

State of Georgia

Ballot Image Audit Report

November 2025



GEORGIA SECRETARY OF STATE **BALLOT IMAGE AUDIT REPORT** NOVEMBER 2025

PURPOSE

This purpose of this report is to inform the Georgia Secretary of State of the results and findings of the 2025 ballot image audit by Enhanced Voting. The report includes details which are intended to be used by the Secretary of State during the certification process of the 2025 November Special Election and Municipal General Elections.

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Executive Summary and Findings

The 2025 ballot image audit was conducted by Enhanced Voting staff, with data collected from the Georgia Secretary of State's office and each of the 159 Georgia county election offices. The audit examined 1,581,539 ballot images from Dominion Voting System tabulators deployed during the November 2025 Georgia Special and General Municipal Elections held on November 4, 2025. The audit used the Enhanced Audit software from Enhanced Voting to examine the ballot images and scrutinize election outcomes for all 1,032 contests in the November 4 elections.

The 2025 Audit examined all contests on all ballots cast during the November 4 elections using ballot image data, batch-level results, and cast vote records to independently tabulate and compare results to those from the voting system. Enhanced Audit derived results from ballot images using optical character recognition over the human-readable portion of each summary ballot image or by detecting voter marks on hand-marked ballots and compared its tabulation against the original results provided by Georgia's Dominion Democracy Suite system.

The ballot image audit produced the following findings, with additional details available in the main report:

- The audit confirmed the election results, and the associated winners, in all 1,032 contests in the election (3 state contests, 1,029 local contests).
- Discrepancies were identified between the tabulation of two summary ballots between the human-readable portion of the ballot and the machine interpretation. Neither discrepancy impacted any election outcome.
- The human-readable portion of two other summary ballots were insufficiently legible to be interpreted in the audit, however neither of these votes could have impacted any election outcomes.
- All 11 differences found in hand-marked paper ballots between the original count and the audit were attributable to voter intent interpretations made by reviewers at the county level while reviewing the ballot images during the audit.

Table 1 – Audit Statistics

Statistic	Value
Total Ballots	1,581,539
Total Ballots Audited	1,581,539
Summary Ballots Audited	1,564,630
Hand-Marked Ballots Audited	16,909
Contests Audited	1,032 (3 state contests, 1029 local contests)
Ballot Styles Supported	3,382
Ballot Images Requiring Manual Review	1,364 (0.086% of the total ballots)
Ballots with Discrepancies	14 (see Table 3)

Table 2 - Accuracy by ballot type

Ballot Type	# Ballots	# Discrepancies	# Unreadable Images	Accuracy
Summary Ballot with QR Code	1,564,630	1	2	99.999%
Hand-Marked Ballots	16,909	11	0	99.934%

Table 3 – Discrepancies by discrepancy type

Discrepancy Type	# Discrepancies
Adjudication Differences	11
Ballot Coding	0
Discrepancy	1
Discrepancy Due to Unreadable	2

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1. Background and Methodology

The Georgia Secretary of State's Office contracted with Enhanced Voting to conduct a ballot image audit of the November 2025 Special and Municipal Elections. The State of Georgia used Dominion's Democracy Suite to conduct these elections, during which voters marked ballot either by hand (producing hand-marked ballots) or via an ImageCast X Ballot Marking Device (producing summary ballots). Ballots were tabulated using either the ImageCast Precinct scanner (for Advance and Election Day voting) or the ImageCast Central (for hand-marked absentee by-mail and Provisional ballots).

Summary ballots represent all votes both by a QR code as well as human-readable text, which can be reviewed by the voter to verify that it accurately reflects their selections prior to inserting their ballot into the scanner. Hand-marked ballots encode voter selections in ovals which are laid out on a grid of timing marks, with each oval corresponding to a possible selection in the contest.

To tabulate these ballots, the Dominion ImageCast scanners read the QR code on summary ballots and identify which ovals are filled in on hand-marked ballots. For each ballot, a record of its contents is created at time of reading called a Cast-Vote Record (CVR), and an image of the ballot is saved along with the CVR. Dominion also appends the CVR for the specific ballot to the image of the ballot (called the AuditMark). Election results are created by aggregating CVR files across a jurisdiction and producing an Election Results file containing the sum of all CVRs for each selection in each contest in a jurisdiction.

