. Tell me if I’ve got the second one, your last name down right.

MR. FAVORITO: Yes, you did, Chairman Fleming. Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yes, sir.

MR. FAVORITO: And I had a --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And tell us where you're from, Garland.

MR. FAVORITO: I’m from Roswell, and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Thank you. Good to have you here today.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, commission members, for volunteering your time. I had a -- before I begin, I had a handout that I gave to Candice.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We’ve passed it out.

MR. FAVORITO: And so, I’ll just introduce myself. My name is Garland Favorito. I’m the cofounder of Voter GA. I have 40 years plus of IT experience including about 12 years in transaction security, which is different from cyber security, and about 16 years of part-time research into the existing Georgia voting machines.
I advocated for verifiable voting in 2002 before these machines were put into Georgia. I think that the most important subject for the commission to be able to address is why does the public distrust these machines and how can you regain their trust.

In that regard, Voter GA has collected a lot of information over the last 16 years. I would like to share that information with you at a future point in time. We have a PowerPoint presentation of only about an hour: 40 minutes and 20 minutes for questions and answers.

In the presentation, it will cover some of the issues you see there: historical problems, testing, vulnerabilities and so on and so on. But, most importantly, we have identified seven objectives that I believe the commission can achieve to restore that public trust that’s -- that’s obviously gone (ph).

So, with that in mind, I think it’s particularly important information to share with board of elections directors because you’re the -- you’re the folks that are on the ground. And so, with that in mind, I’m requesting that that the commission would vote today on whether that presentation will be beneficial to them at a future meeting.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Garland. We appreciate you being here today. Okay. Susan Cannell.
Susan, good to have you hear today. Thanks for coming.

Please introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.

MS. CANNELL: My name is Susan Cannell. I am a citizen and I vote in Cobb County, Georgia.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. CANNELL: So welcome to my county. I am speaking here as a citizen without any organizational connection. Obviously, the 2000 election was my first wake-up call to the issues around strange things happening in an election, and the 2016 election became a much greater wake-up call for me about problems with elections and voting systems.

The -- the idea that my vote is not secure or potentially not secure became far more important to me. And, since that election, my choice has been to vote absentee. I’m old enough that I get to do that with one application. Once a year, I can vote and it’s like, Yes, please, send me all of my ballots for the year, which I think any citizen should be able to do. That allows me to vote on paper; I know that my ballot can be sent back and counted. Ms. Eveler does a great job on -- in Cobb County, counting our votes.

And the only issue I have with absentee voting is that the envelope is -- the outer oath-of-elector envelope is insecure and allows my signature and other personal information visible to anyone who happens to see it out in
the transit from my house to the voting office where a
longer flap on that envelope would solve that problem.
So, for someone who’s had identity theft, like myself,
that’s a simple reset-per-envelope solution. I’ve priced
that one out with a -- a person who’s in the industry.

The system demonstrated with paper ballots in Virginia
-- they moved to paper ballots and they showed a system
where there was an optical scanner in each precinct, and it
meant that the voter took their paper ballot that they
filled out and they walked over to the optical scanner
themselves.

So any problem with an undervote or an overvote was
immediately -- the voter, themselves, was alerted and it
said, Would you like me to give you back -- slip back, you
know, your ballot to finish that race you forgot? Or, If
you want to fix the one where you’ve got an overvote,
you’ll need to go see the election official, spoil that
ballot and get a new ballot and correct it. But it left
that solution of undervotes and overvotes directly with the
voters so that they knew that their -- if they had a
problem, they could fix it. But --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Susan, I'm going to let you
wrap up.

MS. CANNELL: Okay. Sorry. But the systems that we
have do not allow a voter to verify their own votes.
Electronic systems are consistent; they have the same product (ph), they’re speedy, they’re fast, but they don’t have the kind of voter-verifiable issues.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you coming today, Susan. Thank you very much. Okay. Next on our list is Laura -- and I think it’s Digges. Laura? Is Laura here?

MS. DIGGES: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Laura, please come forward. Did I -- did I pronounce that right?

MS. DIGGES: You're the first person ever that got my name right.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Well, my goodness. I finally won something. Will you tell me what lottery ticket to buy now? Laura, good to have you here today.

MS. DIGGES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Please introduce yourself.

MS. DIGGES: Thank you. My name is Laura Digges, and I’ve been a Cobb County voter for 22 years, and I wanted to thank all of you for participating in this. It's greatly appreciated.

Only with robust and a comprehensive response to invest in our serious security flaws in our voting system will we (ph) -- we be able to protect the democratic process.
REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Laura, pull that mic down just a little bit to make sure that --

MS. DIGGES: I know. I’m short.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: That’s okay.

