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2	THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE STATE OF GEORGIA
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4	IN THE MATTER OF:
5	STATE ELECTION BOARD MEETING
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7	Wednesday, December 20, 2023
8	Georgia State Capitol, Room 341
9	Atlanta, Georgia
10	9:30 a.m.
11	Day 2 of 2
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14	APPEARANCE OF THE PANEL
	APPEARANCE OF THE PANEL  Matt Mashburn, Acting Chair
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14 15	Matt Mashburn, Acting Chair
14 15 16	Matt Mashburn, Acting Chair  Janice Johnston
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Matt Mashburn, Acting Chair  Janice Johnston  Ed Lindsey

1	Transcript Legend
2	[sic] - Exactly as said.
3	(ph) - Exact spelling unknown.
4	Break in speech continuity.
5	Indicates halting speech, unfinished
6	sentence or omission of word(s) when reading.
7	Quoted material is typed as spoken.
8	
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## PROCEEDINGS

MR. MASHBURN: Ready to go ahead and get started. We've got a busy morning this morning ahead of us. So we'll call the meeting to order and I will go ahead and give an invocation. So pray with me, please.

(Invocation)

MR. MASHBURN: We'll now do the Pledge of Allegiance. And I'll ask Mr. Lindsey to lead it if he'd like to.

MR. LINDSEY: Please stand.

(Pledge of Allegiance)

MR. LINDSEY: Thank you.

MR. MASHBURN: Everybody please be seated.

## Petition for Amendment of Rule of State Election Board - Garland Favorito - Rule 183-1-12-.23 Storage of Returns

MR. MASHBURN: The first item on the agenda today is a petition for amendment of rule of state election board. Garland Favorito is the petitioner.

Mr. Favorito, the floor is yours. You can present up here or from your chair, whichever is your -- your -- whichever is your pleasure.

I had offered you up to thirty minutes and

you said that you didn't need that long. So we're not going to keep you on a strict timer. We'll just let you -- let you go as you will.

MR. FAVORITO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. MASHBURN: You are on now.

MR. FAVORITO: All right. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman. Are you -- I don't know, probably

try to keep this to about fifteen minutes as

possible.

I have a little handout. This is a very simple rule change. It's very straightforward. I've got a little handout that we can follow along for the presentation. It has to do with memory cards.

This handout is also available on our social media platforms, Telegram, if anybody's watching at home. And it'll be on our studies tab this afternoon.

This has to do with memory cards and the retention of memory cards. First of all, as you see on our diagram, you know, what does the memory card contain? We know that it contains in-person ballot image, cast vote records, and audit logs based on testimony and so on. And we also know that these are election records and

they're created automatically when ballots are scanned in order to tabulate votes.

So they are probably the most important election records other than the physical ballots because they can be used to reproduce the election results. And that's why they're so critical.

Under federal law, they are required to

be -- our election records are required to be

retained for 22 months and under state law for 24

months. And that is -- I'm referring to

52 USC 20701. It says: Every officer of

election shall retain and preserve, for a period

of twenty-two months, all records and papers

which come into his possession relating to any

act requisite to voting. That's 52 USC 20701.

In Georgia O.C.G.A. 21-2-273 says: All primary and/or election documents shall be preserved therein for a period of least 24 months.

So it's pretty common and standard. I don't think that's a surprise to anyone here. But under state election board current rule 183-112-.13, it says that the election superintendent may use the memory cards for

programming ballot scanner units for the next primary election or runoff.

Well, the next runoff could be within 30 to 60 days. And according to federal and state law, they -- this has a two-year -- you know, election records have a two-year retention period. So what we're proposing to do here is very simply change that statement to say that the election superintendent shall retain the memory cards for a period of 24 months in accordance with Georgia law. So that's something similar to that. And then there's a couple of additional minor changes in there.

So I wanted to try to address what the arguments could possibly be against this. We've heard a couple of things. We said Senate Bill 202 made ballot images public record in 2021, but that is really irrelevant because election records have always had a two-year retention period. So what happened in 2021 with Senate Bill 202 was a good thing, but it didn't -- it's not relevant to what we're discussing here.

The other issue that comes up is cost. The memory cards, we believe, cost about \$10 each, depending upon the storage capacity. And they

could be purchased as commercial off-the-shelf products from third parties and used. So you -- cost is really not an issue, particularly when you consider the cost of this voting system.

There was a hundred and seven plus million dollar initial purchase. There's a seven to ten million additional total per year for all the counties to perform maintenance, testing, certification, licensing, storage, and logistics. There was a -- \$35 million in taxpayer-funded interest when they purchased the system. And this was done without any of the required fiscal notes either for the initial purchase or for ongoing expenses.

And then finally it was financed by a 20-year bond for a system that had a 10-year shelf life. So we're going to be paying for this system 10 years after it's done. That -- so the \$10 for memory cards -- and you only have to buy those once because once you retain them, you can reuse them after two years. That's not a legitimate argument.

I want to just mention to you a couple of other things. We found that in our -- we did a survey about images statewide, all hundred and

fifty-nine counties. We found out that a couple of times counties have told us that the elections director and people in the elections office have actually told him they can go ahead and overwrite the memory cards. We have a letter -- e-mail here in my record there from former elections director Chris Harvey back in 2020 as well as one from Michael Barnes who's still on staff. And he said that you can clear used CF cards when you're ready. Well, that's not really true. That's not conforming to federal or state election law.

So just to wrap up, I mentioned in my letter that we had -- we did this ballot image analysis for open records requests, survey all the images statewide. We found out some really appalling information that 70 Georgia counties out of a hundred and fifty-nine could not actually produce the original 2020 ballot images which were required to be retained for two years based on our -- you know, the clear, plain text of federal and state law.

What we found was that there was a total of roughly 1,726,651 missing original ballot images from the 2020 election. That is across 70 counties. Thirty-six of those counties are

missing all 100 percent of the original ballot images. Six of the counties had no recount or original ballot images. Seventeen counties only had recount images. And the reason why a recount image doesn't work is because the metadata is -- you need the metadata from the original ballot images not from the recount. There's no original timestamp for audit purposes, no original metadata, and the image could've been replaced between the time of the recount and the time it was originally scanned. So recount images are basically worthless. You have to have the original ballot images.

Finally we found that another -- 34 of those counties were incomplete. And by incomplete we mean -- we don't mean that they were only missing a couple of ballot images. They were missing thousands of ballot images.

So in a nutshell -- finally one last thing is 13 counties just flat refused to comply with the open records requests. And you have all that information in the little presentation that I just left you.

So to wrap up here, what are we asking the board to do? Specifically is to make the rule

change that we are proposing here for 183-1-12-.13 to conform to federal and state law, make that conform to federal and state law simply by proposing this rule change to retain the memory cards for -- for two years in accordance with existing law, which is not -- the rule is inconsistent with federal and state law.

Second thing, I think we should -- what I would ask the board to do is issue a letter of instruction to Michael Barnes since he's still on staff to prevent any further inappropriate advice he's given to counties in regards to the destruction of election records here in the state of Georgia.

And then finally what I would ask the board to do is to issue a request to the superior court judges in counties that for all the counties that could not produce the memory cards, which were records of the original ballot images — ask the courts to release the corresponding ballots that are no longer under the two-year seal. The two-year seal has been up. These are 2020 ballots. People still have not seen them, and they — a lot of these counties have not destroyed them. They've kept them because of all

of the controversies in 2020.

So we believe that the board would -- is authorized and they could write that letter to the superior court judges in those counties and that the judges would listen to the board because the board has authority for elections in the state of Georgia.

So that is all I have and I'm happy to answer any questions if you -- if you have any.

MR. MASHBURN: Thank you for your presentation, Mr. Favorito.

Questions from the board? Okay, your mic is on.

MR. LINDSEY: Quite frankly as long as we are maintaining the paper ballots, I'm not convinced that we're in violation of the law, but I do -- I do respect your interpretation of it.

And so I -- I am curious as to whether you've done any kind of analysis because other states utilize electronic voting as well, including memory cards. Do any of the other states have the same interpretation that you have in terms of the memory cards being something that needs to be retained under federal law?

MR. FAVORITO: I -- I'm sorry, Ed. I was

1 having trouble with the question. Do any other 2 states have the -- I'm having trouble hearing 3 you. MR. LINDSEY: Have -- have accept -- agree 4 5 with your interpretation of federal law that the 6 memory cards are required to be retained? 7 MR. FAVORITO: As far as I know, there is a 8 general consensus that the clear, plain text of 9 federal law means what it says. Of course, 10 Georgia law would not apply. 11 MR. LINDSEY: I understand that. 12 what -- I guess my question is is can you cite to 13 me other states that have interpreted federal law 14 the way you have in terms of the requirement to 15 retain the memory cards? Because I'm not -- I'm 16 not aware of any --17 MR. FAVORITO: I quess I'm not a --18 MR. LINDSEY: (indiscernible) they aren't. 19 I'm just saying I don't know of any. 20 MR. FAVORITO: Uh-huh. Yeah, I'm not aware 21 of any state that has interpreted the law 22 differently than the way it's written --23 MR. LINDSEY: Okay.

MR. FAVORITO: -- which is that the election
records have to be retained. They, you know -- I

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mean, in rec -- we're in the age of electronic election records. So I don't think there's any dispute, based on the national calls I've been on, that the election records -- that statute applies to electronic election records --

MR. LINDSEY: Yeah.

MR. FAVORITO: -- as well as the, you know,
physical documents and so on.

MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. Well, certainly before we went to requiring the paper ballot to be printed and retained, the memory cards had a much higher importance. So let me ask you this question. What's the problem with trying to -- stick with the memory cards. I hear you in terms of the problem that you were citing and I think that bears a different investigation for a different day in terms of counties retaining the paper ballots, which they're required to do under state law.

Put that aside for a minute and let's just sort of stick with this. Assuming that the counties are doing what they are required to do under state law, which is to retain the paper ballots for the time period that's required underneath the law, what's the problem that

you're trying to fix here?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, the first -- the first -- the first problem is that the physical ballots are under seal. The ballot images, according to Georgia law, are available to the public. As you might be familiar, we have spent three years trying to see the 2020 Fulton County ballots. We've actually won our case in the Georgia Supreme Court. They said that we did have standing. And through all this political manipulation and the lower court system, we have still yet to see the ballots from the 2020 election after winning the case in the Georgia Supreme Court.

MR. LINDSEY: I understand your frustration. That has a lot to do with your ability and your interpretation of the law regarding the paper ballots. And I hear you and I respect what you've tried to do there.

But I'm trying to figure out how does that fit with the -- how does that fit with retaining the memory cards? Assuming that people are following the law and your interpretation of the law in terms of the paper ballots is held up, which it was held up by the Georgia Supreme

Court, you know, what is the -- what is the problem that's going to be fixed by retaining the memory cards?

MR. FAVORITO: Well, the problem that's going to be fixed -- take the interpretation of the law completely away and then just the flat -- isn't it common sense that you would want to retain the memory cards which contain ballot images, audit -- audit logs and cast vote records for a two-year period as all other election records? Regardless of what the law says, isn't that something that the board would want to do and want to request that the counties do just in case other problems come up regardless of what the law says?

MR. LINDSEY: Like I said, frankly, what I want to see is that the -- the state and the counties follow state law regarding the paper ballot.

I thank you for your time. Appreciate it.

MR. MASHBURN: Member Lindsey yields the floor. Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. Is the mic on?

MR. MASHBURN: You are on.

DR. JOHNSTON: I'm on? Can you hear me?

So I would share with my fellow board member that with regards to elections and election documents that the records have to be retained so that anyone can have access to the legal and properly documented record of who was eligible to vote, who voted, how many ballots were cast, and how many votes were counted. And those documents, whether they're electronic or paper have to be available in some way or form consistently for members of the public. It's just -- it's a -- it's an adherence to the Open Records Act. And I see that if there's difficulty with counties retaining the records, whether it's paper or electronic, there's an issue.