Enhanced Voting's audit collected data on the election using these three data sources: ballot images, CVRs, and election results file. The audit included training counties on supplying data for the audit, collecting data from counties and the state for the audit, and performing automated and manual reviews of all data submitted. Enhanced Voting used its ballot image auditing tool, Enhanced Audit, to automatically process all ballot images, election results files, and cast vote records (CVRs) and compute a tally for all selections and contests in the November 2025 elections that was independent from the original voting system tabulation.

Enhanced Audit uses optical character recognition (OCR) to examine only the human-readable text on Georgia's summary ballots (comprising over 98% of ballots cast during the November 4 elections). Enhanced Audit also uses mark-sensing for hand-marked ballots, and computes tallies for all contests from these data sets. It then cross-references its

tabulation against the election results files at a batch level, as well as cross referencing individual ballot tabulation against the cast-vote record for each ballot.¹

Auditors and reviewers can manually review ballots images. In cases where the image processing cannot determine what votes are reflected on a ballot, or in cases where discrepancies are detected between the tabulation of an image and its CVR, the ballots are flagged for review by county reviewers.

1.1. Audit Timeline

County officials began to upload their election results files, ballot images, and cast vote records into Enhanced Audit shortly after Election Day on November 4th. Uploading continued through the following week, and Enhanced Voting worked with state and county staff to resolve ballots that needed manual review and investigate potential discrepancies.

By November 19, 2025, all 159 county audits were complete in time for state certification on November 21, 2025.

¹ For more technical detail on how Enhanced Voting analyzes ballot images, see Appendix A.

2. Findings

This section contains details about findings during the audit. None of the findings presented in this report impacted any election outcomes. These are presented to illustrate the function of the ballot image audit as well as to document issues it discovered. No issues were discovered that impacted any election outcomes.

2.1. Municipal and Special Election Split

Municipalities whose boundaries extend into more than one county must select a county to conduct the election for them. As Georgia was simultaneously conducting a statewide special election and municipal contests, voters who lived in the portion of a municipality that is not in the county that programmed the municipal election could cast separate ballots in both the statewide special election in their home county and the municipal election run by a different county. This resulted in the county that conducted the municipal election tabulating ballots that do not contain the statewide contests in addition to ballots that do for voters located in that county. This finding was normal and expected, but noteworthy because it may break assumptions about how many ballots or votes should appear in a county.

2.2. Toombs County

The city of Vidalia has its own school system, so what appeared to be a county-wide bond should not have appeared on county ballots within the city of Vidalia. In preparing ballots prior to the start of voting, Toombs County mistakenly put the county school bond on all ballots, including those in the city of Vidalia. This issue was corrected during Advance Voting and ballots from the city of Vidalia that were already cast that mistakenly contained the contest were remade on ballot stock without the contest. Any votes in the county school bond contest on those ballots were discarded, resulting in accurate tabulation that matched the audit results. This follows the municipal and special election split issue described above: a countywide contest not appearing on all ballots in the county is normal and expected but may not align with assumptions about how many ballots or votes should appear in a county.

2.3. DeKalb County

DeKalb County conducted a recount concurrent with this audit. During the recount, one provisional ballot had its adjudication changed, creating a one-vote understatement for Decatur City Commissioner District 1, Post A.

2.4. Hall County

In Hall County, we observed a discrepancy between the text on one ballot and its tabulated CVR, including a discrepancy with the Dominion AuditMark CVR included as part of the ballot image. This caused a 2-vote understatement of the PSC 2 and PSC 3 margins, as well as a 1-vote understatement in the SPLOST contest. The Advance Voting batch containing the impacted ballot was rescanned because of this finding, and the correct totals were recertified. Due to recertification, this discrepancy is not included in the data included in this report.

2.5. Wilkinson County

We observed a discrepancy between the text on one ballot and its tabulated CVR. Unlike Hall County, this ballot image and its Dominion AuditMark were consistent; only the CVR that was used for tabulation differed. The discrepancy did not cause differences in any election outcomes.