MS. DIGGES: Okay. Is that better?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Will it turn towards you more?

MS. DIGGES: (Adjusts microphone.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: There you go. Okay.

MS. DIGGES: Is that better?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. Go ahead.

MS. DIGGES: Georgia, as we all know, was woefully ill-prepared for this. Updating Georgia’s -- updating paperless DRE machines with hand-marked paper ballots and adequate cyber-security measures are crucial to our democratic process.

We need a new voting system that we can have faith in. We are asking for the highest level of protection for our voter data. As you review the options, I ask if you’ll complete the following: Can the voters be confident that the commission will seek for us the best available for election security? We need hand-marked paper ballots, software independent for every vote cast.

This system should not have any of the IT (ph) or ballot-marking devices that generate non-human readable
barcodes like the barcode system that the counties piloted.

We need a human-readable ballot that can be reviewed.

The voting system that Georgia needs should be in the best interest of the voters. Can voters be assured -- ensured that the process of choosing Georgia's new voting system not be dictated by voting-machine vendors and their lobbyists?

We also need to ensure that the vendor chosen follows basic cyber-security best practices. Can we be assured that robust postelection audits will be conducted? That voter-registration systems and E-poll books are updated and secure? That cyber-security standards for voter-registration systems and other pieces of voting infrastructure are met? Those are my questions, and I thank you for your consideration.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Laura, thank you for coming today.

MS. DIGGES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being with us. Next on my list is Elizabeth McNamara. Elizabeth, if you would, please come forward.

MS. MCNAMARA: (Complies with request.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Elizabeth, good to have you with us today. Thanks for coming. Please introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.
MS. MCNAMARA: I'm Elizabeth McNamara. I'm with the League of Women Voters of Georgia. I do live in DeKalb County and I was the president -- the president of the League of Women Voters in Georgia back in the early 2000s when we went through this process with the Twenty-first Century Voting Commission. And I really do appreciate the presentation that was made -- been made here by Chris Harvey this morning, reviewing that history and reviewing all of the reasons that we currently -- that we use the current system.

Because it is a system that, for all of the reasons stated in that presentation, the League of Women Voters of Georgia supported and we've had confidence in that system for, again, all of the reasons stated during this period of time.

I will tell you I've taken a lot of -- we've taken a lot of heat in our -- in our own organization for that support, and we obviously recognize right now that the current machines need to be replaced and that this is an important process and an important undertaking that you all are taking on here.

Fortunately, the current technology now almost invariably includes a voter-verified paper trail and the League supports that. We also support making the paper ballot the official record.
But our focus, largely, is on the systems surrounding that device. It’s been pointed out any device can be -- any device can be hacked, any device can be tampered with -- it is the system that counts, and making sure that that system is accessible to all involved, both those who are running the election and voters who are coming to the polls in all counties under all circumstances, is what is most important to the League of Women Voters.

So we welcome the opportunity to continue to interact with this -- with this commission and continue to have input. And I will tell you, based on the presentation, that one of my -- one of our chief concerns, looking at facts surrounding our voting system, is early voting and making sure that early voting remains a viable option here in Georgia, especially with a 50-percent turnout rate or a 50 percent of Georgia voters in an election taking advantage of that.

So thank you for this opportunity, good luck and I'm sure we'll be seeing you again.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Elizabeth. We appreciate you being here today. The next name on my list, I believe, is Smythe DuVal. Smith (ph) or Smythe?

MR. DUVAL: Smythe.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Smythe. Okay. Smythe, thanks for being here with us today, and please introduce
yourself, tell us where you’re from. We’re happy to have you.

MR. DUVAL: All right. My name is Smythe DuVal. I’m here in Cobb County. I’m also a citizen candidate for the Georgia Secretary of State under the libertarian party. I did decide to run this year because I couldn’t stand on the sidelines any longer.

I am also coming to you as a recovering IT director. I was at a big medical practice here in town and they said, Hey, we need a security officer. What do you say? And I said, Sure. I had no idea what I was getting into and, I’ve got to tell you: I was a little jealous of you guys being on this panel, but I kind of know what you’re getting into and my remarks are going to try to help Mr. Lee so that he doesn't have to explain most of the -- most of the things that you actually are going out and researching.

One of the things you’re going to hear about over and over again is confidentiality, integrity and -- and testability (ph). Those are the foundations for any IT security system. It's foundation 101; I would never recommend that you actually take a foundations-security course in grad school. I took it two semesters ago and the logic and math is awful.

However, I would suggest that you start to learn all about information security, listen to podcasts and learn
about the threat landscape. And what threat landscape --
is what you guys are going to be looking at in security.
It’s not just a hacker in a bedroom but is an entire
criminal organization that is way bigger than you can ever,
ever imagine.