And more importantly if there's any question of the conclusion of an election, you -- one must have the records available and accessible for review, whether it's from an election official's viewpoint or from a member of the public, so that all can agree that the results are what they are purported to be.

So I think this is -- you know, just follows with basic good recordkeeping and legal recordkeeping. And the Attorney General of

Georgia, he addresses compliance with the requirements for records, pertaining to O.C.G.A. 50-18-70 through 77, that the records include not only documents and papers but photographs which are on -- on the memory cards and computer-based or -generated information. Well, information includes all metadata.

So I think that this is a great amendment to -- to our rule to include the requirement of the retention of the memory cards.

And I did a little research and I find the cost of a memory card today, a 16-gigabyte memory card is fourteen to twenty-six dollars. And --but Dominion, I believe, sells the memory cards and rather than getting a volume discount, I think it's a volume upmark in price to \$46.

So if -- and if you calculate that for
Fulton County for the number of scanners that
they have, it would cost -- \$46 for a memory card
would cost \$3600 for Fulton County. And for all
the memory cards used in scanners on election
day, it would cost \$32,000. But they have a
budget of 40 million, what's \$32,000? And if you
extrapolate that to the entire state, it would be
\$300,000 spread out over a hundred and fifty-nine

counties.

So I don't think it's too great of a financial burden. And, of course, the memory cards can be reused after two years. So you can -- you can apply the old business standard of a grandfather, father, and son. You can have one set of memory cards available for emergencies, have the set that you're using for the current election, and have the retained set in the records.

So I would -- I would fully support this and would make a motion to accept the amendment to this rule.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. There's been a motion made to accept the rule. Is there a second? Is there a second? Okay, without a second the motion cannot be considered.

I have a couple questions and Dr. Johnston might have the answers for these. But, Garland, you can chime in as well. And everybody who knows me and as long as I've been on the board, you know that I'm always worried about unfunded mandates.

And so what I want to do is kind of quantify. Dr. Johnston was doing a good job of

1	this already. So she might've already done this
2	work. But tell me how many cards do we use
3	statewide for an average presidential election?
4	Do we know?
5	MR. FAVORITO: I would have to be
6	speculating. I would have to just guess. And my
7	guess would be around 30,000. I'm I'm not
8	sure.
9	DR. JOHNSTON: You're close.
10	MR. MASHBURN: 30,000? Dr. Johnston?
11	DR. JOHNSTON: I would say that's close.
12	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So thirty we're
13	doing 30,000. Okay. And how many memory
14	cards are used in an average off-year election?
15	Do we know?
16	DR. JOHNSTON: Don't know.
17	MR. MASHBURN: Ballpark estimate?
18	DR. JOHNSTON: Don't know.
19	MR. MASHBURN: Probably less.
20	MR. FAVORITO: Not not very many.
21	MR. MASHBURN: Probably less or maybe the
22	same. So
23	MR. FAVORITO: No. It'd be dramatically
24	less.
25	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. And so, Dr. Johnston,

is your 300,000 based on that 30,000? Or ...

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. MASHBURN: That would be -- that would
be ten apiece, right?

DR. JOHNSTON: That would be \$46, Dominion
price. Dominion markup.

Now, one should know that the next generation of scanners that Dominion plans to use will use SD cards and not compact flashcards.

And they currently use 16-gigabyte compact flashcards which is -- it's hard to find one because flashcards today and SD cards are vastly larger, more -- more capable of storing much more information and are faster.

So I think we should expect better performance. It depends on the performance of the host device also. So the quality of the host device makes a difference on the scanning properties.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Thank you. Thank you for that. So there's been a motion made to accept the rule. It was not seconded so it could not be considered. Is there a counter?

MR. LINDSEY: Well, let me first explain
why -- I do understand your point and it sounds

to me, Mr. Favorito, like most of your complaint is regarding the retention of the paper ballots in the proper following of Georgia law. And that needs to be our focus rather than a duplicate document -- a duplicate source of the memory cards. And so that's -- that's where I think that really the focus could be. So therefore I would move that -- that this -- this rule change be -- be denied at this time.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Chairman, point of
order. I'm not able to hear (indiscernible).

MR. LINDSEY: I'm sorry. I'm sorry, sir.

I'm a little too relaxed here. My apologies. My apologies.

I'm going to vote to deny --

MR. MASHBURN: I think there's going to
be --

MR. LINDSEY: -- because I think that the issue here as raised by Mr. Favorito that needs to be looked at is the following of state law regarding the paper ballots. That's the problem if there is a problem.

And so I think this is sort of an end around, but if folks are having a difficult time retaining paper ballots, they're going to

probably do the same problem with electronic. So let's try to clean up this -- if a problem does exist, that we focus on the retention issue with the paper ballots which we have made such a hard effort to get to in 2020.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. There's -- there's been a motion to reject the petition. I second the motion. Is there discussion?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes. I would like to make a point that election documents must be available for review by anyone. And the paper ballots are not available for review. So one must rely on the electronic documents that should be retained and made available, and they just have not been. The election offices are failing in saving what is legally required for them to retain.

MR. LINDSEY: I understand your point, but that gets back to mine, which is the problem is the -- is what to do with the paper ballots.

MR. MASHBURN: Any further discussion?

Okay, we'll vote in, again, reverse chronological order of seniority. So Dr. Johnston gets to go first.

Dr. Johnston? On the motion to reject the petition.

1	DR. JOHNSTON: I vote nay.
2	MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston votes nay.
3	On the motion to reject the petition, how
4	say you, Mr. Lindsey?
5	MR. LINDSEY: Aye.
6	MR. MASHBURN: Mr. Lindsey votes aye.
7	I vote aye. The motion to reject carries 2
8	to 1.
9	Thank you for your presentation,
10	Mr. Garland Favorito.
11	MR. FAVORITO: Thank you for the time.
12	MR. MASHBURN: We appreciate you, all the
13	hard work that you do.
14	Petition for Amendment of Rule of State
15	<u> Election Board - Marilyn Marks -</u>
16	183-1-1211 Conducting Elections
17	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. The next order
18	please. The next matter we have for
19	consideration are petitions for amendment to the
20	rule from Marilyn Marks. You gave me an order
21	that you wanted to present them in. I don't know
22	if it's the same as on my agenda or not.
23	MS. MARKS: The agenda is better to me.
24	Whatever the board would prefer.
25	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So whatever is your

1 pleasure. 2 MS. MARKS: Okay, great. 3 MR. MASHBURN: Dealer's -- dealer's choice. 4 We'll let you -- we'll let you pick which one. 5 MS. MARKS: We'll start with -- well, I 6 don't know whether it's the hard one but maybe 7 the most repetitive one -- ballot secrecy. Let's 8 do that. 9 And I'm splitting my time today with Ms. Jeanne Dufort --10 11 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Just for the --12 MS. MARKS: -- our co-petitioner. 13 MR. MASHBURN: Just -- just for the board's 14 record, that one is going to be on tab 50. We 15 have labeled it on the agenda as conducting 16 elections. 17 Okay. Is the board -- everybody -- the 18 board ready? 19 DR. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh. 20 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Board ready? 21 MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. 22 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Thank you. 23 Please proceed. 24 MS. MARKS: Thank you, Mr. Chair and members

of the board. Thank you so much for letting us

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present today. I'm Marilyn Marks, director of Coalition for Good Governance.

You're familiar with both petitions that we will be presenting today: ballot secrecy as well as logic and accuracy, compliance, rulemaking petitions. We've been here before. We've tweaked slightly the last rulemaking petition that we put before you at the October meeting. So I won't go through all of the rationale for why we need secret ballots, why we have a violation today. You all are very familiar with that.

But as we start this discussion again, we should remind ourselves that across all modern democracies in the world, the right to vote a secret ballot is considered a human right in international treaties. Our nation's foreign relations laws say that governments that are elected without protected ballot secrecy are not to be considered democratic nations.

We all know it is a hard-won right to protect every voter in the country, every voter in Georgia. But Georgia has stripped away that right not by law, but by permitting the Secretary of State to adopt and deploy a voting system that

violates a host of laws.

But this board has not felt compelled to return that right to Georgia voters by simply making rules to enforce Georgia and federal laws.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the right to a secret ballot as a fundamental right. Federal HAVA laws require secret ballots and the state constitution requires it. Your own rules acknowledge the importance of the secret ballot. In fact, your own rules state that it is a constitutional right. But somehow the board seems to be taking the view: Never mind all those superior laws or the Constitution or what the Georgia statutes require in absolute ballot secrecy; we want to merely comply with a small portion of 21 -- 21-2-300, requiring BMD ballots and ignoring the conditions of that law.

That BMD use law is certainly not unconditional, but it is in the way it's being interpreted by -- interpreted by this board.

Ballot secrecy is an urgent matter that needs to be taken up right away as -- and voters need to be protected. As we head into probably the most contentious election in our lifetimes, we all know voters who don't really like one candidate

or the other of the likely presidential candidates in 2024, but they feel pressured by family or bosses at work or their pastor or their landlord to vote for a particular candidate. But they cannot vote their conscience in Georgia because of the unconstitutional voting process that essentially requires them to publicly display their votes where their pastor, their boss, their controlling spouse may see it.

There's no doubt that some authority figures are abusing the illegal system of voting in Georgia right now. This board is duty-bound to stop the illegal voting method because -- not only because it's illegal, but it is immoral to force people to vote in public.

At the October 3rd board meeting, you told us that the board needed to study this ballot secrecy issue some more. That was also the board's response in February 2020 when we asked you to make the same rule changes. Any study would've revealed that four years of voting experience has found no method of effectively shielding voters' votes on the touch screen.

At the last meeting you said there are other ways to ensure ballot secrecy. Whatever they

are, they need to be adopted today. We implore you to act to adopt those methods before the 2024 election cycle. You've acknowledged your const -- the constitutional right to vote a secret ballot in adopted rules as recently as 2021 when you were adopting rules for the early processing of mail ballots. Yet the board continues to deny our repeated petitions for rules to vindicate and protect that constitutional right.

And the board's position seems to be that it cannot adopt regulations counter to the statute. But the statute certainly requires ballot secrecy. The rationale seems to be: We will allow unconstitutional conditions to exist on voting because the Secretary of State chose a system that violates Georgia Constitution, federal law, and Georgia statutes; we will just adopt whatever he chose to buy.

The Dominion touch screens certainly failed to meet the conditions of law. The law authorizing the BMD touch screens is conditional. They have to meet a host of mandatory statutory conditions, ballot secrecy being one. But the system does not meet those laws. We beg you to

stop this anti-democratic violation of Georgia law.

At the October meeting, you expressed that you only had two options with our proposed rule: to accept it word for word, comma for comma, or decline to adopt that rule for rule into -- or to decline to adopt that rule for rulemaking process.

We thought we were clear at the last board meeting in encouraging this board to suggest amendments if there were any amendments that you thought were appropriate that could certainly be proposed. We are here, ready to take live amendments and are, you know, ready to agree with them if they're friendly amendments.

rule as proposed, word by word, comma by comma.

We're looking to protect the voter's right to

ballot secrecy. And it cries out for resolution

before this contentious 2024 election cycle

begins. Not more study, not more deflection of

the problem with the false notion that current

law requires touch screens regardless of their

violation of a host of federal and state laws.

So from there if you have some questions

about our proposed rule on ballot secrecy, I'm -I'm happy to take that now. We tried to -- we
tried to modify it just a bit to address the
questions that you had last time in taking
decision-making about ballot secrecy out of the
emergency realm.

And that was a concern, I believe, Chairman Mashburn, you -- you had last time. You were concerned that somebody would be trying to do that at the polling place.

MR. MASHBURN: Yeah, and indeed that was what I was about to ask is can you take us through the changes that you've made? Can you highlight those for us, please?