3. Challenges and Limitations

3.1. Poor image quality on a small percentage of ballots

While the Enhanced Audit system was able to interpret 99.914% of ballots fully without the need for manual review, some ballots still required manual review due to image quality. The images were captured by the Dominion tabulators at 200 dots per inch (DPI) black and white (B&W). This was sufficient quality to perform OCR except when the image quality was reduced by poor printing or scanning conditions.

The audit found several reasons for reduced image quality, including:

- **Vertical black line:** some images had a black line running down the entirety of the image, which is often caused by dead pixels on the image sensor or dirt and other debris on the scanner glass. This was particularly impactful if the line ran through the ballot style name. An example of this is shown in Image 3 and Image 4.
- **Scanner artifacts:** ballot images with other distortions or artifacts that don't appear to be printer related were found and are most likely due to the cleanliness of the scanner. Depending on the severity and the location of the artifacts, these caused varying levels of difficulties for the OCR engine. Examples of this are shown in Image 1, Image 2, and Image 4.

We were unable to come to a conclusion about one contest on one ballot due to image quality issues (see Image 7).

3.2. Missing contest titles

The audit found that one county left off the contest titles for a municipal contest on 1,446 summary ballots. The resulting summary ballots only had the text of "Vote for Yes" or "Vote for No" but did not have the corresponding title for the contest above it. The lack of a contest title led to a higher than usual number of OCR Failures, leading to more manual reviews in these counties. An example of this is shown in Image 5.

3.3. Gwinnett County

One ballot in Gwinnett County was missing text reflecting the voter's selection in one contest. This appears to be because a portion of the ballot was cutoff during printing (see Image 6). Because the missing text included the selection for that contest, the audit was unable to compare an audited result to the CVR.

3.4. Lack of write-in results from the original results file

The original results file provided by the counties did not include the write-in vote totals for contests. This prevents the audit from being able to compare the original vote totals for write-ins with the audited vote totals. However, the cast vote records do contain write-in selections so at least one point of comparison was available for write-ins. No contests were observed that contained qualified write-ins with enough votes to impact the outcome.

3.5. Write-ins and undervotes

During the audit, it was discovered that counties do not handle unqualified write-ins and disqualified candidates consistently. Many counties adjudicated these selections as undervotes, while other counties left these assigned to their original selection. By adjudicating these selections as undervotes, the write-in and undervote totals will not match with the audited write-in and undervote totals. Additionally, in cases where the county adjudicated the disqualified presidential candidates as undervotes, those original and audit totals will also not match. Due to this, there are differences in the write-in and undervote totals, but these are not considered discrepancies in the audit.

3.6. Methodological Limitations

While ballot image auditing provides a powerful tool for identifying issues in the conduction of an election, it is not a substitute for other methods of data collection and examination.² In Hall County, the only way to confirm the contents of the ballots was to directly reference the original ballots (in this case, via rescanning).³

Ballot image auditing additionally assumes data provenance and good faith engagement from participating jurisdictions. We have no reason to believe any data we received was compromised or otherwise incomplete (and we have substantial evidence that the data we have is correct and complete), however current voting system technology lacks the ability to provide data integrity guarantees, for instance cryptographic signatures, which limits the ability of auditors to validate the veracity and completeness of data received in this way.

² Bernhard, M., Kandula, K., Wink, J., & Halderman, J. A. (2019, September). UnclearBallot: automated ballot image manipulation. In *International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting* (pp. 14-31). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

³ Hand counting may have also provided similar assurance, however because both cases were dealing with one-vote deltas, hand-counting may not have been sufficiently precise to resolve the issue. Refer to Goggin, Stephen N., Michael D. Byrne, and Juan E. Gilbert. "Post-election auditing: effects of procedure and ballot type on manual counting accuracy, efficiency, and auditor satisfaction and confidence." *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* 11, no. 1 (2012): 36-51.

Furthermore, audit methods that explicitly reference the paper ballots (such as through statistical hand counts, like risk-limiting audits) are essential to providing critical properties like software independence.^{4,5} However, the practical constraints around the efficiency and accuracy of hand counting mean that pairing that practice with an image audit enabled a more complete audit than is otherwise possible.