The reason that you have these hand-marked ballot
folks really talking to you is that they have some really
grave concerns about garbage in, garbage out, and knowing
that you can actually twist anything once it gets inside of
a computer system and that you have to have a good source.

I would like to close my remarks by saying go to
Malicious Life. It is a podcast. It gives you the entire
history of malware. You'll learn a lot about it. You’ll
learn about Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear types of infections
that -- it infiltrated the Democratic and Republican --
Democratic National Committee servers.

You'll learn about that they were in there at the same
time and they didn’t even know each other were in there.
You’ll also learn that John McCain and Barack Obama had
their entire laptop and their organizations infiltrated
during their elections. There is a lot going on and there
is a huge amount. I’m standing up --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you so much. We
appreciate you coming here today.

MR. DUVAL: -- and helping Mr. Lee so that he can --
he can do his job. Thank you very much for setting up this
commission.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Smythe. We
appreciate you being with us today. Okay. Next on my list
is -- I think it’s Janine Eveler. Janine, did I pronounce
that right?

MS. EVELER: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Janine Eveler. Please come
forward. Good to have you here today. Please introduce
yourself and we’ll be happy to hear from you.

MS. EVELER: Thank you very much. My name is
Janine Eveler and I’m the director of elections here in
Cobb County, so I want to welcome the SAFE Commission and
Secretary Kemp to our beautiful county and our -- our
library facility that’s brand new.

I would like to, before I continue these remarks, just
say that -- and I hope I speak for all of the election
officials in the state -- that whatever voting system
is eventually determined, we, as election officials,
wholeheartedly will do our best to make it a success.

I know that the dedicated officials who administer
elections throughout the state will continue to operate
with the same integrity and faithfulness as they do today,
no matter what system is selected. I appreciate this
commission and the work that they’re doing to give the
voters the best possible voting system.

But I would like to focus my comments on the one possibility that I would be against, and that is the preprinting of paper ballots that are then delivered to the polling places. That -- and some -- some supporters of that option say that that’s the cheapest and easiest solution to implement but, in fact, it shifts large, ongoing expenses to the county budgets.

And I’m asking the commission, instead, to consider the many printing-on-demand options that are available. Although I’m very much in favor of having a paper record so that voters can verify their ballot and election officials can conduct recounts and audits, preprinting the ballots is not the most efficient way to go.

We have some experience in that in Cobb County. We were one of the counties that has the optical-scan unit in each of the polling places and I have records from the 2002 primary that indicates we bought 700,000 ballots to send out -- and as a large county -- and that was when we had 36-percent fewer voters than we do today.

So my estimate for what the May -- the May 22nd primary that we just conducted, it would have cost our county $272,000 in ballots at our current printing price and that's almost half of what a primary should cost in totality.
So I would ask that you also consider, you know, the transport of those ballots to the polling place, as it’s also an issue. And many of our polls have over 5,000 voters in them and the poll manager would have to load and unload 5 to 12,000 ballots out of their car and would have to account for those ballots that were used and unused for security purposes.

And, just to sum it up -- and I know we -- I have a time constraint here, I would like to urge the commission to reject an option that is a preprinting ballot option and look at some of the new technology that's either a blank ballot on demand at the polling place or a ballot-marking device type of option.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Janine.

MS. EVELER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We appreciate you being here today. Okay. Let's see. Senator, have you been playing with my microphone?

SENATOR JACKSON: I have not.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. All right. (Adjusts microphone.) There we go. All right. The next name I have is Michael O’Pitts (ph). Opitz, Michael Opitz.

MR. OPTIZ: It’s Optiz.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Michael, good to have you today. Please introduce yourself. Happy to have you.
Good afternoon now. My name is Michael Opitz. I am from Cobb County, Marietta. I am president of Madison Forum, an organization focused on good government based on the constitution.

A brief bio: I’m a technologist. I’m not -- I’m not afraid of technology. I was with AT&T and I serviced national accounts, International Paper, Federal Express and Holiday Inns (ph) for computer systems and computer networking. I understand that very well.

In AT&T manufacturing systems, I took technology out of Bell Laboratories for commercialization, internal with AT&T as well as externally, leading edge technology. And I created the data-engineering department in Sandy Springs that serviced accounts -- new telephone-company accounts nationwide.

The purpose of voting machines is to do basically one thing: It’s to record a vote accurately where we can then have a verifiable recount. The current system that we have in place fails miserably on that, and that was selected by a group of folks who ignored the basic requirement of voting systems, and we spent millions of dollars. So I would implore you to keep it simple.