MS. MARKS: Okay. We -- we got rid of the notion in 2(c) -- we got rid of the notion of emergency situation. And we're just saying that -- and, of course, emergency situation is the creation -- it's a creature of this board's rulemaking. It doesn't exist in the statute.

The statute that -- that speaks to when you have an impossible or impracticable situation is not at all related to an emergency. And, in fact, the very example given in the statute is one that wasn't an emergency at all. And that is

when there were more candidates that would -than would fit on the ballot, the mechanical
ballot. And they said, Okay, you've got to go to
a hand-marked paper ballot. And, you know, that
was well understood long before -- long before
the election.

The other -- a change that we also made in (c) is to make it clear that if a -- if it is legally impossible or impracticable to use the touch screen or the voting system, that -- that that clearly is permitted to -- as an impossibility so that you do go to hand-marked paper ballots.

I know that some members of this board previously have taken the position that you must use touch screens so long as they are physically operating. Doesn't matter if they're operating accurately but so long as they're physically operating, you've got to use them. That -- that's really -- that ends up with an absurd result, of course.

And we're saying let's make it clear. If they're legally, functionally, or physically impossible for use, go to hand-marked paper ballots; that the determination of an emergency

should be at the discretion of the board, the election superintendent as we talked about before, or you had asked previously about the word "official designee."

I think we're consistent in saying -consistent with other rulemaking in saying that
the official designee of the county board should
be someone like an election supervisor, an
official, not the random guy that wandered out of
the bar last night and into the polling place.

MR. MASHBURN: I don't mean to interrupt you but just to have a dialogue with you, what about a poll manager?

MS. MARKS: I think the -- a poll manager in an emergency situation makes sense but probably not in a nonemergency situation. That's the way we've tried to write it. Generally, Mr. Chair, what we've seen is when the rules require a designee, it's often -- it's a typical use that this county election board's designee is the election supervisor for a host of things, whether it's accepting a complaint that comes in and signing for the board or conducting the logic and accuracy test that the official designee is doing it, while the statutes themselves tend to call

for the superintendent to do it. But we don't expect the superintendent to be the hands-on manager.

MR. MASHBURN: Because I remember the dialogue that we had previously and I appreciate you addressing it. And the issue still in my mind is one of the worst things you could possibly have in an election is for something to change while the election's going on.

And so I've always been concerned and I'm always concerned that we -- that everybody thought that this is the way it was going to be the day before the election, and on the day of the election something changes. And that's just catastrophic. So tell me how your --

MS. MARKS: Well, that's not what we're --

MR. MASHBURN: Tell me -- tell me how your proposal does not create a problem where I've got different precincts all throughout the state of Georgia making decisions.

MS. MARKS: Because again we're having -we're asking the superintendent, which is
generally going to be the election board, right?
They're meeting in public session. They don't
meet suddenly, you know, at a precinct at

10:00 on election day. They are making their decisions ahead of time. And -- but generally they have an official designee to handle a lot of the managerial decision-making. And that's --

MR. MASHBURN: So --

MS. MARKS: And that is their election supervisor.

MR. MASHBURN: So under your proposal today, what's the last day before the election that this decision can be made? What's the -- what's the final cutoff for making this decision?

MS. MARKS: We certainly don't have a magic date because boards meet at different intervals, but presumably it would be the last board meeting of that county board before voting goes into place where -- goes into effect where this might be effective, whether that's early voting or election day voting.

Yeah? You want ...

Yeah. Jeanne says that she has an answer.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay, sure.

MS. DUFORT: It's addressed in my remarks
which I haven't delivered yet.

MR. MASHBURN: Either --

MS. DUFORT: But I have watched a lot of the

practical cycle of --

MR. MASHBURN: Let's -- let's let you get to
a microphone --

MS. MARKS: Here.

MR. MASHBURN: -- one way or the other so
that the court reporter can take it down.

MS. DUFORT: So I'll come back to my prepared remarks later.

MR. MASHBURN: I get -- I get -- I get
yelled at if somebody talks without a microphone,
so ...

MS. DUFORT: Okay. And I'm Jeanne Dufort, the first vice chair of the Morgan County

Democratic Committee, and I have been engaged in the local cycle of how you prepare for elections.

So your question about what the last day is is a useful but not practical question. In fact, being ready for election day is -- is not an impulse based set of activities. It is a planning based set of activities.

So the process of determining polling setup happens well in advance. The -- a large number of counties rely on actual planograms. They may be informal, sketched out on paper. Sometimes those papers don't exist if a polling place has

been used for enough time that, quote, everybody knows how it's going to be set up. But when a piece of equipment is designated to go to a polling place -- Right? -- there's a lot of process behind that.

So in order to put this rule into place, which we're recommending, it requires a local understanding of all of the twenty-two-odd hundred different shapes and sizes, from those cinderblock buildings in south Georgia -- that, you know, that -- you know, that they are, right? You've visit them -- to State Farm arena.

There is not a one-size-fits-all when it comes to polling places. So local knowledge -- what I can do, what are my sight lines? Where are my doors and windows -- all these things go into preserving ballot secrecy as you've seen from the pictures we provided to you, right?

So it is literally not the case you can make a one-size-fits-all rule that has to be. And our rule designates that to the local person who knows their polling places.

So here's what they have to do. They have to assess it for each and every polling place.

How many of these can I set up, protecting

absolute ballot secrecy, considering windows, shape, size, number of polling stations I'm required to have? Right? And they make decisions.

The -- practically speaking, it will not be the knowledge of the local election board, it will be the knowledge of the local election superintendent. They're the ones -- the administrator -- who makes those decisions -- supervisor -- in consultation in a big county with their team.

So, for example, Athens, with a hundred thousandish voters, they've got Lisa who's been doing this for a while. She isn't their election director but she's the person who does all this stuff, figures out how it's going to be set up for each and every polling place. So there's a plan.

Now, once you have the plan, you've got to figure out what machines have to be logic and accuracy tested for which ballot styles, right?

That's part of the plan. How many ballots do I have to order? Right now they have to order enough for mail ballots plus to meet your

10 percent rule for emergency paper ballots. So

now they're going to have to look at the order.

If this -- XYZ precincts need stations set up for hand-marked paper ballots, they're going to need more ballots, right? So there's a series of plans. This will not be an impulse decision.

But I can tell you an anecdote that I personally observed of why a poll manager should not be prohibited from responding to the absolute requirement of preserving ballot secrecy.

I arrived to poll watch at one of our fairly small polling places. The station setup for people who need wheelchair access -- Right? -- the accessibility station, was sitting there facing the three chairs allocated for poll watchers. The only place available in the room for us to sit.

So we were sitting where we were told to sit and where we were supposed to sit. The station was mostly not being used and then a voter came in. And we looked with horror -- I mean, this BMD screen was closer to me than Dr. Johnston is close to me, staring straight at the three of us. The three of us looked at one another and we're, like, horrified. We're like this (indicating), whatever. The poll manager observed it.

Okay, voter leaves. She turns around and immediately comes and turns it in another direction. There were only two possible ways to turn it and retain wheelchair access, right? So she turned it. We couldn't see it anymore. But she stepped back and realized every voter standing in line to enter the room could now see it. So she turned it back and told us, Don't look.

But -- but that is both an example of how difficult it is in practice to protect ballot secrecy. But why you would want a poll manager who walks in a room and decides despite what we planned on paper, this isn't working, to be further instructed to do her best to protect ballot secrecy because that is the only rule that is covered by the state constitution and the federal Constitution and the law, right? That cannot be subrogated to other things.

Does that -- that makes -- it's a long-winded answer, but does that make sense?

MR. MASHBURN: I appreciate your answer.

MS. MARKS: And I just -- I just want to make the point about the -- we definitely need to keep emergency decision-making related to other

issues. The poll manager comes in and -- and the 1 2 pipes have bursts and the touch screens are 3 flooded. She doesn't need to have to convene a 4 board meeting to try to deal with that. 5 So you do need emergency operations to be 6 done on the spot, live when something happens. 7 We were trying not to get rid of that, but at the 8 same time, permit hand-marked paper ballots to be 9 used under that same statute for ballot secrecy. 10 Hope -- hopefully that's clear. 11 MR. MASHBURN: Thank you. I appreciate 12 that. Are you -- did I interrupt your 13 presentation? So you're still going? 14 MS. MARKS: No, no --15 MR. MASHBURN: Or we ready --16 MS. MARKS: -- you asked --17 MR. MASHBURN: -- for board questions? 18 MS. MARKS: No, no. I was done with the 19 presentation. 20 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. 21 MS. MARKS: And I asked you for questions. 22 MR. MASHBURN: Very good. 23 MS. MARKS: And you asked me about the --24 the rule here. So --

MR. MASHBURN: Very good. Wanted to give

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you a chance to finish before I turned it over to the board.

MS. MARKS: Okay. Are any other -- any
other questions for me?

MR. MASHBURN: Exactly. Questions from the board?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. MASHBURN: Dr. --

MS. MARKS: Was that a yes or a no?

DR. JOHNSTON: Go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston has the floor.

DR. JOHNSTON: Thank you.

MS. MARKS: Okay.

DR. JOHNSTON: So, Ms. Marks or Ms. Dufort, either one, I like the dedication to ballot secrecy and the positioning of the BMDs. In looking at your proposal, the -- the distance requirements between one BMD touch screen and another of 8 feet would automatically disqualify anyone using the Runbeck hubs that are used throughout many of the counties now because they have two or four BMDs that are less than 8 feet between. So some consideration of that would be an automatic disqualification or a reversion to hand-marked paper ballots if you followed this

1 rule. 2 MS. MARKS: May I address that? 3 DR. JOHNSTON: Sure. 4 MS. MARKS: Okay. What we were trying to 5 say -- no, we don't love those hubs for lots of 6 reasons. You're talking about what Fulton County 7 and Cobb County have, the big rectangular boxes. DR. JOHNSTON: Right. 8 9 MS. MARKS: Right? Okay. DR. JOHNSTON: 10 I am. 11 MS. MARKS: And, you know, what we were 12 saying was 8 feet between the center of adjacent 13 touch screens. And I'm not sure that we would 14 think of -- you know how they are on each side? 15 That we were thinking of those as adjacent touch 16 screens. 17 DR. JOHNSTON: Right. Well, what -- the 18 larger hub that is made by Runbeck -- that's used 19 in Fulton County -- has two BMD screens next to 20 each other --21 MS. MARKS: And in that --22 DR. JOHNSTON: -- probably not 4 feet apart. 23 So it would be an automatic --24 MS. MARKS: Correct.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- automatic

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1 disqualification. 2 MS. MARKS: Correct. One of those -- one of 3 those would be down one. But the two -- the two 4 on -- one of these would be -- yeah. 5 DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. The other issue --6 question, not issue but question, is the 7 restriction of 30 feet for an individual to -- to 8 walk in front of a BMD while someone is voting? 9 Positioning --10 MS. MARKS: I guess you would call it 11 behind. DR. JOHNSTON: Behind? Or behind? 12 13 MS. MARKS: Yeah. 14 DR. JOHNSTON: Yes? There are polling 15 places that are -- that are contained in a room 16 that is less than 30 feet. 17 MS. MARKS: Exactly. And it's a problem we 18 need to acknowledge. 19 DR. JOHNSTON: So the entire polling place 20 would be disqualified for use. 21 MS. MARKS: I don't think so. No, no. 22 We're talking about we don't -- we're suggesting 23 that no one be able to walk behind the voter

voting, right? But within 30 feet.

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So in -- take those small polling places,

many in rural areas, what we would envision is that you would have one touch screen facing every corner so that you would have at least four touch screens there. The voter would have his back to the corner and then you're right, it's impossible to put any more.

That's why we would say then the -- most of your voting stations would be hand-marked voting -- a hand-marked paper ballot. But the idea would be nobody could walk behind me if I'm the voter, have my back to the corner.