⁴ Bernhard, Matthew, Josh Benaloh, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter YA Ryan, Philip B. Stark, Vanessa Teague, Poorvi L. Vora, and Dan S. Wallach. "Public evidence from secret ballots." In *International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting*, pp. 84-109. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.

⁵ Bernhard, Matthew. "Risk-limiting audits: A practical systematization of knowledge." In *Proc. 6th Int. Joint Conf. Electron. Voting*, pp. 162-177. 2021.

4. County Audit Results

One-hundred and forty-four of Georgia’s 159 counties completed the audit with zero discrepancies for any contest. In cases where auditors could not reach a conclusion about a ballot, it is included as a discrepancy below.

Table 4 – County ballots cast vs discrepancies

County	Ballots Cast		Discrepancies		
	BMD	Hand Marked	BMD	Hand Marked	Total
Appling County	2035	23	0	0	0
Atkinson County	797	4	0	0	0
Bacon County	947	13	0	0	0
Baker County	347	24	0	0	0
Baldwin County	5992	120	0	0	0
Banks County	2566	40	0	0	0
Barrow County	9149	79	0	0	0
Bartow County	17037	173	0	0	0
Ben Hill County	1947	21	0	0	0
Berrien County	1808	20	0	0	0
Bibb County	19032	336	0	0	0
Bleckley County	1095	16	0	0	0
Brantley County	1700	4	0	0	0
Brooks County	1922	91	0	0	0
Bryan County	7220	64	0	0	0
Bulloch County	9199	133	0	0	0
Burke County	2513	98	0	0	0
Butts County	3703	40	0	0	0
Calhoun County	571	23	0	0	0
Camden County	5219	78	0	0	0
Candler County	1405	12	0	0	0
Carroll County	13348	115	0	0	0
Catoosa County	6966	44	0	0	0
Charlton County	1055	17	0	0	0
Chatham County	49779	810	0	1	1
Chattahoochee County	372	3	0	0	0
Chattooga County	2381	22	0	0	0
Cherokee County	41620	414	1	0	1

Clarke County	18915	204	0	0	0
Clay County	422	5	0	0	0
Clayton County	36006	218	0	0	0
Clinch County	1700	13	0	0	0
Cobb County	125010	1166	0	0	0
Coffee County	3078	30	0	0	0
Colquitt County	4207	30	0	0	0
Columbia County	21273	289	0	1	1
Cook County	2029	22	0	0	0
Coweta County	26906	278	0	0	0
Crawford County	1329	7	0	0	0
Crisp County	2778	96	0	0	0
Dade County	1703	16	0	0	0
Dawson County	3592	42	0	0	0
Decatur County	4215	94	0	4	4
DeKalb County	151194	1445	0	0	0
Dodge County	1518	27	0	0	0
Dooly County	1412	45	0	0	0
Dougherty County	10947	143	0	0	0
Douglas County	20430	126	0	0	0
Early County	1761	48	0	0	0
Echols County	182	0	0	0	0
Effingham County	9633	77	0	0	0
Elbert County	2380	46	0	0	0
Emanuel County	3000	31	0	0	0
Evans County	1118	55	0	0	0
Fannin County	2739	31	0	0	0
Fayette County	29784	210	0	0	0
Floyd County	12482	116	0	0	0
Forsyth County	30797	252	0	0	0
Franklin County	2171	16	0	0	0
Fulton County	224429	1631	0	0	0
Gilmer County	5298	60	0	0	0
GlascocK County	421	7	0	0	0
Glynn County	10448	132	0	0	0
Gordon County	5241	54	0	0	0
Grady County	2611	29	0	0	0