I find it interesting that we would spend millions of dollars on computerized systems to do one thing, and that’s to add a single-digit number. I think computer systems are
much more suitable for manipulation of data in complex situations. Often times, when you look -- the voters will look at this and say, This is another government boondoggle where you're spending millions of dollars to do something very, very simple, a simple function.

Having applied technology and also implementing an ISO 9000 processes -- before you throw data, before you throw technology at a problem, you engineer that problem, you engineer the process to make sure that it is simplified.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I'm going to let you wrap up, Michael.

MR. OPITZ: Okay. So I would ask that you look at it as a business problem and apply a business solution, not another government boondoggle that the taxpayers and voters don't have confidence in.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Michael. We appreciate you being here today. The next name on my list is -- I think it’s Dana Bowers. Dana, are you here?

MS. BOWERS: I am.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to have you with us today, Dana. Thanks for coming. Please introduce yourself. We’re happy to have you.

MS. BOWERS: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Tell us where you’re from, Dana.
MS. BOWERS: Hi, my name is Dana Bowers. I’m the operations director for Democracy Spring Georgia and I’m a Gwinnett County voter and activist that’s committed to the cause of verifiable and secure elections.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you -- thank you, Dana.

MS. BOWERS: I’ve communicated with many of you as -- as I opposed SB 403, the bill that would’ve permitted barcodes as ballots. Thank you for your rejection of that misguided concept and your willingness to devote -- devote your time, energy and knowledge to finding the right solutions with generous input from other experts and voters.

I believe that you-all have received a proposal from the Coalition For Good Governance as well as my summarized bullet points for the immediate conversion to paper ballots using the paper-ballot system that Georgia currently owns and -- excuse me. I’m sorry. I lost my place -- currently owns and uses for counting paper ballots. Georgia owns over a thousand of these scanners and more are readily available for loan or donation.

The counties that have them now, they also have the software licenses and capability to use these scanners to count hand-marked paper ballots for all voters and get them right away. Immediately employing the current paper-ballot system for November’s election as well is definitely
feasible and gives the state and -- gives the statewide --
over, you know, a period of time to actually do what this
commission is meant to do, which is decide on a proper
system but also guarantee protection for our vote [sic].

I know a concern has been raised today that the
AccuVote scanners are unable to handle the volume of paper
ballots to be an efficient method for tallying our votes.
I’ll happily provide the commission with years of data from
many other states that use these scanners during high-
volume elections and that will demonstrate the adequacy of
the AccuVote scanners. Georgia already possesses and uses
these scanners and I urge the commission just to keep an
open mind and -- and I will follow up accordingly. I ask
that, in your near -- during deliberations --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I’m going to let you
summarize, Dana, please.

MS. BOWERS: Oh, sure, sure. No, I -- basically, all
I will say is I’ll be happy to provide information and I’ve
already been in touch with a lot of people. So I just
really want to thank the commission for, you know, doing
their job and thank you, Mr. Kemp, for putting this
commission together for us.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Dana, thank you for coming
today. We appreciate your input.

MS. BOWERS: Thank you.
REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Next on my list is Caroline Stover. Caroline, if you would, please come forward. We appreciate you being here today. Thanks for coming out, and introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.

MS. STOVER: Thank you. My name is Caroline Stover. I’m a DeKalb County resident and voter.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. STOVER: Secretary Kemp, I certainly appreciate you convening this committee here today, but my fear is that it’s too little too late. I am not as technically involved, I think, as a lot of people here -- a lot of the citizens here today. What I heard was a tremendous amount of information about financing, legal and logistical guidelines and hurdles that the committee needs to -- needs to do its job [sic].

Time is really of the essence. That’s my main concern. Time is of the essence because, in just over two years, we have an important election coming up. In just a few months, we have another important election and, of course, it’s really -- whatever happens here, you know, with this committee, it’s really too late for that election. That’s understood.

So, Secretary Kemp, my question is why now? How can -- how can you personally, in your position, justify
waiting so long? I am referring specifically to 2016 --
two years ago -- when, across the nation, there was
increased concern about voter security to the degree that
the Department of Homeland Security offered the states some
oversight.

They offered to scan networks and, unfortunately,
apparently on your watch, sir, the -- Georgia was only 1 of
2 states that refused that help from the Department of
Homeland Security. Why was that? That was two years ago.

Last year, in the midst of the controversy at Kennesaw
State’s voting center, why wasn’t --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I’m going to let you wrap up.

MS. STOVER: -- any committee convened at that time,
sir? My question is -- and I hope that there is time for
an answer -- how can you gain back the trust of Georgia
voters that -- that this committee is, in fact, going to be
able to do this by the 2020 election? That is my question.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Caroline, we appreciate
you --

MS. STOVER: Can you guarantee the 2020 election will
have safe and secure voting in Georgia?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Caroline, we appreciate you
being here today.