DR. JOHNSTON: I see. And the third distance parameter that's -- that you've added is no such officer may -- may not stand within 6 feet of the polling place scanner during operation by a voter.

I'm going to say that practically speaking, Ms. Dufort, so many voters need assistance or questions or have difficulty or think they will have difficulty inserting their ballot into a scanner, that it would automatically disqualify this rule.

MS. MARKS: Two -- well, there are two answers to that. One, your person who's stationed to watch the scanner, have them stay

more than 6 feet away and only approach when a voter needs it. But the other thing that -- that most states do for scanners -- and, in fact, we've got some counties in Georgia that do it, and that is create a ballot secrecy folder, envelope and --

DR. JOHNSTON: Exactly.

MS. MARKS: -- all it is if you think about it is a manila folder cut -- with a little inch of it cut off. You put your ballot in that. You hold that folder that's -- with the tab of the ballot sticking out at the top and -- and it feeds it into the scanner.

DR. JOHNSTON: I like that suggestion.

Florida uses that and it's very effective. And
--

MS. MARKS: Very typical.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- and acknowledges the
respect that a ballot deserves for secret ballot
voting.

MS. MARKS: Right.

DR. JOHNSTON: All right. Another question.

Just a logistics question. So you have the ballot secrecy rearranged voting hubs or BMDs and now the line is too long. It's 30 minutes and

there's a -- there is a desire to resort to or revert to hand-marked paper ballots.

In early voting in Fulton County that has 360 precincts thereabouts and over -- and a thousand ballot styles, in early voting I have a hard time imagining the logistics of having that many ballots, paper ballots, available for use. So it would require at least a ballot-on-demand printer in every early voting site or packs of preprinted ballots because you have to maintain the proper precinct for each person that's voting.

MS. MARKS: Correct. Okay. So thank you for -- for both of those questions. What we would envision, going back to -- we would -- we don't want to see the lines back up and say, Oh, okay, now we have to go to -- to paper ballots.

We would want to see the setup with voting stations anticipate that -- that the majority of voting is going to take place with hand-marked paper ballots. And so it would all be set up a head of time. We wouldn't wait until the lines backed up.

But in terms of the paper ballot style management, absolutely. You are going to need to

be able to have ballots available for every ballot style. And Fulton County would be the biggest challenge. But states and municipalities do this all over the nation.

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But when you look at -- it's been a while since we've done it, but we did some quick and dirty numbers on Fulton and looked at the various early voting locations in Fulton. We determined that basically in almost all of them, with 20 ballot styles, you could take care of 70 percent of your voters because people tend to vote at the same voting location in early voting year after year, either where they work, where they live. It's quite predictable that the top 20 ballot styles, about 70 percent of your voters then have ballot-on-demand printers, which are not nearly as fancy as they sound like, for your one-off if you've got an Alpharetta voter that's voting down near the airport, which is going to be rare, but you still need to accommodate them.

And Dominion has a laptop ballot-on-demand application that can just be hooked up to a cheap Office Depot printer and create ballot-on-demand with an official ballot created by the Dominion program on the spot. This is not new technology.

This is already purchased by the state and it's in the system.

DR. JOHNSTON: Correct. They use an HP printer that's about this big now (indicating) for ballot-on-demand printing. I think it costs about 900 --

MS. MARKS: With the Dominion markup --

DR. JOHNSTON: It may -- oh, maybe 3,000 for the Dominion markup. And it would require for a county like Fulton County to have probably 35, one for each early voting site and other counties that have fewer voting sites, but they would need a ballot-on-demand printer and they would need -- and that would be an additional recordkeeping and accounting of how many ballots are printed off of those ballot-on-demand printers. There has to be documentation --

MS. MARKS: Yes.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- and recording of -- of
such actions.

MS. MARKS: Right. And -- and -- and that's -- you know, other states have learned how to do that long ago. But not only that, but the amount of money you would save by not having the plethora -- the 35,000 very much more expensive

touch screens to set up, test, transport, secure, et cetera. You would end up saving so much more money. You could -- you could buy a new HP printer for every election and toss the old one in the landfill and still save money.

DR. JOHNSTON: Okay. I yield the floor.

 ${\tt MR.\ MASHBURN:}$  Dr. Johnston yields the floor.

Board member Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: Just a -- just a couple of
quick. In addition to the practical --

MS. MARKS: Mr. Lindsey? Mr. Lindsey, we can't quite hear you.

MR. LINDSEY: In addition to the practical concerns that Dr. Johnston raised, just a couple of points of clarification. Number one, the argument that we have or that we ever have ignored the right to a secret ballot because of electronic voting is patently false.

We have a strict rule that requires

private -- that -- of secret ballots. We have a

state law that requires secret ballots. We have

admonished counties when we -- when a complaint

has been raised about secret ballots, about the

positioning of electronic machines not affording

people with secret ballots. As a matter of fact, y'all were at the last hearing when we did just that.

MS. MARKS: But it didn't work. That was
the problem.

MR. LINDSEY: And -- well, it didn't in that situation. And we took corrective action, telling them to stop.

MS. MARKS: Then the corrective action
didn't work.

MR. LINDSEY: No. Well, we don't know that
yet. We don't know that.

MS. MARKS: We do.

MR. LINDSEY: Well, we -- they haven't had a vote since then. So we don't know that. So right now what we have is a strict law to -- a strict law that requires secret ballots.

We also have a requirement by the state that you -- that you have -- that you conduct your votes by electronic. That sets a clear mandate to the local governments -- to the county governments to -- to operate your electric ballots, electronic ballots, in a way that protects people's secrecy.

You -- you made a point of going, well, we'd

take -- take a look and see whether or not other things need to be done. I have taken a look.

Quite frankly I like that strict prohibition.

There is no exceptions. There's no way to get out of the use of electronic ballots by using a, Well, we've got to do privacy.

No. If you've got to -- if you -- the state has mandated electronic. The state has mandated private, secret ballot. So you've got to conform to that, period. And they've got time to do so. So for that reason, I think that that clear line of demarcation, which I believe is being watered down by your proposed rule change, is -- is something that -- that is disappointing.

And so that's why I have some concerns with that from a policy standpoint, in addition to some of the practical concerns raised by Dr. Johnston. And please feel free to respond.

MS. MARKS: So, Mr. Lindsey, we don't -- we don't understand how you can do both. We have never seen it work in Georgia. We've gone through four years now. No one, no county has been able to both protect ballots secrecy and use the touch screens.

And, you know, I would respectfully

disagree. The law does not say you will conditionally use touch screens.

MR. LINDSEY: I didn't say that.

MS. MARKS: Because you will -- you will use
touch screens that protect the absolute secrecy
of the ballot --

MR. LINDSEY: And I agree with you.

MS. MARKS: -- when we don't have those.

MR. LINDSEY: And I agree with you. And that's -- and that's something for the Secretary of State to deal with and something for the local counties to deal with. But right now we've got a strict rule that -- involving both and you're absolutely right.

But right now it's up to them to come up with the -- we've given them discretion on how they do it because different counties are different, different configurations, and precincts are different. And so we've got to give folks a certain amount of leeway as long as they recognize the importance of --

MS. MARKS: We -- we would re --

MR. LINDSEY: -- a secret -- hold on. As long as they recognize a secret ballot. Now, please.

MS. MARKS: We would respectfully disagree that people have got leeway on whether or not to protect the constitutional right to ballot secrecy.

MR. LINDSEY: Actually, I've said just the opposite. They don't have any leeway.

MS. MARKS: Right. But they -- if they absolutely, physically cannot use the touch screens, and that is -- in most situations the rooms are not big enough, they can't do it, then it is impossible, impracticable, and --

MR. LINDSEY: Then they need to get another room or they need to get another precinct. Then they need to change --

MS. MARKS: Not everybody can -- can use a State Farm arena.

MR. LINDSEY: (indiscernible)

MS. MARKS: It is impract -- I mean, the idea of saying we're going to take -- make these counties go get enormous gymnasiums for every precinct in order to accommodate our noncompliant touch screens is -- is not what the law presumes. And so --

MR. LINDSEY: No. What the law presumes is that -- is that you find a location that also

meets the requirements of --

MS. MARKS: It is -- no. No.

MR. LINDSEY: -- of a secret ballot.

MS. MARKS: It certainly --

MR. LINDSEY: I'm sorry, but that's -that's what the law presently requires. And if a
county is not doing that, that's another issue
altogether.

MS. MARKS: That -- that would seem to take things to an extreme and absurd place. There are many counties that don't have a single public building that would accommodate. And we've -- we go to rural counties all the time and see their precinct facilities. And many of the counties wouldn't even have a single building that would accommodate a number of voters and the machines. And to say, Well, you need to build new buildings to accommodate these machines because they don't comply with basic rules ...

Now, I -- you know, Ms. Dufort and I were -were sharing the presentation time. And we
haven't let her do her presentation. Shall I
stand aside a minute and --

MR. LINDSEY: Please do. Please do. I'm
sorry, I didn't realize that -- I wouldn't have

even started if you hadn't -- hadn't --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sit right here.

MR. LINDSEY: My apologies.

MR. MASHBURN: Absolutely. Make yourself comfortable.

MS. DUFORT: That's okay. And although
Marilyn and I are good friends, I am standing
here before you representing the Morgan County
Democratic Committee.

Thank you, George.

All right. I just have to say, wishing something is so does not make it so. So you are right. There are absolutely clear laws about protecting ballot secrecy. And you are right, there is a law that says use these ballot-marking devices for in-person voting as long as they comply with all other laws.

In your -- in your October letter declining it, you said, point two, we already have rules, no addition rules are necessary. I'm guessing maybe you were the draftee of that because that is the position you're taking today. But there is a trove of evidence before you in our petition, in the filings in federal court that violations of ballot secrecy are routine across

the state and continuing, right?

Because I represent a rural Georgia county,
I am going to take the position that we don't
have lawbreakers as our election directors across
the state. We have seen them try hard. We have
seen counties like Fulton spend millions of
dollars in this effort to figure out how to meet
the rule -- Right? -- these rules that are out
here.

They have not -- it's not because they have not tried, but there is a part of this for which this board -- I'll say this board because you are the -- you are the current caretakers of the board, right? You're not the people who always sat before you. In 2020 when this board responded to Athens-Clarke County, Athens-Clarke County was the first board to really try to meet the three standards that have to coexist: protect ballot secrecy, deploy one voting station for 250 voters, and keep the equipment available for view to be sure there's no hacking or malfeasance going on. Those are three rules that coexist.

They tried so hard. They had meeting after meeting, planogram after planogram. They really worked it and came to the conclusion it was

impossible to meet that standard. And they took action.

This board showed up in Athens within a week of that, threatening them with large fines. The message that the State Election Board sent that day was heard all across the state.

The message was the State Election Board will punish any county that does not comply with universal use BMDs, but will not punish a county that fails to protect ballot secrecy. Prioritize universal use over ballot secrecy, that was the message sent by action of the State Election Board that day. I was at that meeting. I was at many of the election board meetings that led up to that meeting and saw how hard they tried.

And the finding of that board was not that you could protect it. The board did not figure out a way to solve it. The board said try harder. So here we are, almost four years later. And all across the state, people have been trying harder.

But do you know what I hear that they will not tell you? I have heard from many election directors. We heard the message of Athens. We don't want to be "athened." They call it that in

private conversations -- election directors. We can't raise this issue with you or we'll be "athened." They're scared of you.

And that is why you have an obligation to take an affirmative action to send a different message to contradict the message that you put out into the universe on that day with that decision in Athens-Clarke County.

You know, I was going to talk to you about why it matters. It really doesn't matter why -- why ballot secrecy matters because it's the law, right? There isn't any other area where when we talk about the law, we say, Well, if it's too hard, we can just break the law. If it's going to cost too much, we can just break the law. It is not a conditional right, the right to ballot secrecy.