Greene County	3884	47	0	0	0
Gwinnett County	121216	864	1	0	1
Habersham County	6285	77	0	0	0
Hall County	24454	289	0	0	0
Hancock County	1101	39	0	0	0
Haralson County	3811	31	0	0	0
Harris County	4504	41	0	0	0
Hart County	2491	23	0	0	0
Heard County	963	90	0	0	0
Henry County	41992	246	0	0	0
Houston County	26214	252	0	0	0
Irwin County	852	5	0	0	0
Jackson County	10000	136	0	0	0
Jasper County	2728	83	0	0	0
Jeff Davis County	1155	7	0	0	0
Jefferson County	3118	137	0	0	0
Jenkins County	756	23	0	0	0
Johnson County	859	3	0	0	0
Jones County	3607	60	0	0	0
Lamar County	3261	70	0	0	0
Lanier County	711	2	0	0	0
Laurens County	6917	150	0	0	0
Lee County	3442	31	0	0	0
Liberty County	6714	142	0	0	0
Lincoln County	1413	45	0	0	0
Long County	1599	9	0	0	0
Lowndes County	9897	65	0	0	0
Lumpkin County	3462	31	0	0	0
Macon County	1567	82	0	0	0
Madison County	3717	37	0	0	0
Marion County	755	16	0	0	0
McDuffie County	3000	17	0	0	0
McIntosh County	2399	55	0	0	0
Meriwether County	3114	52	0	0	0
Miller County	584	3	0	0	0
Mitchell County	2379	86	0	0	0
Monroe County	5092	66	0	0	0

Montgomery County	728	10	0	0	0
Morgan County	2811	39	0	0	0
Murray County	2791	11	0	0	0
Muscogee County	19243	291	0	0	0
Newton County	14263	167	0	1	1
Oconee County	8125	51	0	0	0
Oglethorpe County	2751	126	0	0	0
Paulding County	21067	143	0	0	0
Peach County	3688	40	0	0	0
Pickens County	5017	46	0	0	0
Pierce County	2321	30	0	0	0
Pike County	2435	68	0	0	0
Polk County	5864	71	0	0	0
Pulaski County	782	3	0	0	0
Putnam County	2961	45	0	0	0
Quitman County	206	1	0	0	0
Rabun County	2980	45	0	0	0
Randolph County	1146	18	0	0	0
Richmond County	22986	248	0	0	0
Rockdale County	14032	122	0	1	1
Schley County	577	13	0	0	0
Screven County	1596	14	0	0	0
Seminole County	1096	13	0	0	0
Spalding County	10747	231	0	0	0
Stephens County	2409	53	0	0	0
Stewart County	814	82	0	0	0
Sumter County	4244	102	0	2	2
Talbot County	843	10	0	0	0
Taliaferro County	293	8	0	0	0
Tattnall County	2006	55	0	0	0
Taylor County	1286	37	0	0	0
Telfair County	886	7	0	0	0
Terrell County	1406	88	0	0	0
Thomas County	6232	78	0	0	0
Tift County	2894	19	0	0	0
Toombs County	2520	68	0	0	0
Towns County	1493	34	0	0	0

Treutlen County	475	1	0	0	0
Troup County	9115	175	0	0	0
Turner County	910	11	0	0	0
Twiggs County	990	35	0	0	0
Union County	5834	74	0	0	0
Upson County	4831	71	0	0	0
Walker County	5870	81	0	0	0
Walton County	13706	103	0	0	0
Ware County	3789	66	0	0	0
Warren County	858	16	0	0	0
Washington County	2226	86	0	0	0
Wayne County	2853	23	0	0	0
Webster County	363	8	0	0	0
Wheeler County	465	9	0	0	0
White County	4363	40	0	0	0
Whitfield County	8796	110	0	0	0
Wilcox County	713	6	0	0	0
Wilkes County	2057	96	0	1	1
Wilkinson County	1824	33	1	0	1
Worth County	2156	38	0	0	0
Total	1564630	16909	3	11	14

5. Example Images




Image 1 – Example of ballot image with poor quality




Image 2 – Example of ballot image with poor quality




Image 3 – Example of ballot image with poor quality

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Hancock County, Georgia

Statewide Special and Municipal General Election
November 04, 2025

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law." [O.C.G.A. 21-2-284(e), 21-2-285(h) and 21-2-383(a)]

4 Second Darrien



For Public Service Commission - District 2

Vote for Alvin M. Hubbard (Dem)

For Public Service Commission - District 3

Vote for Peter Hubbard (Dem)

Image 4 – Example of ballot image with poor quality

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Effingham County, Georgia

Statewide Special and Municipal General Election
November 04, 2025

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law " [O C G A. 21-2-284(e), 21-2-285(h) and 21-2-383(a)]

312-2C



For Public Service Commission - District 2
Vote for Alicia M. Johnson (Dem)