MS. STOVER: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: You can have a seat.
Mr. Secretary, do you want to make any comments?

SECRETARY KEMP: (Nonverbal response.)

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Okay. Next on our list will be Fred -- and I want to say Brandez (ph). Fred Brandez. Fred, did I get the last name right?

MR. BRANDES: It was close.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Close. I’m going to let you correct me when you get up here today. And your handwriting was pretty good. I just can’t pronounce it. So welcome, Fred. Good to have you. Tell us who you are and where you're from.

MR. BRANDES: Yes. My name is Fred Brandes. I’m from Roswell. And I feel a little bit like Mr. Smith in his maiden speech before congress. I know some of the younger folks probably don't know the reference, but I'm sure all of you have seen the movie.

I relocated to this great state in 1986 from New Jersey, what many native Georgians would consider foreign land. One of the first things that struck me about Georgia besides from the hospitality of the people and the hospitable climate -- if you've ever spent a day in February in New Jersey, you’ll understand what I mean -- what struck me was how elections were conducted.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fred, you’re doing fine but I want you to pull that mic down just a little bit so that I
can hear you.

MR. BRANDES: (Adjusts microphone.) That good?

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MR. BRANDES: My bad.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Go ahead.

MR. BRANDES: The difference in elections between New Jersey and Georgia is the difference between night and day. When I voted in New Jersey, I would step into a voting booth, pull the lever and close the curtain behind me, set levers to indicate my ballot choices and then reverse the lever to register my vote and draw back the curtain. I knew -- or I thought I knew that I had voted and that my vote would be counted. My confidence rested solely and entirely on some mechanical counters inside of that voting machine.

When I first moved over here to Georgia, I was delighted that paper ballots were used. When I slipped my ballot into the ballot box, I had a sense that, yes, I really have voted and that my vote would actually be counted and that maybe my vote could be reexamined. The confidence I had when I voted in New Jersey paled in comparison to the confidence I had in Georgia’s paper-ballot system.

A lot has changed here in Georgia in the 30-odd years I’ve lived here. Most, for the good and, some, for the
worst. I believe --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to give you --

MR. BRANDES: -- the current voting system --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I want to give you a chance to wrap up, Fred. Okay?

MR. BRANDES: Okay. I believe the current voting system has been changed for the worst, not only for the possibilities of unintentional human error in the software designed to tabulate the vote and possibilities of malicious manipulation of that software, but also -- and I believe most importantly -- the erosion of public confidence that one’s vote will count.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Fred, we appreciate you for coming in today.

MR. BRANDES: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you so much. The next person I have on the list is Steven Griffin. Steven, if you would, please come forward all the way up from the back. You’re not a Baptist, are you, Steven? They usually sit in the back. Good to have you, Steven. Thanks for coming today. I do appreciate it. Please introduce yourself and we’d love to hear from you.

MR. GRIFFIN: Absolutely. Good afternoon and thank you to the committee for allowing the time for public comment. My name is Steven Griffin, and I was a candidate
for public office in the most recent election. During my run, I had several people -- well, not several -- a number of people approach me with various concerns about the election system in Georgia, so I’m here today in my capacity as a private citizen but also to represent their concerns.

The issues before us today are not new. I wrote about them back in -- when I was in high school. I was a senior, specifically, back in 2006. I am pleased that we’re taking the time to discuss these issues before us today, but I encourage the commission to take a different path than the one that we play so far.

To be clear, this isn't a democratic, republican or libertarian issue. It’s a foundational one. Regardless of where one stands on the political continuum or what issues one advocates for, all of that is for none if we cannot reasonably believe that our vote counts and that we can verify that our vote counts.

As hundreds of years of democratic tradition have taught us, secure, verifiable voting needn’t to be complex and it needn’t be expensive. It simply requires that we acknowledge what works and discard what doesn't. Paper balloting has served us well and there is no reason to believe that it couldn't continue to do so. On-demand printing would allow us to improve this process even
further. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Steven. We appreciate you coming in today. Thank you for your being here. Next is Marilyn -- and is it Maxx (ph)? Marilyn, is it Marks?

MS. MARKS: Marks.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Marks. Okay, Marilyn.

MS. MARKS: I’m one of your ones with bad handwriting.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: What? It’s not that bad --

MS. MARKS: I apologize.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I couldn’t -- it’s just a C or an R. Marilyn, good to have you. Thanks for coming.

Please introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.

MS. MARKS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes. I’m Marilyn Marks and I’m here from Charlotte, North Carolina.

I’m the executive director of the Coalition for Good Governance, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, focused on election quality, transparency and voter privacy.