And you created the circumstance right now where the counties have a clear direction from the State Election Board, whether you like it or not. Your predecessors created that condition.

That, more than anything else, is why you have an obligation to act right now so that you're not burdening those local election officials with being law breakers.

By the way, SB202, let's talk about that.

SB202 says it subjects all of us -- me as a poll watcher, election workers, subjects us to the charge, to felony charges. We can be accused of intentionally observing a voter in a manner that allows them to see votes.

On that day -- that anecdote I told you earlier -- I could've walked out of there with felony charges because everyone knew that that screen was in front of me. We couldn't not see it without turning away and not doing what we were there to do, which was observe elections and observe activity and observe voters, right?

That cannot be the standard that you allow to rule. You have to protect election workers. You have to protect citizens that are walking into the polling places. And you have to protect voters, right? We -- we say where I come from everybody knows your name. But they're not supposed to know how you voted unless you tell them. It's not okay.

But it's also just not the law that says it's okay. And you have to undo what you did, you the board, your predecessors, what you did in 2020 or things won't change. Thank you.

MR. MASHBURN: Thank you. Yeah. I was the only member of the board who was there in Athens that day, so ...

MS. DUFORT: That was a day, wasn't it?

MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston and -- and board member Lindsey are exonerated and absolved from that, but I -- I remember at the time examining the meetings of the Athens-Clarke County Board of Elections and they couldn't even approve their minutes. They couldn't even get a vote to approve the board's minutes.

So that board was in a lot of dysfunction.

The -- the chair and the election director had major dysfunction and trust issues. So there was a lot of dysfunction going on in that -- in that board of elections at that time. So we'll just let the transcript from that hearing speak -- speak to that.

I do want to ask -- this is probably for

Ms. Marks, but just to correct the record.

Ms. Dufort brought up the rejection letter that

was sent from the October meeting. And in your

presentation on the first page, it stated that

the understanding that the previous petition was

denied because the board determined that they had

had not enough time to study the problem.

And so I -- I took no offense from that. We had a lovely conversation before the meeting started. So no, I'm not mad or anything, but I went back and reviewed my letter that I sent, denying the petition. And I don't recall that being one of the rationales listed at all.

MS. MARKS: It did.

MR. MASHBURN: And it's the only one listed here. So you and I are not going to be the only one reading this document. So I just wanted to correct for the record --

MS. MARKS: Right. Well, I -- I -- my comments related to what -- what the board decided in the meeting. I think if we went back to the transcript of the meeting, that that was the rationale, the primary rationale, that -- that you needed more time to study.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So I just wanted to correct -- correct that on the record. And the -- and then me personally, just speaking for my own self, the petition was over -- if I recall correctly, over 300 pages. So I spent hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours studying it. So -- and I know the

board is very conscientious in their work and so they studied it as well.

But I'd like to go back to Ms. Dufort and just be real clear with each other. And I appreciate your candor. I absolute -- totally appreciate your candor because it would be easy just to try and say this isn't -- this problem doesn't exist, but I think we owe ourselves the respect to have a dialogue about it and discuss it and if it's a problem, it's a problem.

And so let's go back to the example that you gave us where the poll watchers were in a poll on election day and they came across this problem.

And so am I correct or incorrect that under this proposal, the poll manager or the election superintendent would decide on election day that ballots secrecy cannot be met and therefore we're switching to paper ballots on election day?

MS. DUFORT: No. I would say you're
incorrect.

- MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Explain --
- MS. DUFORT: Because under these --
- MR. MASHBURN: Explain it to me.
- MS. DUFORT: Under these proposed rules, that polling place would never have been set up

the way it was. Understand, it was set up to the best of our election director's ability to follow one voting station for 250 voters -- Right? -- set up in a manner that they could be observed against hacking and protect ballot secrecy, right? And she had a given space.

So she set it up to the best of her ability.

Under this proposal, she would make that -- and she doesn't want to be "athened," that's a fact.

I've had that conversation, right?

Under this proposal, that polling place would never have been set up that way to begin with because that condition would've been recognized. She would have had the direct charge to protect ballot secrecy absolutely and set her polling place up with a mix of stations, however many ballot-marking stations she can possibly set up.

I don't disagree that that is a priority, right? But she would then stop to the extent -- because, see, you don't need eight foot apart when you're voting -- marking a ballot by hand. So she would have the flexibility to push more stations close together, separate the ones that needed protection because the big screen needs

protecting. And we would never have been in that position.

But I'm just saying to you also, practically, I never ever want to take away the authority of the poll manager to respond to actual on-the-ground conditions to make voting better and more legally compliant for all voters.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. And so back to Ms. Marks now.

So are -- are you and I clear, Ms. Marks, that your proposal is that the deadline for this determination to be made is the last board meeting before the election whenever that board meets?

MS. MARKS: As a practical matter, you know, I -- I would certainly look to the judgment of the board, but generally I would say that the deadline would be when they are doing their final approval of the layouts of the precincts and that sort of thing.

You know, if it -- if their board meeting's five minutes before early voting starts, no.

It's going to need to be before that. I would leave it to their judgment as to making this decision at the time that they are setting up

their polling places, approving the setups, approving the hours and that sort of thing and not try to nail it down to the last -- well, say, Oh, it's the very last meeting. They may need to have an emergency meeting about something else.

We don't want to wait that long.

But they understand what their problems are here. They -- they know. The example that Jean just was using, I'm sure that it was well-recognized that if they tried to cram all of the machines in the voting place that there were going to be problems, when the poll manager and the superintendent could have said, Okay, our accessible voting station is going to be facing the corner. We're going to have wheelchair -- plenty of access to have wheelchair access into here. And then the rest of the voting stations that we need will be hand-marked stations other than in the corners.

They would have that concept in mind well ahead of the time the poll watchers show up.

- MR. MASHBURN: Okay, thank you.
- MS. MARKS: Certainly.
- MR. MASHBURN: Other comments from the
  board?

MR. LINDSEY: Just an ask. And I have

talked to a lot of different counties. We go out

and visit with them and we chat with them.

Has -- has anyone joined in your petition from a

county election board?

MS. MARKS: We haven't asked them to. And,

I mean, we could have, but what -- when we do

talk to election supervisors and superintendents,

board members, they tell us, We completely -
many of them tell us, We completely support what

you are doing, but we are not about to speak up

and be fined by the State Election Board for

saying that we need to do this.

We get a -- we have a lot of silent support about this, but I'm not coming to you, saying, trust me, they're all behind us.

MR. LINDSEY: Yeah.

MS. MARKS: They know that they will be punished if they speak up on this.

MR. LINDSEY: Because frankly that's just patently false.

MS. MARKS: Well, they feel -- it may be --

MR. LINDSEY: Hold on. Let me finish. Let
me finish. You've had your moment --

MS. MARKS: It may be, but they feel --

MR. LINDSEY: Let me finish my --

MS. MARKS: They feel that way.

MR. LINDSEY: Let me finish my -- because I have talked to them. And I made a point and others on the board have made a point that we are in a collaborative phase, that we've worked well with them, we've worked well with the county that was out of -- out of compliance before and have worked with them in terms of working at a solution rather than fining.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We can't hear you.

MR. LINDSEY: We are --

MS. MARKS: They can't hear you.

MR. LINDSEY: I'm sorry, guys. And that we have been in a collaborative phase and we have asked, and -- and with other folks. And I haven't had folks -- and I -- you know, a lot of what we do is going, Okay, guys, the law is not working, what needs to work? Because our job is to then go back to the legislature and then, you know, be your mouthpiece with the legislature. And we have sat down and sat with many -- many supervisors.

And in terms of simply coming to us and saying the present thing doesn't work and

therefore we'll fine, I think it's just patently false. I'll tell you that much right now.

MS. MARKS: Well --

MR. LINDSEY: For one thing, there's no -there's no ability for us to do that, and, number
two, there's no incentive for us to do that. So
that's just my comment.

MS. MARKS: But, you know, the legislature has addressed this. That's the problem here. It is only the State Election Board that has not addressed it. The legislature's been incredibly clear about it. They say the touch screens that are to be purchased must provide absolute secrecy of the ballot.

MR. LINDSEY: I agree.

MS. MARKS: And so they've done their job.

The problem is that the -- what they ordered in the law is not being enforced by this board. And the rules don't comply with what the state and federal authorities ordered.

And you talk about how you had one county who you've talked to and they began to try to address it. But we know enough about the little shields that they are going to use in the set up to know that that may be a nice try, but it will

not be effective. You know, it -- just the physical properties are going to keep that from being effective. So we shouldn't pretend that it's going to be effective and we shouldn't pretend this is a legislative problem. And we shouldn't say, Well, we'll just wait until the Secretary recognizes that he's out of compliance with the law.

It is really this board's duty, responsibility, particularly as we're facing 2024, to say, Okay, we must act and recognize the Secretary's out of compliance, the equipment's out of compliance with all of the laws. It's up to us.

MR. LINDSEY: I'll -- I'll let you have the last word.

MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: Just a few comments. Indeed, ballot secrecy is a priority and it is a requirement and it is the law. And it can be a problem, especially with the large touch screens. It could be a problem with paper ballots too, if they're not protected for privacy also.

Just to -- for the people here and those that are listening to know, 44 states use

hand-marked ballot -- paper ballots and that's kind of the elephant in the room. I mean, I know this -- this petition for this rule amendment is about secrecy, but it's the elephant in the room because the consequence of not meeting the ballot secrecy standard is to revert to hand-marked paper ballots.

So, you know, I think we just all should acknowledge that. It can be done. This petition led me to -- or required me to start visiting places that were using hand-marked paper ballots. There's nothing to be afraid about with hand-marked paper ballots.

I traveled to Orange County, Florida and witnessed the use of -- Orlando, Florida in using hand-marked paper ballots. And in fact the entire state of Florida requires such.

So to -- I mean, it's not that it's

dangerous to use hand-marked paper ballots. It's

feasible to use hand-marked paper ballots. With

that comes the additional requirements of

security of that method of voting.

I will -- if -- if we had that, I wouldn't lose as much sleep over the issue of security of paper ballots as I do over the issue of using BMD

big screens.

So that being said, the conflict is with the Secretary of State who decides what voter system the state uses. And so -- so whether -- so that's the issue here is it's -- it's the Secretary of State's decision and it's -- the question really goes to either the legislature or the Secretary of State as to whether they would allow the use of paper ballots like you're proposing in this rule.

So it's -- they're -- it's all tied together and I don't think we as a board could implement this rule because of the affect that it would have on the manner of voting that is the decision of the Secretary of State. And I really have no issues other than some of those distance requirements. I'm not afraid of hand-marked paper ballots. I think we could certainly use them, but it's -- it's in the hands of the Secretary of State in my opinion.

MS. MARKS: Dr. Johnston, could I address
that for a moment?

DR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MS. MARKS: I would respectfully disagree that it is in the hands of the Secretary. The

law is pretty clear, is quite clear, that the Secretary can only certified a system in Georgia that meets all of the Georgia statutes.

The Secretary certified 5.5A Dominion system, where it violates Georgia law in a number of places, including ballots secrecy. The role of this board is to enforce the law. That is really clear in the statute, in its mission.

This board must enforce the law. It is not up to the Secretary to make up any ol' system that violates the law and then we all have to live with it just because the Secretary violated the law in certifying the equipment.

DR. JOHNSTON: Well, Ms. Marks, the question today is whether to accept the petition for the rule amendment. It's not a decision on the Dominican Voting System which is a debate for another day. The issue here today is whether to accept these rule changes, and I think we need to keep the focus on -- on the petition.

MR. MASHBURN: And if you're -- if the board is ready to make a motion, the chair's inclined to hear it. Is there a motion?

Y'all have made your presentations? Okay.

Is there -- is there a motion?