For Public Service Commission - District 3
Vote for Peter Hubbard (Dem)

For Mayor
BLANK CONTEST

For City Council At Large
Vote for Eric L. Hills
Vote for Veronica King
Vote for Pat Kirkland

Approves Issuance of Licenses for
Package Sale
Vote for No

Vote for No

General Obligation Bond and
Reimposition of 1% Educational Sales Tax
Vote for Yes

Image 5 – Example of ballot image missing contest titles for referenda

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Gwinnett County, Georgia

Statewide Special Election

November 4, 2025

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law " [O C G A 21-2-284(e), 21-2-285(h) and 21-2-383(a)]

711-012 Berkshire B



For Public Service Commission - District 2
Vote for Alicia M. Johnson (Dem)

For Public Service Commission - District 3
Vote for Peter Hubbard (Dem)

Gwinnett County Board of Education and
City of Buford Board of Education SPLOST

Image 6 – Gwinnett County ballot with cutoff human-readable portion

OFFICIAL BALLOT

Cherokee County, Georgia

Statewide Special and Municipal General Election
November 04, 2025

Understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law " [O.C.G.A. 21-2-284(e), 21-2-285(h) and 21-2-383(a)]

286-Victoria



For Public Service Commission - District 2
Vote for Alicia M. Johnson (Dem)

For Public Service Commission - District 3
Vote for Peter Hubbard (Dem)

T-SPLIST (Transportation Special
Purposes Local Option Sales Tax)
Vote for Yes

Senior Homestead Exemption - Surviving
Spouse Amendment

Image 7 – Cherokee County ballot with unreadable image

6. Reports by Reference

The following audit system reports are included by reference. These reports are available through the Georgia Secretary of State.

Contest Results Comparison (PDF) – comparison of the ballot count and vote totals for all Federal and State contests

Contest Results Comparison with Jurisdiction Details (PDF) – county-level comparison of the ballot count and vote totals for all Federal and State contests

Contest Results Comparison with County Breakout (XLSX) – county-level comparison of the ballot count and vote totals for all contests

7. Appendix A

7.1. Optical Character Recognition (OCR) Approach

The Enhanced Audit software is the first auditing solution to use optical character recognition (OCR) technology to process and interpret summary ballots. All in-person voting in Georgia produces a Ballot Marking Device (BMD) summary ballot, which contains the voter's selections in human-readable text along with a QR code representing those selections. The voters are instructed to review the human-readable text before placing their ballot into the tabulator. Once the ballot has been placed in the tabulator, the tabulator reads the votes from the QR code and includes them in the count. The audit is intended to tabulate the same ballots using the human readable text and compare those results against the tabulator's results which were computed using the QR codes.

To perform this analysis, the Enhanced Audit software uses OCR technology. First, Enhanced Audit reads the ballot style name printed on the ballot. This ballot style name is then used to look up the list of associated contests for that ballot style. If there are multiple possible ballot style matches, the system takes the one with the highest OCR confidence. If there is an error reading the image or a high level of uncertainty, the ballot is put into a separate list for manual review by the county election official.

Next, the Enhanced Audit system processes ballot style information (precinct identifier), contest titles, and the voter's selections on each page of the summary ballot. The contest title is read using OCR and the system matches the text against the list of possible contests for a given ballot style. Ballots with multiple languages are supported. If the printed contest title cannot be matched to an expected contest, the ballot is put into a separate list for manual review by the county election official.

Then, for each contest, the system processes the text corresponding to the voter's selection to determine the vote that appears on the ballot. The selection text typically includes the selected candidate's name but may also contain text which indicates a blank vote, write-in vote, votes for multiple options, or a yes/no vote. If the selection text cannot be interpreted by the OCR software with high enough confidence, the ballot is put into a separate list for manual review by the county election official. As discussed in a later section, the ballot image may have been of too poor quality for the OCR to determine the voter's selection. This could have been the result of poor print quality, poor scan quality, or both. In these cases, the Enhanced Audit system flags the voter's selection as requiring review by a county election official.

For the ballots in the manual review list, county election officials view the ballot image and determine the voter intent based on the ballot image. Auditors reviewed these changes to ensure consistency with the ballot images.