Thank you for your dedication to this panel and the most fundamental rights that you are protecting for us. I have four foundational issues that I would like for you -- as to consider to be placed on your next agenda.

One, whether the state should continue to have the uniform system that you heard about today, the one-size-fits-all system, and you might see it as placing all of the
eggs in one basket, one vendor, one type of system. And then whether the state should continue to have centralized programming and management -- excuse me -- of that system.

Now you’ve taken all of your eggs, put them in one basket. I think you’re taking all of your eggs and putting them all into -- combining them in one egg. It ends up with a very high-risk, highly-exploitable system and there is a reason that most states reject that as a very bad practice.

You’ve heard today very few states do it; there's a good reason why. Please revisit that in your next meeting.

I urge you to bring in other states’ officials to understand exactly why they reject those -- the single point-of-failure strategy.

Also, I would like for you to address the realistic timeframe for the implementation of the new system. I think, if you talked to other state officials who've actually done this, what you will learn is from where Georgia is today, it’s probably a three-plus-year transition to actually do it well.

And so, we've got a long time yet to deal with how are we going to transition to get there, to have a secure system, and I urge you not to be unrealistic about what it’s going to take to make the move.

You-all have from me a memo that is a proposal for a
low-risk, low-cost transition, a stop-gov method (ph), to
use your current scanners that would work perfectly fine
for the next several years as you can phase in a more
modern system.

You'll be getting another memo from me today to rebut
some of the things you’ve heard in the presentation where
I think you may have picked up some misinformation. But
thank you for the opportunity to have such a public
dialogue and to have the openness that you have on the
panel so that you can hear from us. And I know there's a
lot to deliberate over the next several months.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Marilyn.

MS. MARKS: And thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: We do appreciate you coming
in today. Thank you very much.

MS. MARKS: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Next on our list is
Todd Edwards. Todd, please come forward. Happy to have
you with us today. Thanks for coming. Please introduce
yourself, tell us where you're from and we’ll be happy to
hear from you.

MR. EDWARDS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is
Todd -- Todd Edwards. I’m with the Association of County
Commissioners. I’ll waive my opportunity for comments
other than to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for setting up this
commission. It’s a great group of folks. And, in particular, we sincerely appreciate the inclusion of county election officials who, no doubt, will provide invaluable input on both county suggestions and concerns throughout the process. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Todd. We appreciate you coming today. Thank you for your organization and all of the work you do on behalf of the counties.

Next on the list is Elizabeth Shackelford. Elizabeth, good to have you with us today. Thanks for coming. Come on up front and please introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.

MS. SHACKELFORD: Certainly. Thank you. My name is Elizabeth Shackelford. I’ve been a Georgia resident for about 39 years, and the last 20 of those in DeKalb County.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. SHACKELFORD: Thank you. I’m glad to have this opportunity to speak with you and I’m grateful for your service. I’m very concerned, like many of the folks who have spoken about this issue. I merely want to know that every person’s vote counts.

Your work will probably inform legislative decisions that will -- we will live with for at least 10 years. Voting cyber-security experts, such as Jeremy Epstein of
the National Science Foundation, state that hand-marked --
and typically pen, not pencil -- ballots -- paper ballots
are the most secure system available today. The state of
the art for voting cyber security.

I am alarmed by the number of people, including voting
officials I’ve talked to, who believe an all-electronic
ballot-marking device system is automatically superior.
Some of this tech bias is due to most people getting their
information about voting systems from vendors rather than
from independent experts.

One quick reference: The incorrect assertion that
voting machines or voting systems can't be hacked by remote
attackers because they are quote, Not connected to the
Internet, is not just wrong; it’s damaging, says -- says
Susan Greenhalgh, a spokesperson for the National Election
Defense Coalition and Elections Integrity Group.

This oft-repeated myth installs a false sense of
security that is inhibiting officials and lawmakers from
urgently requiring that all voting systems use paper
ballots and that all elections be robustly audited.

So my question to you is will there be independent
analysis of all of the possible touch points of the system
and how will you ensure that your process is not unduly
influenced by voting-system vendors and their lobbyists?

Also, like some others who have spoken --
REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: I’m going to give you a second to wrap up, please.

MS. SHACKELFORD: Okay. I worked in IT for many years. Processes always started with developing detailed requirements before any thought about vendor selection, so I’m wondering why RFIs are being elicited now without a detailed set of requirements and who preselected these vendors and on what basis? Thank you very much.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Elizabeth. We appreciate you coming here today.

Next on my list is Sara Henderson. Sara, are you here with us? There you are in the back. Come on up. Good to have you. I think we’ve -- we’ve outlived the life of some of the batteries in these mics.