1	MR. LINDSEY: (inaudible)				
2	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Is there a motion?				
3	I'll make a motion. I move to reject this				
4	petition. Is there a second?				
5	DR. JOHNSTON: Second.				
6	MR. MASHBURN: It's motioned and seconded.				
7	Is there any discussion? Hearing no discussion,				
8	we're ready to vote.				
9	Dr. Johnston, on the question to reject the				
10	petition how say you?				
11	DR. JOHNSTON: Aye.				
12	MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston says aye.				
13	Mr. Lindsey?				
14	MR. LINDSEY: Aye.				
15	MR. MASHBURN: Mr. Lindsey says aye. I say				
16	aye. So the motion to reject the petition				
17	carries unanimously.				
18	We'll now move to the second question and				
19	that is logic and accuracy testing, right?				
20	MS. MARKS: I'm sorry, what was you				
21	say				
22	Petition for Amendment of Rule of State				
23	<u> Election Board - Marilyn Marks -</u>				
24	183-1-1208 Logic and Accuracy Testing				
25	MR. MASHBURN: We're up for logic and				

1	accuracy testing?					
2	MS. MARKS: Yes.					
3	MR. MASHBURN: Okay.					
4	MS. MARKS: Logic and accuracy.					
5	MR. MASHBURN: And so that is tab 51 in the					
6	board's packages.					
7	And whichever of the two would like to					
8	begin. And, again, y'all have not requested the					
9	full 30 minutes					
10	MS. MARKS: No. I think you were					
11	MR. MASHBURN: we'll have as long as you					
12	want.					
13	MS. MARKS: going to do, like, four					
14	minutes. Do you want to go first do you want					
15	to go first because I have a passout					
16	MR. MASHBURN: The passout.					
17	MS. MARKS: as we talked about.					
18	MR. MASHBURN: But don't pass out.					
19	MS. MARKS: Yes. We have an insider joke					
20	about passing out.					
21	MS. DUFORT: Okay.					
22	MR. MASHBURN: Ms. Dufort					
23	MS. DUFORT: Again					
24	MR. MASHBURN: Ms. Dufort, the floor is					
25	yours.					

MS. DUFORT: -- I'm here on behave of the Morgan County Democratic Committee. In preparation for this morning, again I read the transcript of the October meeting, discussion, and your letter of denial.

In light of no objections raised, it seems you might be prepared to adopt the provisions in our proposed rules that bring logic and accuracy testing into compliance with state law. That is the central point of our petition, that the General Assembly required comprehensive logic and accuracy testing, but the Secretary of State's procedures do not require it and no one is enforcing it.

And the recent election in North Hampton

County, Pennsylvania delivered a chilling warning

that LAT shortcuts present unacceptable risk.

Election workers had to tell voters that ballots

that did not reflect the choices they made, at

least not in the human readable text, would be

counted anyway because the barcode and the text

did not match. Thorough logic and accuracy

testing reduces the chances that programming

errors like this will go unnoticed.

Your questions and concerns in your letter

of denial were focused on the second purpose of our rules, to ensure access to meaningful public observation. And as the representative of county committee, public observation is a big deal for us. We have lots of volunteers who engage in that. Observing logic and accuracy testing is very similar to observing tabulation and scan recounts.

And recently I was at the Fulton County recount, credentialed as a candidate observer.

Dr. Johnson[sic], you were there. So please have some patience with my retelling of it.

It was a very large room with a plexiglass room in the center with the scanner set up inside of that. The general public was confined to an area from which you could see things were happening but you couldn't tell what was happening. But as credentialed observers, we were allowed much closer but not inside that plexiglass room. But from our vantage point, I was about half the distance to the scanner as I am to Dr. Johnson. So I could read the monitor that was set up at the scanner, and I could tell, in fact, a lot of what was happening. I could not hear. And really audio -- hearing what

election workers are -- are talking about as they solve problems would really, really help.

In my home county, with credentials I'm allowed into the room with the scanner. Without credentials, again, I'm outside, looking through a thick plexiglass window at an angle that does not allow effective observation. And I fully understand that far too many people have beha —been behaving badly towards election workers.

But the answer cannot be to reduce public observation. There has to be an answer to that but it can't be reducing the public's right to observe elections. The rule must allow for visual -- effective visual observation with the ability to hear discussions of poll workers so we can understand what's happening.

There must be reasonable access to supervisors so observers can report problems and ask questions. We were able to solve a few things by being able to talk to the Fulton County -- new Fulton County board election director, Dr. Patrise, for example, right?

Observers must be held to a reasonable standard of behavior, similar to what we use for poll watchers. Don't interfere with the work,

direct questions to the supervisor not the workers, and don't disrupt the work.

Transgression should result in removal. Control the behavior not the access.

The logic and accuracy tests have been modified to address the concerns you raised. Testing for the 2024 presidential preference primary begins in about eight weeks. So the time to act is now. There will be a high cost if you defer this decision. Democracy dies in the dark. Thank you.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace.$   $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MSHBURN}}\xspace:$  Ms. Marks, you have the floor.

MS. MARKS: Great. Have a seat.

Yes. Thank you again. As you know, HB316 requires that logic and accuracy testing be done on the BMD voting system. It's fairly standard across the nation, the type of language in the logic and accuracy testing HB316 language.

However, in October 2020, in our Curling v.

Raffensperger case, the court found that the

procedures used by the Secretary of State in

ordering the counties to conduct their LAT fall

far short of what is required by Georgia law or

common sense. And the court asked that this

board specifically address the failure to comply with logic and accuracy testing statutes before the January 2021 runoffs.

That's been some time ago and this board still has not acted, although we are facing again a contentious, will be high turnout, 2024 election cycle. Still hasn't been addressed. We're asking you at this meeting to address it.

At the last meeting, the discussion was, as you declined our petition, that more study was needed. We hope you've, indeed, studied the situation and learned that the shortcuts that the counties are taking with the Secretary's permission and instruction are dangerous and result in Georgia's logic and accuracy testing falling far short of the minimum standards. It permits both human errors in the ballot definition files as well as undetectable hacking to occur.

I want to try to give a couple of examples that might bring home the issue that -- and urge the action of this board. We sent you materials in -- Ms. Dufort just mentioned -- the BMD election problem that happened in North -- North Hampton, Pennsylvania last month when human

error, no hacking, happened in creating the ballot definition files. It wasn't caught in LAT, but what happened was that the barcode was accurate. It reflected what the voter was putting into the machine, touching the machine, but the face of the printed ballot was incorrect.

We all know that that is certainly physically, mechanically, electronically possible. And it is a perfect example of why we don't believe that computers should be marking ballots and recording the vote.

There were numerous opportunities for the North Hampton officials to catch this error in the logic and accuracy testing on the touch screens. However, LAT on touch screens is super complicated. It is complex; it's tedious; it's error-prone. And even with hundreds of tests, they did not detect the error.

But what happened shows the danger of ballot marking devices because once those marking devices were out in the field with the error, the voters could not print a ballot that reflected their choices on a particular judge retention issue. If they chose yes, no was printed on the face of the ballot. They could -- they could do

ballot after ballot and still would get the wrong answer.

It could happen in Georgia. And in Georgia it says in an audit -- and just as in Pennsylvania, in an audit what's on the face of the ballot counts. So an audit would have in -- if the margins had -- had been such in Pennsylvania, an audit would actually reverse a correct outcome. A hand recount would've reversed a correct outcome. It's -- so the importance of logic and accuracy testing as well as a hand-marked paper ballot is hard to quite imagine.

So I brought -- I brought some examples with me. Let's -- the first -- first one is a Fulton County ballot. Let's just go -- move right past that one and go to --

MR. MASHBURN: And just for the court reporter to note, the board has these that -- passouts, handouts that you've given us. Each board member has one. It's --

MS. MARKS: Yeah.

MR. MASHBURN: Begins Fulton County official ballot at the top.

MS. MARKS: Right.

MR. MASHBURN: So this --

MS. MARKS: And I'm -- I'm asking to set that one aside for the moment and let's go to the next one that says the Chatham County official ballot for November 3, 2020. And -- and it's got a --

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Third -- third -- third page?

MS. MARKS: It's says -- on the front of it, it says, "Correctly interpreted," in a little box up at the top on the left-hand --

MR. MASHBURN: Yeah, third page --

MS. MARKS: -- side.

MR. MASHBURN: Got it.

MS. MARKS: The one I want to look at is

"Correctly interpreted." Let's -- and I want to
say before we panic, this was the machine

recount. And this was only counting at this
time -- this was only counting the presidential
election. But I just want to give you an example
of what can -- what can happen.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay.

MS. MARKS: Okay. So let's look at the constitutional amendments at the very end.

Constitutional Amendment 1, the vote says it was

for yes. Constitutional Amendment 2, the vote 1 2 for yes. Statewide referendum, vote for yes. 3 Are you with me on the front page? MR. MASHBURN: 4 Yep. 5 MS. MARKS: And then we go to the next page 6 which the Dominion System calls the audit mark 7 page that tells us how the barcode was 8 interpreted. And we get the same thing in those 9 constitutional amendments, right? Yes, yes, and statewide referendum, yes. Everything is 10 11 correctly interpreted, it appears. The printed 12 text that the voter saw is the same as what the

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (inaudible) the
barcode.

cast vote record tells us was voted, right?

MS. MARKS: Yeah. The -- what -- what's in the barcode. So I'm saying there's no exception here. This is fine, right?

MR. MASHBURN: I'm with you.

MS. MARKS: Okay. Now -- and this is nothing I have altered -- this is -- this is a ballot image. There are hundreds of these that were printed like this. Okay. The voter saw yes, yes, yes.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (inaudible)

MS. MARKS: Wait. Well, we're not there yet. No, we're on the next Chatham County ballot, right?

MS. DUFORT: The one that does not say corrected. Look at the second Chatham ballot.

MR. MASHBURN: Pages four -- well, pages 5 and 6.

MS. MARKS: Okay. So it's -- it's the

Chatham County ballot that has no text box on it,

okay? So it says -- what the voter saw here is

those last three yes-or-no questions. Yes, yes,

yes. With me? On the front page?

MR. MASHBURN: I'm with you.

MS. MARKS: That's what the voter saw.

Well, let's look at what the machine counted.

The machine says no, no, no. Okay. So -- so what the machine ended up doing -- now, again this -- this was a recount, so that's -- these particular races were not being recounted. But what this shows is that these glitches can happen in the database and have happened in the database where --

MR. MASHBURN: Sorry to interrupt you but just for the record, we don't put people making presentations under oath, so you're not under

oath, but tell us for the record where these images came from, how they were obtained, the chain of custody, et cetera.

MS. MARKS: I don't know that I can tell you the chain of custody, it's been so long. But I will -- I will go back and find it and send it to you by e-mail. But these came from Chatham County's databases after the November 2020 election. And these are ballot images from the original count and the recount.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So I'm just going

to -- I don't want -- I'm -- I'm not intending to

put you on the spot here. So what I'm going to

do is I'm going to leave the record open and let

you submit that and we'll just append that into

the record.

MS. MARKS: Okay.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay?

MS. MARKS: That's -- that's just fine.

That's just fine. But I think what you will see is that in this glitch -- and again I'm not saying these were counted this way because it was a recount and this is not the race that was subject to being recounted. I'm showing the example of how glitches can occur that count the

ballot differently than what the voter is seeing.

And this just underscores the need for logic and accuracy testing that is robust and fully compliant with state law.

Right now it is -- it is the most superficial kind of testing that is taking place where each machine is tested in a very, very, very limited way.

Here's another example that I think
everybody can relate to. And that is that the
system does not even require that they test to
make sure that if a race is undervoted -- in
other words, somebody skips a race, somebody
doesn't vote at all, there is no test that will
make sure that a vote's not counted there, that,
you know, the vote doesn't show up for Sally even
though nobody touched Sally or any other
candidate on the screen.

There's -- there is no question, and as -as the court has held, that the measures that are
un -- that are in process today are inadequate.
They don't meet state law. And we are asking
this board to -- to require that the counties
meet the state law in the testing. It is
tedious; it is complex; it is extremely hard to

do; it is expensive; it's time-consuming, but it needs to be done. And we're asking this board to 3 insist that the -- the law be enforced and asking you to think about the example of Northampton, Pennsylvania which you are going hear again and 6 again as when a voter is looking at his ballot 7 and cannot trust the printed text, what do you There's nothing that can be done then. Okay? Any quest -- oh --10 MR. MASHBURN: Well, I just thought of -- I 11 just thought of a -- kind of a workaround. Have 12 these been -- have these ballot images been

admitted into evidence in the suit?

MS. MARKS: No.

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MR. MASHBURN: Okay. I was -- if they were -- if they were admitted, I'd say, okay, this is Plaintiff's 1 (indiscernible) --

MS. MARKS: No, not that I -- no, they haven't.

> MR. MASHBURN: Okay. I tried. I tried.

MS. MARKS: That's -- well --

MR. MASHBURN: I'll just leave the record open.

MS. MARKS: I beli -- okay. And I believe that what I'll find for you -- I think what I

1	will end up finding for you is that we obtained				
2	the images from the Secretary of State. But I				
3	don't want to swear to it right this moment.				
4	MR. MASHBURN: And you're not under oath.				
5	MS. MARKS: It's been so long. 2020's been				
6	a little while ago.				
7	MR. MASHBURN: And you're and you're not				
8	under oath. But I'll just leave the record open.				
9	I thought I had a workaround for it, but we'll				
10	just leave				
11	MS. MARKS: Thank you.				
12	MR. MASHBURN: the record open and let				
13	you get that to us.				
14	MS. MARKS: We'll we will definitely get				
15	that to you.				
16	MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Thank you.				
17	MS. MARKS: But thank you for the question.				
18	MR. MASHBURN: Thank you. Any questions				
19	from the				
20	Oh, do you want to go? You went first,				
21	Ms. Dufort.				
22	MS. DUFORT: I went first.				
23	MR. MASHBURN: You went first, okay.				
24	MS. DUFORT: So if there's any question				
25	about the access side of it.				

MR. MASHBURN: So here we are. Questions from the board. Dr. Johnston, you get to go first.

DR. JOHNSTON: Sure.

So, Ms. Marks, I'll -- I'll just say for the -- for the folks here and those listening that I'm in -- I was in favor of this amendment last time and I'm in favor of it now.

I do know that -- that this voting system is -- is enormous and the -- and the devices that are involved with the election process. It is time-consuming to -- to perform logic and accuracy. It's like setting up controls in the laboratory to make sure that your medical tests are accurate. You do a control every single day --

MS. MARKS: Right.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- every time you use the machine. So it's -- it's just doing that same -- that same proper procedure and step to make sure that the machines are working properly and counting properly. With thousands of scanners in the state and tens of thousands of BMDs, every one of those pieces of equipment, those devices, must be checked and they must -- it must be

confirmed that they're accurate before the election begins.

We know -- and from -- and also from the

Pennsylvania experience, but we know that if -
once those machines have been checked for an

accurate database, if there's any change made

after that point, it has a consequence --

MS. MARKS: Uh-huh.

DR. JOHNSTON: -- and it can actually -- it actually change -- it could change the ballot.

It may not, but it must be tested because if there's -- if it does change the ballot, the electronic ballot, it corrupts the ballot.

You're dealing with a corrupted ballot and that can have an effect. It may not have an effect but it can.

It could have an effect that would change the results of an election. And it might change the results of an election and the candidate is the one that suffers the consequence of this because they don't know. They just say, Oh, darn, I just barely lost, and would never know unless it's a very obvious unexpected result.

So shortcuts have consequences, and I fully support complete logic and accuracy testing. And

the -- and the prohibition to not change the ballot database once that has been set and the election begins. If we had -- if one were using paper ballots as in our code -- it says if you have time, you may reprint the proper ballot.

Well, when you're changing the electronic database for a ballot, you're essentially thinking you're reprinting it. But you have to go through all the proper steps of logic and accuracy testing of every single piece of equipment to make sure that it is true and accurate. Thank you.

MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston yields the floor.

Board member Lindsey?

MR. LINDSEY: Yeah, thank you.

Is -- in terms of your rule, is --

MR. MASHBURN: Speak close to the microphone.

MR. LINDSEY: Thank you. I'm sorry, guys.

In terms of the rule, do you define logic and accuracy in your rule? I don't see where it's -- where it's defined.

MS. MARKS: Well, the -- the rule itself is entitled and has been for decades, I guess, logic

1 and accuracy testing. 2 MR. LINDSEY: I'm saying -- but is there --3 have you -- you're asking for us to add the terms logic and -- logic and accuracy; correct? 4 5 MS. MARKS: No. We're -- no. We're not. 6 MR. LINDSEY: Well, I'm seeing it several 7 places where it looks like it's being --8 MS. MARKS: I'm so sorry. Your -- your -what's that now? 9 10 MR. LINDSEY: It's -- it looks like you're 11 adding -- oh, is logic and accuracy simply 12 something that you guy have highlighted in the 13 rule? I'm sorry. Maybe I misunder --14 MS. MARKS: I think that's just the way it 15 printed straight from --16 MR. LINDSEY: That's fine. 17 MS. MARKS: -- the (indiscernible) --MR. LINDSEY: That's fine. That's fine. 18 Ι 19 just wanted to know whether or not that was a 20 term that being added or --21 MS. MARKS: No, no. No --22 MR. LINDSEY: -- whether that's --23 MS. MARKS: -- the -- the --24 MR. LINDSEY: So the logic and accuracy

testing is already in the rules.

1	MS. MARKS: Correct. Correct.
2	MR. LINDSEY: Okay. That's good.
3	MS. MARKS: And I don't know whether yours
4	is a color printout.
5	MR. LINDSEY: It is. I just
6	MS. MARKS: Okay.
7	MR. LINDSEY: I just didn't understand the
8	bold and the under
9	MS. MARKS: Right. Right. That's
10	MR. LINDSEY: underline. Okay. My bad.
11	MS. MARKS: No problem.
12	MR. LINDSEY: Which relates back to O.C.G.A.
13	21-2-379.25(c); correct?
14	MS. MARKS: I believe that's correct.
15	MR. LINDSEY: Okay. And it's your
16	contention that that these that the
17	requirements in the requirements in that code
18	section, which we are required to enforce when a
19	complaint is raised, lays out in specifics a
20	sufficient level of testing required under
21	MS. MARKS: For logic and accuracy.
22	MR. LINDSEY: So I well, I guess my first
23	question is do I need to go back to the
24	legislature and ask them to tighten up this?

MS. MARKS: No, no. The --

1 MR. LINDSEY: So you're fine --2 MS. MARKS: What the --3 MR. LINDSEY: You're fine with (c). I just want to make sure. I'm just --4 5 MS. MARKS: Right. No --6 MR. LINDSEY: -- checking the box here. 7 MS. MARKS: We believe -- we believe that 8 for purposes of preelection logic and accuracy, 9 the legislature got it right. 10 MR. LINDSEY: Okay. 11 MS. MARKS: And they did what most states 12 do. 13 MR. LINDSEY: All right. That's my first 14 question. 15 MS. MARKS: Okay. 16 MR. LINDSEY: All right. And so that's 17 good. Just one less thing I've got to go back 18 and ask the legislature. And we've got a few 19 things we've already talked about. 20 But it's your contention that several 21 counties, and perhaps multiple counties, are 22 not -- are not following (c); correct? 23 MS. MARKS: Virtually all of the counties 24 are not complying with the law. But what they

are doing is using the Secretary of State's

1 procedure manual, which is a -- far, far distant 2 from the law. And Judge Totenberg had quite an 3 extensive hearing in the finding on that. MR. LINDSEY: Yeah, I understand that. 4 5 Has -- you know, we've already had that 6 discussion yesterday as -- in terms of our 7 authority with the Secretary of State. Not going 8 to go down that path again. But we have asked 9 for clarity from the -- from the General Assembly 10 in terms of our -- I'm just letting you know in 11 case you weren't here yesterday --MS. MARKS: Right, right, right. 12 13 MR. LINDSEY: -- for that part. 14 MS. MARKS: But our -- our request is you --15 your --16 MR. LINDSEY: I know. I know. I know. 17 (Cross-talking) 18 MS. MARKS: -- (indiscernible) that the 19 counties --20 MR. LINDSEY: I'm sort of -- I'm just 21 letting -- letting you and the audience know that 22 we have requested that the General Assembly 23 clarify what our authority is when it comes to 24 the Secretary of State.

MS. MARKS: Right.

MR. LINDSEY: Has there been any specific complaints filed against any counties that have not complied with (c)? Because that's -- that's the clearest way for us to mandate something, is to -- is to say, hey, you're out of compliance.

MS. MARKS: Well, of course, it -- the public is not permitted to know the nature of the complaints that are in your backlog. And I think I read somewhere that there are 300 complaints in your backlog. And if any member of the public ever tries to find out, we are told no, that they are secret.

MR. LINDSEY: Yeah. That's another thing, quite frankly, we're working on because I agree with you. It shouldn't be secret.

MS. MARKS: So -- so we can --

MR. LINDSEY: I just wanted to let you know.

MS. MARKS: -- not answer your question.

MR. LINDSEY: As far as I know -- and I will say this, as far as I know, there isn't one, and I will also state for our greater audience and the people in this room --

By the way, if your arms get tired, you can put it down and I can still see it. I promise.

Or you can keep it up. Your call. I just wanted

to make sure you can understand that. I see it.

I just wanted to let you know that that's -that's -- this board is operating, trying -trying to clean that up as we get -- as we get
proper administrative staff, as we get proper
funding to move beyond that because I do agree
with you, complaints should be a matter of public record.

MS. MARKS: And --

MR. LINDSEY: I'm just sort of giving you
that background.

MS. MARKS: Right. But may -- if I could come back to the comment you made, though, that it -- it sounds like you're saying, well, it's easier, perhaps, for this board to deal with specific complaints than it is with promulgating rules.

MR. LINDSEY: I understand. I understand.

MS. MARKS: No --

MR. LINDSEY: Let me get to my point.

MS. MARKS: -- but if that is the way we need to come to you, to -- rather than asking you to enfor -- to promulgate rules and to create rules that support the law is to pile up the complaints about these things --

MR. LINDSEY: No, that's not what I'm
saying.

MS. MARKS: Okay.

MR. LINDSEY: Hold on. That's not even
remotely what I'm saying.

MS. MARKS: Okay.

MR. LINDSEY: What I'm saying is that the rules are there -- rules are put in place to supplement what the law mandates. Rules are not there to simply repeat what the law mandates.

MS. MARKS: Correct.

MR. LINDSEY: And in looking at (c) -- and this is my issue with this one is that (c) lays out pretty much in detail. A lot of times we get laws that sort of tell us in general terms what they want us to do, and it's up to us to come back with details.

But (c), by contrast, lays it out pretty
much in detail. And if they -- and if the -if -- big "if" here because they're not here to
respond, if the Secretary of State or the
counties are not following the explicit
requirements in (c), that's an issue that we'll
have to deal with. And I'm not sure if simply
repeating the rule is the way to go other than --

other than pushing on them to enforce that which is already laid out in great detail. I'm looking at it again, and I did look at it before. So anyway.

I'll yield while I look at a couple things.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Mr. Lindsey yields the floor.

I have a couple of questions, please. And everybody by now knows when Mashburn starts talking, we're going to start talking about unfunded mandates. So here we go.

I want to make sure that I'm understanding your -- the way you've marked this -- just so I don't have any mistakes -- in that the copy that we have, there's a blue strike-through for what you're taking out and a red indication for that which you want to add; correct?