MS. HENDERSON: Oh, wow. That’s impressive.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Sara, but it’s good to have you. Please introduce yourself. Tell us where you’re from.

MS. HENDERSON: Yes. Hi, everybody. I’m Sara Henderson. I’m the executive director of Common Cause Georgia. We are a good-government watchdog group. We’ve been around since 1970, here in the State of Georgia for about 20 years.

I’d just like to thank Mr. Harvey for his presentation, but talk a little bit about paper
ballots, the cost associated with going to an all-electronic system.

The Brennan Center along with Common Cause, Verified Voting and also the National Election Defense Coalition all have come up with estimates on cost of an all-electronic system. At the end of the day, with service contracts included, we’re looking at over 400 million dollars as opposed to about 60 million dollars for an all-paper system.

Now, I hear the counties. I -- we’ve tried to work with you guys on this past legislative session on SB 403. We extended the certification deadline in the Senate for the elections in order to give you more time to do the audits.

We thought we had a paper-ballot bill -- that's what we were sold and that’s what we talked about we were being sold. It wasn't a paper-ballot bill. That bill, SB 403, gave paper no authority -- none -- not in the audit process, not in the recount process.

So we are asking -- we highly recommend that not only are you looking at paper but you're considering the cost associated with it. There's a lot of flexibility in being able to correct ballots at the precincts and it also reduces the amount of provisional ballots that have to be cast as well, which is very problematic in our state.
Finally, I would like to say that we are disappointed that there are no election-integrity groups on -- represented on this commission and that's very disappointing for Common Cause, but we will be here at every commission meeting making sure that our questions are asked and -- and, hopefully, answered.

So, again, we would like to encourage you to look at paper systems and, also, we would like to encourage you to look at ways and suggest ways that vendors are not railroading this process and writing legislation as they did this past legislative session.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara.

MS. HENDERSON: Thank you for your time. I appreciate it.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Sara. I’ll need my -- (adjusts microphone) there we go. Okay. Next is Pamela Reardon. Pamela, good to have you here today. Thanks for coming. Please come forward, and introduce yourself and tell us where you’re from.

MS. REARDON: Hello, and thank you for being here and working on this. My name is Pamela Reardon. I am a citizen in Cobb County.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you.

MS. REARDON: I wear a lot of hats, but I won’t complain about those. I -- just listening to all of this,
it's very good information and I came because I'm very interested in this whole voting-machine decision or non-decision. But I have three different things that I want to bring before you.

Yeah, the machines are important; paper ballots are important, whichever way we go. But what -- what about the absentee ballots? I have a growing concern on the security and integrity of these especially after last year's primary.

So I -- I just wish we could have a better way of knowing that that person is actually that person that is signing and filling in the ballot and mailing in the ballot. That's number one.

Number two, Ohio -- or the Supreme Court, about two days -- three days ago, ruled that Ohio can purge their dead people off of their list -- because I don’t even know why there was any objection to that, but we have a lot of dead people on our list.

I have somebody I know who passed away three years ago that was still voting and it took a lot of effort by the person who was close to that person to get him off the ballot list, off the voting list.

So I think it’s a really easy solution if, when you have a death certificate and you send it to the health department, why can't it go to the Secretary of States and
purge the voting -- the list? I mean, I -- I just think that’s just a no-brainer.

The third thing is I didn't know -- because it’s federal, you said -- that you have to have dual languages or you have to have multiple languages in Spanish and in English. The last time I took my citizenship test, I had to know English. I am not born -- I was not born here; I was born in Canada, but I am a citizen in 1994 and I know that that was a requirement then, so why are -- if citizens can only vote, why are we letting noncitizens who can't speak English or read English vote? That’s my question.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Pamela. We appreciate you for being with us. Thank you very much. Okay. Next on our list is Mike -- I think it’s Lowry. Mike? Is Mike Lowry here today? Mike?

Okay. All right. Nancy Larson? Is it Nancy -- is it Larson? Nancy?

MS. LARSON: Hi.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Good to see you, Nancy. Thanks for coming today. We appreciate you being here, and please come forward and introduce yourself and we’ll be happy to hear from you.

MS. LARSON: Thank you. I appreciate your time today. My name is Nancy Larson. I live in DeKalb County and I am here today as a concerned Georgia voter. And I think, like
a lot of other concerned Georgia voters, I had to miss the bulk of the conversation earlier due to work obligations.

So my first concern is that there is a -- an open communication between voters and this commission to be able to voice our concerns and get some feedback and --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Did you say, Nancy, you missed the first part of the meeting? I’m sorry to --

MS. LARSON: Yes, I missed the previous discussion.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Yeah. I believe we said that there is a E-mail that anybody can sit through and we’ll get that --

MS. LARSON: Okay. So --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: -- and we’ll repeat it before the end of the meeting.