MS. MARKS: Correct.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So if we look to three -- if we look to 3(b) --

MS. MARKS: Correct.

MR. MASHBURN: -- you want to add this
second sentence.

MS. MARKS: Right.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. So I want to

address -- I want to find out what we're telling the counties they're going to have to do with regard to the second sentence. So let's -- let's kind of talk about that.

MS. MARKS: Okay. And this goes to

Mr. Lindsey's comment actually. He's saying that
the statute itself is pretty explicit already and
specific. This just kind of adds a little bit
more emphasis, saying, and what we mean by that
is that each ballot-marking device shall be
tested for accurate recording and printing of
each candidate selection on each contest for each
ballot style for which the BMD can be used for
voting.

MR. MASHBURN: All right. And do you have an estimate of how long it takes to do this test for one ballot style on one machine? Do you know?

MS. MARKS: Certainly not --

- MR. MASHBURN: I'm not -- this isn't a game
  of catch you. I'm just trying to quantify this.
- MS. MARKS: Certainly not because we've never been -- had that kind of access, but do recall that that's going to be incredibly different if you've got a runoff race with two

1 candidates versus a May primary ballot with 47 2 contests and --3 MR. MASHBURN: Right. MS. MARKS: -- a hundred and thirty 4 5 candidates. 6 MR. MASHBURN: Okay, that makes sense. 7 So, yes, I don't think MS. MARKS: there's -- there's a uniform answer there. 8 9 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Is there -- is there 10 any estimate or idea on how many ballot styles 11 that we use in Georgia? Ballpark? 12 MS. MARKS: It's going to be in the 13 thousands. 14 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. 15 MS. DUFORT: (inaudible) 16 MS. MARKS: Yeah. Yeah. It -- there will 17 be, as she was just saying, one per seat per 18 precinct. But there're -- there are going to be 19 more than that because let's take a primary. 20 every -- let's see, you're going to have 21 Democratic, Republican, and nonpartisan for every 22 race and every precinct. 23 So, no, there is no question this is an 24 enormously complex, time-consuming, expensive ... 25

But it was -- the legislature put it in for a

1 The legislature also determined that reason. 2 there was no cost to doing this. 3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (inaudible) MS. MARKS: We challenged them on that at 4 5 the time. So --MR. MASHBURN: Do you agree or disagree with 6 7 that? 8 MS. MARKS: Well, we disagreed --MR. MASHBURN: That there's no cost? 9 10 MS. MARKS: -- at the time. And we -- and 11 we strenuously disagree now, having watched it in 12 process. 13 MR. MASHBURN: So do you have an estimate 14 for us on how much that we can go to the 15 counties -- how much -- an estimate on how much 16 more time this is going to take them than what 17 they're doing now, assuming the ones that are 18 complying with the law -- how much more time are 19 y'all asking them to put in? 20 MS. MARKS: It is not that we are asking 21 them --22 MR. MASHBURN: Or is your petition asking 23 them to put --24 MS. MARKS: We are -- our petition is not

asking them to take more time than what they are

doing now. Our petition is to do what the law requires. Not -- not to say, well, what you're doing now is okay. We don't -- we don't want it to cost any more. We don't -- we don't want it to necessarily have to complete what the legislature said you need to.

But, Mr. Chair, it is -- it is substantial. It is quite substantial. It's thousands -- a county like Fulton, thousands of hours.

MR. MASHBURN: More.

MS. MARKS: Yeah. Because they're doing a major shortcut right now that is ineffective.

I'd almost say don't even do -- I shouldn't -- that would be an exaggeration for me to say don't even do what you're doing now. But the -- but they're spending a lot of time ineffectively today.

MR. MASHBURN: Yeah. Because when I talk to the counties, I don't hear that they're afraid of me, but I hear that they don't have the time or the staff to do what they're doing now. And they're always saying, Don't put more on us.

MS. MARKS: Right. Okay. But how do you say, Well, then you don't need to follow the law?

MR. MASHBURN: Right. Yeah, I get that.

MS. MARKS: Yeah. Yeah. Because we've given you -- Northampton has taught us all that 3 this can and does happen in real life. Chatham is teaching us it can and does happen. We can't say, well, we'll hope for the best for election 6 day because what happens on election day is there 7 is no way to recover if such an error gets through the system.

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And I think you all are the most aware of any -- anybody in Georgia of how hard it is for the counties to retain experienced election workers right now and the kind of the brain-drain from the election officials happening right now. Errors are going to occur more.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. I appreciate it. Thank you.

More questions from the board? I think we were -- I think I took the floor while Mr. Lindsey was getting ready to have some further comment or question.

Are you ready?

MR. LINDSEY: No, I just -- well, you know --

MR. MASHBURN: Mr. Lindsey has the floor again.

MR. LINDSEY: You know, just -- you know, where you say shall test each race, they say all races. I'm still looking at the -- at the code section. So, you know, and that situation is -- and -- and does require that all marker -- all ballot markers be tested accurately. I'm just --

MS. MARKS: I'm happy to say each, every,
and all.

MR. LINDSEY: That's fine. I'm just simply pointing out that I think that that's covered by the code section. And -- and I agree that the proper testing is critically necessary. And I want them to follow the law because, as you and I have discussed, while, you know -- you know, every -- every system is -- is capable of having bad guys intervene, whether it be paper or electronic, it's always important to stay one step ahead of the bad guys and including the issue of upgrades and testing and everything else.

My only question here is whether (b) is sufficient notice to the -- to them on how to do it and whether or not yours is -- your additional language is necessary.

It kind of reminds me of the movie, A Few

Good Men, in which, you know, the defendants object, judge rules, and the -- one of the other lawyers gets up, But, Judge, I really, really, really object.

And, you know, we have here a rule already in place and we have here a code section that very much in detail lays out what should be done or what is -- not should, but what is required to be done. And our issue is getting the local counties to comply with the state law and with, for that matter, Secretary of State. And that's my comment.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. We thank you for your presentation. We thank the board for their involvement and their questions. So at this time the -- the chair is ready to entertain a motion from a member of the board if there is a motion.

DR. JOHNSTON: I'd like to make a motion that we accept the amendments to the petition -- the petition for amendments to rule 183-1-12.08, logic and accuracy testing, to be considered and -- and amended.

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. There's a motion to accept the logic and accuracy petition to enter into rulemaking. Is there a second? Is there a

second? Without a second, the motion cannot be entertained. Is there a counter -- is there another motion?

MR. LINDSEY: Move to reject. And after I make my motion, I'll explain why.

MR. MASHBURN: There's been a motion to reject the petition for logic and accuracy testing. I'll second that motion to reject. Discussion.

MR. LINDSEY: I want to make it very clear I'm not moving to reject logic and accuracy testing. Logic and accuracy testing is already required under Georgia law, under the code section O.C.G.A. 21-2-379.25(c) and underneath the existing rules.

And it would be incumbent upon us and the Secretary of State to push on the counties those methods that put them in compliance with this -- with the existing rule and that I simply don't see anything to be added by this proposed rule. Gets back to my analogy on A Few Good Men.

MR. MASHBURN: Thank you. Further discussion? Dr. Johnston?

DR. JOHNSTON: No further discussion.

MR. MASHBURN: No further discussion. So

1 we'll be ready to vote. We'll vote in reverse 2 chronological order of seniority. 3 Dr. Johnston, how say you on the motion to reject? 4 DR. JOHNSTON: Nay. 5 6 MR. MASHBURN: Dr. Johnston says nay. 7 Mr. Lindsey? MR. LINDSEY: 8 Yea. 9 MR. MASHBURN: Mr. Lindsey says aye. I'll 10 say aye. The motion to reject passes 2 to 1. 11 Thank you --12 MS. MARKS: Can we ask --13 MR. MASHBURN: -- very much for your 14 presentation. 15 MS. MARKS: -- a follow-up question? Could we ask a follow-up question? 16 MR. MASHBURN: Sure. 17 18 MS. MARKS: Thank you. Thank you. 19 Mr. Lindsey said that the role of this board 20 would be to enforce, and we would absolutely 21 welcome that. 22 If we were to submit a complaint this week 23 yet, which you know we can do that pretty fast; 24 we know how to complain -- that if we were to

submit a complaint this week, could the board

address that complaint in the near term or is it going to end up in the backlog? Given that we've got 2024 elections --

MR. LINDSEY: I understand. And I do hear you. And the best way I can answer is I'll see what I can do because I do understand the importance of the testing. And it is something that is of great importance to me. And I know it's of great importance to the rest of the board members, particularly since certain upgrades were not able to be done prior to the '24 election.

And so our best backstop is accurate testing. And so let me see what we can do.

MS. MARKS: Thank you. So we have your e-mail addresses.

MR. LINDSEY: Oh, yeah.

MS. MARKS: You'll be hearing from us.

MR. LINDSEY: I get them. And I get all of
theirs too (indicating).

MR. MASHBURN: Okay. Thank you so much for
your present --

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$  . LINDSEY: And for the record, I read them.

MR. MASHBURN: Thank you so much for your presentation. We appreciate your hard work.

1 Thank you. 2 Dr. Johnston requested the floor. 3 DR. JOHNSTON: Oh, just a point of order. 4 question would be if a complaint were submitted, 5 Mr. Lindsey, who should it be submitted against? 6 MR. LINDSEY: To the respective counties 7 that are not in compliance? MS. MARKS: (inaudible) --8 9 MR. MASHBURN: Okay. 10 MR. LINDSEY: I'll leave it up to your 11 discretion. 12 MS. MARKS: Thank you. But you'll 13 understand --14 MR. LINDSEY: I do understand what you're 15 trying to do. 16 MS. MARKS: -- (inaudible). MR. LINDSEY: I understand. 17 18 MS. MARKS: Okay, thank you. 19 MR. MASHBURN: We appre --20 MS. DUFORT: (off mic) (inaudible) county 21 will be in front of you, saying, Here's the 22 procedure for (indiscernible). Here's the law. 23 You choose. So (inaudible) going to arrive at 24 the same point --

MR. LINDSEY: And I'm going to say follow

1 I'll tell you right now I'm going to the law. 2 tell them to follow the law. 3 MS. DUFORT: But --4 MR. LINDSEY: I do understand where you're 5 coming from. I'm going to tell them to follow 6 the law. 7 MS. DUFORT: (indiscernible). MR. LINDSEY: I hear you. 8 MS. DUFORT: (indiscernible) State Election 9 10 Board (indiscernible) state law. 11 MR. LINDSEY: I hear you. (inaudible). MR. MASHBURN: That completes all items on 12 13 the board's agenda for today. I'd like to thank 14 everyone's attendance -- thank everyone for their 15 attendance and their participation in the 16 important work of the board. 17 I thank the board members for all of their 18 hard work in preparing for these meetings. And 19 with that, I'll take a motion to adjourn. 20 MR. LINDSEY: So moved. 21 MR. MASHBURN: There's been a motion to 22 adjourn. 23 DR. JOHNSTON: Second. 24 MR. MASHBURN: Seconded. All those in 25 favor'll say aye.

1	THE BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.
2	MR. MASHBURN: Anybody risk to being
3	opposed? No one opposed. We are adjourned.
4	Thank you very much.
5	(Concluded at 11:42 a.m.)
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## CERTIFICATE

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I hereby certify that the foregoing meeting was taken down, and was reduced to typewriting under my direction; that the foregoing transcript, pages 3 through 112, is a true and correct record given to the best of my ability.

The above certification is expressly withdrawn upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing transcript, unless said disassembly or photocopying is done under the auspices of the undersigned and electronic signature is attached thereon.

I further certify that I am not a relative, employee, attorney, or counsel of any of the parties; nor am I financially interested in the action.

This, the 22nd day of January, 2024.

## \*\*Mary K McMahan\*\*

Mary K McMahan, CCR, CVR, RPR, FPR Certified Court Reporter Certificate Number 2757