MS. LARSON: I’ll have to watch the -- I’ll have to watch the replay then.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Absolutely. Thank you.

MS. LARSON: So thanks. And so -- and I'm here really because it's so important for our voters to have confidence in the system and know that our votes are counted as cast.

So, back in 2002, when the Diebold system was first implemented, I was a little concerned about it back then in 2004 with groups like Verified Voting. Oh, my gosh. We don't have an audit trail or a paper trail. We don't really know if our votes are counted as cast.
And now, fast forward to 2016, with concerns about hacking and also knowing that our central server was vulnerable to hacking here in Georgia, that’s a scariest concern about the integrity of our elections and making sure that voters do have that confidence in that.

You know, here in Atlanta, of course, we have a lot of election-integrity experts; we have a lot of cyber-security experts that seemed to have been left out in the previous conversations during the state-legislature session this year around this issue.

So I want to make sure that those voices are included and the solutions that they recommend are the hand-marked paper ballots with a voter-readable receipt that can be audited and verified.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: And I’m going to give you time to wrap up, please, ma’am.

MS. LARSON: Absolutely. So I really just want to make sure that there’s transparency, that the voters’ voices are heard, IT, cyber-security voices are heard, election-security voices are heard and that, yeah, voters are going to -- or votes are count as cast. I mean, this (indicating) -- is this who I voted -- is this my candidate? I don’t know. So --

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Nancy.

MS. LARSON: -- no barcodes, please. Let’s make -- be
good stewards of taxpayers’ money because this is going to affect us all for many years to come. Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE FLEMING: Thank you, Nancy. We appreciate you being here today. Because Nancy brought up a good question about the E-mail that I was mentioning to her, where anyone could sit in. It’s SAFE Commission at sos.ga.gov. That’s S-A-F-E C-O-M-M-I-S-S-I-O-N at sos.ga.gov.

All right. Well, once again, that is every name checked off on our sign-up list. I want to go ahead and wrap up. And thank you so much. We appreciate all of you being here today. I am going to turn to our Secretary of State and ask him to close the meeting for us.

SECRETARY KEMP: Thank you, Representative. And, first, let me just thank you-all for being here today and for being a part of this. We certainly appreciate the strong turnout and -- and comments that we got today.

I wanted to thank those that presented to us for taking the time to give us some history and lay out some things for the commission to certainly think about.

And I do want to thank the commission members, again, as well for their service, not only today but in the future, and I thank those county election officials that were said earlier for being here today and for what you do every day, and for working with us in the Secretary of
State's office to make sure we have secure, accessible and fair elections.

I know several of you were asking about presentations. Obviously, two minutes is not very long and we understand that. We’re -- we’re going to give time for presentations in the future. So, as Representative Fleming said, if you're interested in something like that, if you could, just send us the E-mail to the SAFE Commission at sos.ga.gov E-mail address.

And we’ll -- we’ll look at those and just let us know what you’re wanting to present on. And the timeframe, we’ll have to look and see how many we’ve got, and where we are, and when we’re going to do that and try to figure out a good, orderly way to do that. So we’ll be glad to work with you on that.

I will say, too, that for the advocacy groups, and election-integrity groups, stakeholder groups, I know many of you-all are here today. We certainly appreciate your attendance and your input and we will -- and -- and have said this from day one, that we will -- you will be included in this process, that it will be transparent. We’ll give you opportunities. We’re glad for you to submit information like papers, presentations -- whatever, and we look forward to working with you on that.

I know Candice Broce has been in communication with
many groups as we rolled this out and, if there’s others
that we have missed or people that are interested, just let
us know and we’ll be glad to stay in communication with
you.

You can also E-mail that SAFE Commission E-mail
address if you -- if you were not on our list and you want
to be notified about different meetings that we’re having.

So spread that word out there as well and we will look
forward to keeping you-all posted on when we’re going to
have our next meeting and -- and start planning out the
rest of the process that we want to go through.

But, with that, I’ll adjourn our meeting. I wish
everybody safe travels today and thanks again for coming.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 12:31 p.m.)
CERTIFICATE

STATE OF GEORGIA
COUNTY OF GWINNETT

I, Patrick Stephens, hereby certify that the foregoing record taken down by me, as a certified court reporter, is a true, correct and complete record of the above-entitled Secure, Accessible and Fair Elections Commission meeting.

This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing proceedings, unless said disassembly is done by the undersigning certified court reporter and original signature and raised seal is attached thereto.

This the 10th day of _ _ July___ _, 2018.

Patrick Stephens

PATRICK A. STEPHENS, CCR, CVR

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